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‘Quand tu veux construire un bateau, ne commence pas par rassembler du 
bois, couper des planches et distribuer du travail, mais réveille au sein des 
hommes le désir de la mer grande et large.’ 
 
[If you want to build a ship, don't drum up the men to gather wood, saw 
planks and divide the work. Instead, teach them to yearn for the vast and 
endless sea.] 
 
Antoine de Saint-Exupéry 
 
 
 
 
“Il semble que la perfection soit atteinte non quand il n'y a plus rien à 
ajouter, mais quand il n'y a plus rien à retrancher.” 
 
[Perfection is attained not when there is nothing more to add, but when 
there is nothing left to take away.] 
 
Antoine de Saint-Exupéry 
 
 
 
 
“Essentially, all models are wrong, but some are useful.” 
 
George E. P. Box 
 
 
 
 
“Life can be pulled by goals just as surely as it can be pushed by drives.” 
Viktor Frankl  
 V 
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Summary 
 
Worldwide, biodiversity keeps declining while many people, especially in rural 
and forest areas, still live in (extreme) poverty. The landscapes in this thesis 
concern sites of exceptional biodiversity, partially protected in national parks 
or reserves with the surrounding unprotected area housing people living in 
great poverty. Interventions in these landscapes often aim at conserving 
nature and/or lifting people out of poverty e.g. through integrated 
conservation and development projects (ICDPs). Booking progress on both 
conservation and development outcomes appears a great challenge and 
worldwide ICDPs have had scarce success.  
 
I hypothesise conservation and development interventions in the landscapes 
are obstructed by a limited understanding of complex systems’ behaviour 
and a failure to recognise trade-offs occurring between conservation and 
development outcomes. Without this understanding and trade-off 
recognition, conservation interventions can negatively influence development 
outcomes and vice versa, buffering each others effectiveness. I consequently 
hypothesise that to get best outcomes in the landscapes, stakeholders should 
exchange more, look beyond their discipline at the landscape system and 
formulate strategies together, combining top-down planning and bottom-up 
approaches, i.e. they should take a landscape approach. I propose 
participatory modelling as a tool to implement a landscape approach. 
 
Participatory modelling is the act of building a model with a group of non-
modellers under the guidance of a model expert facilitator. The modelling 
platform used here, is system dynamics using the icon-based interface 
software STELLA. The model building participants are stakeholders working in 
the landscape, often local decision makers, mainly government officials and 
personnel of conservation and development organisations. A model of the 
landscape is built with the participants capturing all socio-economic, 
ecological and political aspects which according to them are relevant to 
conservation and development. A set of plausible scenarios is jointly defined 
and its implications are explored with the landscape model. Conservation and 
development indicators are plotted on graphs allowing us to quantify trade-
offs between conservation and development outcomes under different 
scenarios. In this way, the model is used to test specific policies (e.g. 
implementing a REDD strategy), interventions (e.g. anti-poaching) or 
investments (e.g. in eco-tourism), and get an idea of their likely intended 
and unintended effects, and the scope of impact. Building the model together 
reveals how all elements in the landscape are connected. It encourages 
stakeholders to exchange knowledge and visions and make their assumptions 
explicit. In this thesis, participatory modelling is applied in a number of 
African and Asian conservation landscapes. The modelling outcomes for five 
of those landscapes are described in greater detail under the case studies 
section of this thesis.  
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Participatory modelling as a tool to promote a landscape approach is 
evaluated and a trade-off analysis between conservation and development 
outcomes in different landscapes is presented. 
 
Overall conclusions 
 
…concerning participatory modelling 
 
Overall, participatory modelling contributes to the implementation of a 
landscape approach. Participants confirmed cross-sector strategic thinking 
was stimulated by the modelling, and it helped to confront the real drivers of 
change and recognize trade-offs. The modelling was generally considered to 
be successful in building shared understanding of issues. This understanding 
was mainly gained in the discussions held in the process of building the 
model, rather than in the model outputs. Different stakeholders valued the 
modelling exercise differently. Noteworthy was the difference between 
scientists and stakeholders connected to the policy process; the first were 
most critical of participatory modelling and the presence of the latter in the 
modelling activities is key to achieving policy impacts. Problems emerged 
when models became too complex. Key lessons for participatory modelling 
are the need for good facilitation in order to maintain a balance between 
‘models as stories’ and technical modelling, and the importance of inviting 
the appropriate stakeholders to achieve impact.  
 
…concerning conservation and development 
 
The alleviation of poverty coincided in several scenarios with great 
biodiversity loss, while in others it gave best conservation outcomes. On the 
other side, in all cases sustained poverty resulted in unsustainable long-term 
pressure on the natural resources. In most cases trade-offs occur between 
conservation and development outcomes and are not easily overcome. Under 
none of the explored scenarios, payments for environmental services (PES) 
sufficed in cash terms to turn them into synergies. I therefore suggest PES 
can reinforce landscape decisions resulting in a ‘conservation scenario’ only 
when this is already supported by intrinsic motivation spawned by non-cash 
benefits. Conservation and development outcomes in landscapes can be 
determined by external factors, making local interventions obsolete.  
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Resumen 
 
En el mundo, la biodiversidad sigue disminuyendo mientras muchas 
personas, especialmente en zonas rurales y forestales, siguen viviendo en 
pobreza (extrema). Los paisajes analizados en esta tesis son zonas de gran 
diversidad biológica, parcialmente protegidas por parques nacionales o 
reservas, rodeadas por áreas no protegidas en las que habitan poblaciones 
en condiciones de grave pobreza. Las intervenciones en estos paisajes suelen 
tener el objetivo de conservar la naturaleza y/o disminuir la pobreza, por 
ejemplo a través de proyectos integrados de conservación y desarrollo 
(PICDs). La obtención de avances tanto en conservación como en desarrollo, 
parece constituir un gran reto y a nivel global los PICDs, hasta el momento, 
han tenido escaso éxito. 
 
En la tesis se plantea la hipótesis de que las intervenciones de conservación 
y desarrollo en los paisajes son dificultadas por una comprensión limitada del 
comportamiento de los sistemas complejos, así como por la falta de 
reconocimiento de los trade-offs (fenómenos por los cuales para ganar en 
unos aspectos se pierde en otros) que tienen lugar entre las consecuencias 
de la conservación y las del desarrollo. Sin esta comprensión y 
reconocimiento de los trade-offs, las intervenciones de conservación pueden 
impactar negativamente sobre el desarrollo y viceversa, disminuyendo así la 
efectividad de ambos. Como consecuencia planteo la hipótesis de que para 
obtener mejores resultados en el paisaje, los actores sociales deben 
intercambiar más, mirar al sistema desde una perspectiva más allá de su 
propia disciplina y formular estrategias conjuntas, combinando la 
planificación dirigida desde lo alto con enfoques de tipo abajo-arriba, es decir 
aplicando un enfoque de paisaje. Propongo la modelización participativa 
como herramienta para implementar el enfoque de paisaje. 
 
La modelización participativa es el acto de construir un modelo con un grupo 
de personas no expertas en modelización, bajo la orientación de un 
facilitador experto. La plataforma de modelización utilizada en esta tesis es la 
de las dinámicas de sistemas, utilizando el software STELLA con su interfaz 
de iconos. Los participantes en el proceso de construcción del modelo son 
actores sociales que actúan en el paisaje, a menudo tomadores de decisiones 
locales, que trabajan para el gobierno o para organizaciones de desarrollo o 
conservación. Los participantes construyen un modelo del paisaje incluyendo 
los aspectos socio-económicos, ecológicos y políticos, que consideran 
relevantes para la conservación y el desarrollo. Colectivamente se define un 
conjunto de escenarios plausibles y se exploran sus implicaciones en el 
modelo del paisaje. Indicadores de conservación y desarrollo son visualizados 
en gráficos, permitiendo la cuantificación de los trade-offs entre resultados 
de conservación y desarrollo bajo los distintos escenarios. De esta forma, se 
usa el modelo para evaluar políticas específicas (por ejemplo la 
implementación de una estrategia de REDD), intervenciones (por ejemplo la 
lucha contra la caza furtiva) o inversiones (por ejemplo en ecoturismo), y 
visualizar sus efectos deseados e imprevistos, así como el alcance del 
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impacto. La construcción colectiva del modelo revela cómo todos los 
elementos del paisaje están interconectados. Asimismo, este mecanismo 
fomenta el intercambio de conocimientos y visiones e incentiva a explicitar 
sus asunciones. En esta tesis, la modelización participativa se ha aplicado en 
varios paisajes africanos y asiáticos. En la sección correspondiente a los 
casos de estudio se discuten en mayor detalle los resultados de la 
modelización en cinco de estos paisajes. 
 
Se ha evaluado el uso de la modelización como herramienta para promover 
un enfoque de paisaje y se presenta un análisis de trade-offs entre 
conservación y desarrollo en los diferentes paisajes. 
 
Conclusiones generales 
 
…acerca de la modelización participativa 
 
Por lo general, la modelización participativa contribuye a la implementación 
de un enfoque de paisaje. Los participantes confirmaron que la modelización 
estimuló a pensar de forma estratégica y transdisciplinar. Asimismo ayudó a 
confrontar motores reales de cambio y reconocer trade-offs. En general la 
modelización fue considerada un éxito en la creación de una comprensión 
compartida de los problemas. Esta comprensión se obtuvo sobre todo 
durante el proceso de construcción del modelo más que por las simulaciones 
generadas. Diferentes actores valoraban de modo distinto el ejercicio de 
modelización. La diferencia entre científicos y actores sociales vinculados a la 
política fue especialmente notable. Mientras los primeros fueron los más 
críticos con la modelización participativa, la presencia de los últimos fue 
determinante para lograr acciones políticas concretas. Por otro lado, 
surgieron problemas cuando los modelos fueros demasiados complejos. 
Lecciones claves para la modelización participativa son la necesidad de una 
buena facilitación para mantener el equilibrio entre ‘modelos como historias’ 
y la modelización técnica, así como la importancia de invitar a los actores 
apropiados para lograr impacto. 
 
…acerca de la conservación y el desarrollo 
 
En varios escenarios, el alivio de la pobreza coincidió con grandes pérdidas 
de biodiversidad, mientras en otros se obtuvieron mejores resultados para la 
conservación. Por otro lado, en todos los casos la pobreza sostenida dio lugar 
a una presión insostenible a largo plazo sobre los recursos naturales. En la 
mayoría de los casos se dan trade-offs entre las consecuencias de la 
conservación y las del desarrollo, que no son fáciles de superar. Bajo ninguno 
de los escenarios explorados, los pagos por servicios ambientales (PSA) 
fueron suficientes en términos de efectivos monetarios para convertir los 
trade-offs en sinergias. Por esto propongo que los PSA pueden reforzar 
decisiones a nivel del paisaje resultando en ‘escenarios de conservación’ sólo 
cuando éstos ya están apoyados por motivaciones intrínsecas alimentadas 
por beneficios no monetarios. Por último, resultados de desarrollo y 
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conservación en paisajes pueden verse determinados por factores externos, 
dejando así obsoletas las intervenciones locales.  
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Chapter 1 shortly discusses global trends in biodiversity and poverty, 
followed by a historical overview of paradigm changes in conservation and 
the integration of development concerns in conservation approaches. It gives 
some hypotheses for the limited success in conservation and development 
interventions so far, and suggests that to reach best outcomes one should 
take a landscape approach: integrating top-down planning and bottom-up 
approaches, getting stakeholders to exchange and look beyond their 
discipline to the landscape system and formulate strategies together. A 
landscape approach can be implemented through participatory modelling with 
landscape stakeholders. A historical overview is given of system dynamics 
modelling and its applications, and a state-of-the-art of participatory 
modelling is provided. The challenge of mainstreaming conceptual changes 
with changes on the ground is briefly discussed. The advantages described in 
the participatory modelling literature clarify why participatory modelling is a 
good candidate to take up this challenge. 
 
 
Chapter 2 (Collier et al. under review) explores the use of system dynamics 
modelling to investigate trade-offs and synergies in conservation and 
development. The use of ‘scoping models’ is advocated because of their 
ability to incorporate complexity and promote social-learning in a 
participatory environment, whilst increasing the capacity of local actors to 
manage complex social-ecological systems. We demonstrate their positive 
role in facilitating change in three landscapes in the tropics, particularly for 
policy. 
 
 
Chapter 3 (Sandker et al. 2008) explains the concept of participatory 
modelling, and our position on the continuum from a predictive model to an 
explorative/scoping model helping shape plausible scenarios. The article sets 
out how multi-stakeholder platforms are perhaps ideal but not always 
feasible and when aiming to inform the decision making process one 
primarily works with decision makers, where in some landscapes like in East-
Kalimantan power is shared among few. This article is a response to Dudley 
et al. 2008 which again is a response to Chapter 6. 
 
 
Chapter 4 (Sandker et al. 2010a) reports on the spatial projection on maps 
of forest cover changes under different scenarios from participatory 
modelling. It combines the system dynamics software STELLA with the 
spatial simulation software GEOMOD (IDRISI) and reports on the advantages 
and shortcomings of this combination. The participatory model was built for 
Kaimana district, Papua, Indonesia, and explores environmental and social 
impacts of large scale plantation investments and payments for Reducing 
Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD). 
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Chapter 5 (Sandker et al. 2007) concerns a case study of participatory 
modelling used in East-Kalimantan, Indonesia. The model was built with 
district officials and explores scenarios of large scale plantation investments 
versus conservation. Impacts of the scenarios on the environment (mainly 
forest cover) and livelihoods (approximated by household income) are 
envisioned. The results show how such large scale investments would trigger 
massive immigration changing daily life in Malinau dramatically. It shows 
potential negative (long-term) impacts of such a development but also shows 
the enormous economic potential which might be appealing to local leaders 
with development aspirations. Ecotourism cannot provide economic 
incentives comparable to oil palm plantations, new mechanisms have to be 
put in place to provide more competitive alternatives like REDD payments. 
 
 
Chapter 6 (Sandker et al. 2009) concerns a case study of participatory 
modelling used in South-East Cameroon. The model was built with personnel 
from conservation NGOs, government officials, donors and development 
NGOs with the objective of formulating a strategy with best outcomes for 
conservation and development. The results reveal win-win situations are rare 
for conservation and development outcomes in tropical forest landscapes in 
Central Africa. In the South-East Cameroon landscape, initiatives holding the 
potential of creating these synergies are severely obstructed by the poor 
governance situation. 
 
 
Chapter 7 (Sandker et al. 2010b) concerns a case study of participatory 
modelling used in South-West Ghana. The model was built with the objective 
of exploring REDD strategies. The results suggest REDD payments would 
struggle to compete with forest conversion for cocoa production. In 
landscapes like the Ghanaian with high population pressure and highly 
lucrative cash crops a REDD payment scheme will likely result in money 
being spend without achieving long term emission reduction. 
 
 
Chapter 8 (Sandker et al. under review) concerns a case study of 
participatory modelling used in South-East Central African Republic. The 
model was built with personnel from conservation and development NGOs 
with the objective of exploring different management options for the 
landscape’s production forest and its implications on wildlife and local 
livelihoods. The resulting model revealed that economic investments in- and 
outside the landscape strongly determine conservation and development 
outcomes, more than conservation interventions. It also explored the 
scenario of turning the production forest into a conservation concession and 
concludes this doesn’t hold the potential of promoting either conservation or 
development given current investment levels. 
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Chapter 9 (Sandker et al. 2010c) evaluates participatory modelling as 
perceived by the model building participants. In specific it investigates 
whether participatory modelling helps to take a landscape approach and 
compares its application in six conservation landscapes in Africa and Asia to 
answer this question. The study gives an overview of the thresholds and 
advantages of participatory modelling, reports on some proven qualities of 
participatory modelling, and illustrates some cases of impact. The article 
touches on discrepancies between what projects claim to do and what they 
really do, e.g. an ICDP in Cameroon was doing ‘conservation and some 
development’ rather than integrating the concepts. The results suggest a 
distinct difference in view between scientists and policy makers concerning 
the methods usefulness, which might illustrate a disconnection between the 
two and explain in part why there is often little uptake of scientific model 
results by policy makers. 
 
 
Chapter 10 (Sandker et al. manuscript) compares the conservation and 
development outcomes under different scenarios in the five landscapes 
where participatory modelling took place. The study finds that development 
trajectories can either be at the cost of conservation or can benefit 
conservation, but in all cases sustained poverty negatively affects 
conservation in the long term. It quantifies trade-offs between conservation 
and development and finds that in cash terms all Reducing Emissions from 
Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD) implementation scenarios come 
at a cost for development and payments for environmental services (PES) 
are not sufficient to make up for lost opportunities to earn cash. However, 
environmental service benefits and subsistence income enhance the 
attractiveness of conservation scenarios to local people and PES may provide 
the extra cash incentive to tip the balance for such a scenario. The paper 
identifies interventions which hold a promise to improve both conservation 
and development outcomes. It also stresses the importance of external 
factors (like industrial investments and the development of the national 
economy) in largely determining landscape scale outcomes, and suggests a 
negotiating and visioning role for conservation agencies.   
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Participatory System Dynamics Modelling to understand 
Conservation and Development trade-offs in Tropical Forest 
Landscapes 
 
 
Following the definition of the FAO, 31% of the earth’s land surface is 
covered with forest, of which more than 10% is legally protected in national 
parks or reserves (FAO 2010). The last decade, an alarmingly high amount of 
around 13 million hectares of forest were replaced worldwide (FAO 2010). 
Optimists might proclaim global deforestation is declining but global 
biodiversity keeps declining without significant reduction of rates (Butchart et 
al. 2010). The stagnating forest loss is largely explained by increased 
reforestation, especially in Asia and Europe, consisting of a biodiversity-poor 
replacement of the species-rich natural forests. At the same time, there is 
great concern for the extinction of many animal species, disappearing as a 
consequence of human activities, especially in Central Africa. Some 
conservationists warn for ‘empty forests’ where impressive tropical trees 
remain while most of the larger fauna is depleted (Redford 1992). 
 
A more positive global trend is seen in poverty, which is declining at a fast 
pace. The percentage of people living in extreme economic poverty has 
halved between 1981 and 2005 (WB 2010). However, these global statistics 
mask great regional disparity; in sub-Saharan Africa the 50% poverty rate 
has remained roughly unchanged between 1981 and 2005. Furthermore, 
though the share of people living in extreme economic poverty worldwide has 
decreased, the absolute number has largely remained unchanged and the 
number of hungry people in the world is increasing sharply (FAO 2009). High 
poverty rates are concentrated in rural and forest areas (Sunderlin et al. 
2008).  
 
The landscapes in this thesis concern sites of exceptional biodiversity, often 
decreasing at a fast pace, which are partially protected in national parks or 
reserves. The areas surrounding the protected zones house people suffering 
high levels of poverty and relying largely on natural resources for their 
subsistence and income. Interventions often aim at conserving nature and/or 
lifting people out of poverty, e.g. in several of the landscapes integrated 
conservation and development projects are active. We define landscapes as: 
mosaics of landcover types providing environmental services and 
development opportunities for the multiple needs of diverse stakeholders. 
Conservation and development are strongly related in these landscapes and 
therefore a strategy to develop the local economy will affect conservation 
outcomes (e.g. through forest conversion) and a strategy to conserve natural 
resources will affect local livelihoods (e.g. through restricted access). 
 
This dissertation attempts to shed light on how conservation and 
development outcomes in tropical forest landscapes and interlinked and to 
identify strategies that can manipulate these outcomes into desired 
directions. The method used to understand conservation and development 
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interactions is participatory modelling (defined later on), using system 
dynamics as modelling platform. Models representing the conservation-
development interactions taking place in the landscape are built with actors 
implementing conservation and development interventions. Plausible future 
scenarios are explored with the landscape model, and the impacts of 
interventions and policies on conservation and development outcomes are 
tested. 
 
 
Conservation and development; a historical overview of paradigm 
shifts 
 
The roots of twentieth century conservation 
 
The first conservation efforts date back far over a thousand years ago, with 
areas being protected for spiritual reasons (sacred groves) and for hunting 
interests enforced by royal and other elites all over the world (Perlin 1989). 
Modern conservation starts with the endorsement of national parks, the first 
of which were established late nineteenth century in the United States. In the 
tropics the first national parks date back to the beginning of the twentieth 
century, starting with game parks in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(Albert National Park in 1925, later to be renamed Virunga National Park) 
and South Africa (Kruger National Park in 1926). They were typically 
implemented by colonial powers without taking into account local people 
using and living in these areas. These conservation efforts were based on the 
exclusion of people from protected areas and occasionally came at a high 
price for local people, being displaced to make way for national parks and 
losing access to natural resources (Cernea & Schmidt-Soltau 2006; Schmidt-
Soltau & Brockington 2007).  
 
Paradigm shift in natural resource management 
 
In the seventies there was a shift in the conception of how to manage natural 
resources largely triggered by the introduction of the concept called adaptive 
environmental management (Holling 1978; Walters 1986). Adaptive 
environmental management suggests a structured, iterative process to gain 
a better understanding of the systems’ functioning in the face of uncertainty, 
with the aim of optimizing decision making. It suggested moving away from 
single discipline interventions to a multi-disciplinary approach. Adaptive 
environmental management is characterized as ‘learning by doing’ and was 
meant to replace top-down or command-and-control natural resource 
management (Holling & Meffe 1996). Holling unified ecology with simulation 
modelling and policy analysis to develop integrative theories of change with 
practical utility.  
 
The approach integrating the various disciplines in natural resource 
management became widely known as integrated natural resource 
management (INRM). Sayer (2007) defines INRM as “a process of 
 3 
incorporating the multiple aspects of natural resource use (biophysical, socio-
political, or economic) into a system of sustainable management to meet 
production goals of producers and other direct users (e.g., food security, 
profitability, risk aversion) as well as goals of the wider community (e.g., 
poverty alleviation, welfare of future generations, environmental 
conservation).” This paradigm shift towards multi-disciplinary and cyclical as 
opposed to linear thinking resulted in the parallel emergence of a range of 
more or less similar concepts. Many of these concepts differ slightly in origin 
and philosophy, e.g. integrated water resource management (Calder 1999) 
was developed as a multi-disciplinary approach to manage water resources, 
sustainable forest management was developed by forestry professionals with 
a primary focus on production, and the ecosystem approach was proposed by 
a more heterogeneous group concerned primarily with conservation (Sayer et 
al. 2007).  
 
Including people in conservation 
 
Following the INRM philosophy, the conviction people that should be central 
in nature conservation emerged. A notion arose that the situation where rural 
poor are compelled to absorb the opportunity costs and suffer the restrictions 
from conservation was unfair and that this situation asked for a new 
approach to conservation which should end social conflicts resulting from 
protectionism (Sunderland et al. 2008). This new people-centred approach 
became functional with the introduction of integrated conservation and 
development projects (ICDPs) (Hughes & Flintan 2001). Despite practically 
no field testing, ICDPs were broadly adopted and generated enormous 
money flows because of the appealing combination of two major concerns, 
alleviating poverty while safeguarding biodiversity, and the promise of ‘win-
win’ solutions (Sunderland et al. 2008). It became a widely accepted 
approach in the eighties, with the launching of some ICDPs by the World 
Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), and the standard of aims of many international 
organizations in the nineties (Garnett et al. 2007) following the Caracas 
World Parks Congress in 1992. The paradigm shift in conservation toward 
more concern with local people was given an extra impulse by the 1987 
Brundtland report (Brundtland Comission 1987) stressing an overriding 
priority should be given to the world’s poor and by the Rio declaration from 
the 1992 Earth Summit which included a principle suggesting environmental 
issues are best handled with the participation of all citizens concerned. ICDPs 
embodied a promise of addressing these growing concerns with local people.   
 
The failure of ICDPs and polarized positions 
 
However promising the ICDP concept seemed, various studies reviewing their 
implementation on the ground revealed in most cases they have not 
prevented biodiversity from declining, and they didn’t do much to alleviate 
poverty either (Alpert 1996; Kremen et al. 1994; Wells et al. 1999) 
provoking the notion of ‘win-win illusions’ (Christensen 2004). Why ICDPs 
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didn’t live up to their promise has become subject to a polarized debate (see 
introduction Chapter 6).  
 
On one side you have those subscribing this failure to the ICDP concept being 
a contradiction in terms. They believe economic development inherently goes 
at the cost of nature conservation and therefore advocate the exclusion of 
local people from conservation efforts (so-called ‘fortress conservation’ or 
‘protectionist-approach’) (Loche & Dearden 2005; Oates 1999; Terborgh 
1999). According to Oates (1999) p189): “An emphasis on large projects, 
linking conservation with rural development and relying on large amounts of 
foreign money, leads to the neglect of relatively simple, low-cost, and more 
sustainable conservation solutions.”  
 
On the other side are those who believe goals of eradicating poverty, 
attaining food security, and conserving the environment are highly 
interdependent and that conservation efforts are doomed if they do not 
integrate local people and aim to enhance their livelihoods simultaneously 
(Martino 2005; McShane et al. 2004; Wilshusen et al. 2002). They believe it 
was not the concept of the ICDP being responsible for their failure, but rather 
conventional conservation programmes auto-proclaiming themselves as ICDP 
while their approach on the ground was still driven by conservation agendas 
with inequitable outcomes for local people (Chapin 2004; Malleson 2002). 
They blame a limited understanding of how conservation and development 
are interlinked and ICDP projects not recognizing the importance of external 
factors in determining conservation and development outcomes at the 
project scale (McShane et al. 2004). Authors on this side of the debate 
underline the unequal cost-benefit distribution, where benefits from 
conservation are captured at national and global levels but the costs are 
borne by (poor) local communities mainly through restrictions in access to 
natural resources (Balmford & Whitten 2003). Guha (1997) goes as far as 
describing protectionist conservation in the tropics as ‘anti-human neo-
colonialism’. 
 
Conservation concessions 
 
In 1992 Richard Rice of Conservation International came up with yet another 
concept seeking to reconcile resource protection with development in the 
form of conservation concessions (Hardner & Rice 2002; Rice 2003) (Chapter 
8 includes the conservation concession as one of the scenarios explored). 
Under this concept the resource owner is compensated for conserving the 
area. However, especially in Africa where most of the forest is state-owned 
this entails money flows to national governments leaving the local population 
largely uncompensated for lost access to natural resources and foregone 
income from jobs from other uses (e.g. logging, mining). Karsenty (2007) 
criticizes conservation concessions for their compensation being much lower 
than actual opportunity costs, for which reason they would obstruct 
development in locations of severe poverty. Rice proposed the idea of 
conservation concessions as an intermediate step for such an area to become 
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an officially protected area so even though the concern for development is 
raised, ultimately the concept is in line with fortress conservation. 
Furthermore, even without providing a full compensation of opportunity costs 
imposed by conservation, in Cameroon (The Economist 2008) and Peru 
(Hardner & Rice 2002) conservationists were unable to provide the funds to 
secure a conservation concession. 
 
Payments for Environmental Services 
 
Pagiola (2008) does report on poverty alleviation going alongside 
environmental protection in Costa Rica through successful implementation of 
payment for environmental services (PES) schemes. Wunder (2005) outlines 
how emerging scarcity of environmental services can make them subject to 
trade. Though Kremen et al. (2000) and Ferraro and Kiss (2002) made a 
notion of economic incentives and direct payments for conservation, Wunder 
(2005 p3) was the first to define PES as: “a voluntary transaction where a 
well-defined environmental service (or a land-use likely to secure that 
service) is being ‘bought’ by a (minimum one) buyer from a (minimum one) 
provider, if and only if the provider secures the environmental service 
provision (conditionality).” The concept holds (again) the promise to 
reconcile conservation with development, though some difficulties have been 
outlined. Sommerville et al. (2010), evaluating a PES scheme in Madagascar, 
mention poor governance as a major pitfall and individuals experiencing high 
opportunity costs losing under such a scheme. Wunder et al. (2008) describe 
how local Dayaks in Indonesia failed to auction off their forest to a set of 
international donors, where the donors were not attracted to ‘pay for doing 
nothing’. Börner et al. (2010), exploring potential carbon payments in Brazil, 
add unclear and insecure tenure over land or environmental services to the 
list of difficulties for PES implementation. And Fisher et al. (2010) evaluating 
PES in Tanzania bring up uncertainty around the causal link between the 
ecological functioning, services delivered, and land-use as a difficulty in 
establishing a PES scheme. E.g. even in the successful PES scheme 
mentioned by Pagiola (2008) the conditionality of PES actually being 
responsible for additional service gains couldn’t be confirmed. Chapters 4, 5 
and 7 discuss the potential of PES in the respective landscapes to reconcile 
conservation and development.  
 
Landscape approach 
 
The unsatisfactory success of ICDPs and the notion they are imposed by 
conservationists on the remaining stakeholders without involving them in the 
design of interventions resulted in the continued definition of more promising 
concepts. The ecosystem approach defined as “a strategy for the integrated 
management of land, water and living resources that promotes conservation 
and sustainable use in an equitable way” (CBD 2000) largely concurs with 
the ICDP concept adding that outcomes of conservation and development 
need to be equitable. The ecosystem approach was perceived by some to be 
too biophysical, lacking a reference to e.g. institutions, which is why shortly 
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after its definition, the term landscape approach was launched by WWF and 
IUCN (Bowling 2002; Sayer 2009). In reality the two approaches are not 
really different though. The landscape approach is a framework for taking 
landscape level-decisions and seeks to integrate top-down planning and 
bottom-up approaches. Key in a landscape approach is to get all different 
stakeholders in the landscape to exchange, to look beyond their discipline to 
the landscape system and formulate strategies together. Chapter 9 evaluates 
whether participatory modelling attributes in taking a landscape approach. 
 
 
System dynamics modelling to understand conservation and 
development interactions 
 
The historical overview given of conservation and development illustrates 
how challenging it has been and still is to reform conservation approaches on 
the ground in accordance with the conceptual changes in natural resource 
management over the past decades. The importance of integrating disciplines 
and of cyclical top-down and bottom-up information flows in decision making 
was already outlined in the 70ies and yet we are still continuously defining 
new approaches to successfully implement this concept on the ground. 
Though often proclaimed differently in project descriptions, on the ground 
projects are often still accused of being top-down (Holling & Meffe 1996) and 
mainly single-discipline conservation biology driven (Chapin 2004). This 
apparent challenge of synchronizing conceptual changes in how natural 
resources should be managed with actual changes in management is 
probably related to the complexity project leaders are faced with on the 
ground. Landscapes are highly complex systems with many non-linearities, 
delayed responses and uncertainties. In fact, the failure in reconciling 
conservation and development goals is attributed by some to the failure of 
conservation biologists to fully understand dynamics and relationships in 
complex landscapes and recognize trade-offs occurring between conservation 
and development (Malleson 2002; Salafsky & Wollenberg 2000). On a similar 
note, Agrawal and Redford (2006) analysing 37 peer-reviewed writings on 
the poverty-biodiversity link, found that 34 out of 37 reviewed studies gave 
“drastic simplifications of the complex concepts of poverty and biodiversity 
and focused on processes and outcomes in a single case and single time 
period without taking into account the relations between outcomes and 
contextual features of programmatic interventions” (pii). 
 
Sterman (2000 p´preface’), a leading figure in system dynamics, comments: 
“Effective decision-making and learning in a world of growing dynamic 
complexity requires us to become systems thinkers–to expand the 
boundaries of our mental models and develop tools to understand how the 
structure of complex systems creates their behavior.” We hypothesise the 
use of participatory system dynamics modelling will increase understanding 
of complex landscapes, enable the quantification of trade-offs occurring 
between conservation and development and stimulate discussion between 
stakeholders with different, often conflicting, objectives. This in turn will 
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promote the negotiation of a joint strategy with best possible outcomes for 
conservation and development.  
 
 
System dynamics; a brief history 
  
“System dynamics is an approach to understanding the behaviour of complex 
systems over time. … What makes using system dynamics different from 
other approaches to studying complex systems is the use of feedback loops 
and stocks and flows. These elements help describe how even seemingly 
simple systems display baffling nonlinearity.” (Wikipedia 2009) 
 
As this definition suggests, the system dynamics approach discarded linear 
thinking to embrace closed-loop or iterative thinking in science that supports 
decision making. Iteration is the act of repeating a process, where the result 
from one iteration is used as a starting point for the next. It refers to a 
cyclical, not a linear process. The change from linear thinking to an iterative 
mental model in research planning was introduced shortly before system 
dynamics was developed with the concept of action research launched in 
1944 by Kurt Lewin. He defined action research as “comparative research on 
the conditions and effects of various forms of social action and research 
leading to social action” that uses “a spiral of steps, each of which is 
composed of a circle of planning, action, and fact-finding about the result of 
the action” (Lewin 1946). Another important conceptual change, which might 
have helped to set the scene for system dynamics, came with the 
introduction of systems theory. This trans-disciplinary approach sees a 
system as a compilation of a set of independent but interacting parts. It was 
developed by Ludwig von Bertalanffy and others just before the 1950s. 
 
System dynamics was first developed by Jay Forrester during the 1950s at 
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). Forrester previously worked 
as an engineer involved in the creation of an aircraft flight simulator for 
military purposes and the testing of computerized combat information 
systems before being appointed to manage a laboratory at MIT. This 
experience made him conclude that the largest impediment to progress 
comes from the management side of understanding social systems rather 
than the engineering side of understanding physical processes (Radzicki 
1997). Forrester believed social systems contain many feedback loops and 
for understanding these systems’ behaviour one has to abandon linear 
thinking. Discussions with managers of General Electric puzzled by a three-
year employment cycle lead him to do his first hand simulations including 
existing hiring and lay-off decision making structures. Forrester was able to 
show the cycle was due to the internal structure of the firm and not to an 
external force such as the business cycle (Radzicki 1997). He named these 
simulations to understand corporate issues ‘Industrial Dynamics’ (Forrester 
1958, 1961). He soon needed a computerized approach to realize these 
complex simulations. The first computer based modelling language was 
created in 1958 by Richard Bennett and named SIMPLE (Simulation of 
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Industrial Management Problems with Lots of Equations). Immediately after, 
in 1959, an improved version of SIMPLE called DYNAMO (DYNAmic MOdels) 
was launched by Phyllis Fox and Alexander Pugh which became the standard 
modelling language for the following three decades.  
 
From the late 50s to the late 60s, system dynamics was mainly applied to 
managerial problems in the industrial sector. Its application was broadened 
to the urban sector in 1968 following the appointment of John Collins, the 
former mayor of Boston, as visiting professor of Urban Affairs at Forrester’s 
institute. With their offices neighbouring, the two men exchanged in daily 
discussions resulting in problems in cities being studied with system 
dynamics, published in ‘Urban Dynamics’ (Forrester 1969). In 1970, Jay 
Forrester was invited by the Club of Rome to a meeting in Bern, Switzerland. 
He was asked to create a model exploring future problems of a growing world 
population’s demand on the earth’s carrying capacity. This resulted in a 
model for the world linking model sectors ‘world population’, ‘industrial 
production’, ‘pollution’, ‘resources’, and ‘food’. He published his findings in 
‘World dynamics’ (Forrester 1971) but continued work on this by his PhD 
student became better know as ‘The limits to growth’ (Meadows et al. 1972). 
 
From the seventies till this moment, important publications in the field of 
system dynamics encompass Roberts (1978), Randers (1980), Senge 
(1990), Ford (1999), Sterman (2000) and Morecroft (2007). Costanza et al. 
(1993) linked the natural and socioeconomic system in a system dynamics 
model. In 1985 High Performance Systems (now ISEE systems) developed 
STELLA; an icon based modelling software, being highly user-friendly and 
making system dynamics available to a broader public. This is the model-
building platform used in this thesis. Similar modelling software are VENSIM 
(developed by Ventana Systems), POWERSIM and SIMILE (developed by 
Simulistics).  
 
 
Scenario planning; how it evolved 
 
Scenario planning was developed simultaneously in the United States and 
France in the 1950s and 1960s. Herman Kahn working for the US Military 
came up with a range of stories of the future based on different key 
assumptions to formulate strategies (Kahn & Wiener 1969) while Gaston 
Berger working for a French research centre invented future scenarios to help 
formulate public policy (Berger 1964). In the 1970s the method was adopted 
by some private companies, notably General Electrics and Royal Dutch Shell.  
 
Shell greatly benefited from the planning method which helped them to 
forecast the beginning of the energy crisis in 1973 and the shock in oil prices, 
which had been stable since World War II. Being prepared for this, they 
advanced from one of the weakest of the seven largest global oil companies 
to one of the two largest (Schwartz 1991). As the methodology was further 
developed by Shell, the first objective of scenario planning became “the 
 9 
generation of projects and decisions that are more robust under a variety of 
alternative futures” (Van der Heijden 1996) p17). Scenario planning became 
all about collective learning, reframing perceptions, analyzing causal 
relationships, envisioning multiple features influencing the future and dealing 
with uncertainty. Peterson et al. (2003) emphasize scenario planning to be 
specifically appropriate for systems where there is a lot of uncertainty that is 
not controllable, where they propose other methods if a system doesn’t 
display this specific combination.  
 
Another major advance in the use of scenario planning came with the 
launching of the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA) in 2001, called for 
by the United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan in 2000. It rose out of a 
demand from both scientists and policy makers and had the objective “to 
assess the consequences of ecosystem change for human well-being and the 
scientific basis for action needed to enhance the conservation and sustainable 
use of those systems and their contribution to human well-being” (MA 2005).  
Raskin et al. (2005 p36) define scenarios as “plausible, challenging, and 
relevant stories about how the future might unfold, which can be told in both 
words and numbers.” The storytelling in words refers to qualitative narrative, 
while storytelling in numbers refers to quantitative modelling. The history 
sketched so far concerns qualitative scenario building. The first global 
scenarios from quantitative modelling were the earlier mentioned limits-to-
growth scenarios forecasting a collapse in natural resources with increasing 
demands from a growing population (Forrester 1971; Meadows et al. 1972). 
Kahn et al. (1967) challenged the limits-to-growth perceptions and sketched 
more optimistic future scenarios with increasing economic growth and 
wellbeing for all, assuming current problems of over-demand from a growing 
population and pollution will either soon solve themselves or have “rather 
straightforward and practical solutions” (Kahn et al. 1967 p20). 
 
 
Models in policy making 
 
System dynamics and scenario planning are used with the ultimate goal of 
informing the decision-making process and to formulate more effective and 
robust policies. Though logical reasoning suggests modelling and scenario 
planning provide information and improve understanding of system’s 
functioning, and better information leads to better decisions, actual uses of 
models in policy making have fallen short of expectations (Meadows & 
Robinson 1985; Vennix 1996).  
 
Disconnection between scientists and policy makers 
 
King & Kraemer (1993) mention it are especially ‘scientific’ models (read 
predictive models) being disconnected from the policy making process. The 
lack of uptake of results from ‘scientific’ models by policy makers according 
to them relates to the policy process going further into the social realm 
where “the word ‘science’ is something of a euphemism” (King & Kraemer 
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1993 p357). On a similar note Kraemer and King (1986 p501) state “‘Pure’ 
approaches to modeling require formal expression and rigor in every aspect 
of model building. The models that result are so abstract and removed from 
the realities of fuzzy political problems that they are almost certain to fail as 
tools for public policy-making.” Both papers report on the unwillingness of 
scientists to deal with uncertainties leading to the creation of highly correct 
and highly useless models. Chapter 9 reports further on different perceptions 
of scientists and policy makers. 
 
Action doesn’t follow logically from a ‘good’ model 
 
However, even in Shell’s earlier mentioned success story, policy uptake didn’t 
follow directly from scenario planning which didn’t avoid uncertainty or stop 
when the problem moved further into the ‘social realm’. When Pierre Wack 
presented the different scenarios to Shell’s directors he made it very clear 
that the Arabs could demand higher prices for their oil and there was all 
reason to believe they would, the only unknown being when. The directors 
understood the implications, realised they might have to change their 
business drastically but didn’t do anything until the scenario actually came 
true. When Pierre saw his outlined scenarios didn’t result in direct change in 
the company’s policy, he realized that to be truly effective, scenarios had to 
“change our manager’s view of reality” (Schwartz 1991 p8). Schwartz (1991 
p9) mentions the comparative advantage of Shell was them being 
‘emotionally prepared’ for the change and therefore responding quickly, not 
them having altered their way of doing business beforehand. This implies 
that apparently, though the managers hadn’t changed their way of working 
before the price shock, something did change in their minds or mental 
models that gave them a comparative advantage when dealing with the 
crisis.  
 
Conceptual insights gained from modelling 
 
Meadows and Robinson (1985) analysing the practise and impact of 
computer models as applied to policy, found most insights gained from 
models are conceptual rather than instrumental. However Pala and Vennix 
(2005) and Vosniadou (1994) report that changing conceptual mind models 
through system dynamics shouldn’t be taken for granted. Pala and Vennix 
studied whether system dynamics improved task performance of students 
and discuss the possibility their students only “enrich (i.e. add information to 
existing conceptual structures) their ideas rather than revising (i.e. changing 
their beliefs or presuppositions) them” (p 169). So, models hold the potential 
of changing the way people think about a system or problem but it is a 
challenge to modellers to actually realize this conceptual change. Achieving 
conceptual change in people’s minds, as the Shell example taught us, can 
have major impacts on the ground. 
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How to assure action follows 
 
In accordance with the Shell experience Vennix et al. (1996) argue the real 
challenge is not identifying the best strategic decisions or robust policy, but 
getting managers (or other stakeholders) to back it up. To get managers (or 
policy makers or other model clients) to take the next step of actually using 
newly gained information and perceptions in their business or policy 
formulation, they propose the creation of a ‘platform for change’. This 
platform for change implies the encouragement of team learning, the 
fostering of consensus, and the creation of commitment to the resulting 
decision especially when divergent opinions are involved (Vennix et al. 
1996). Such a platform for change could be created by involving the client in 
the model building process as is done in participatory modelling. Another 
strong motivation for doing participatory modelling to increase impact on 
policy formulation is given by Greenberger et al. (1976 p321) who found 
“most insights of models exploring policy effectiveness are gained during the 
model building process rather than after.” Similar conclusions from 
systematic research on models in policy making are that the way a structure 
is used is more critical than the nature of the structure (Den Butter & Morgan 
2000) and the desire of politicians to use model-generated information to be 
more important than the means to do modelling (Kraemer & King 1986). 
 
 
Participatory modelling, a state-of-the-art 
 
Definition and origins 
 
There are quite a number of synonyms which all refer to a more or less 
similar approach: group model building (Andersen & Richardson 1997; Stave 
2002; Vennix 1996), mediated modelling (Van den Belt 2004; Videira et al. 
2006), cooperative modelling (Cockerill et al. 2006), companion modelling 
(Barreteau et al. 2003; Bousquet et al. 2007) and participatory modelling 
(Beall 2007; Standa-Gunda et al. 2003). In the remainder of this article we 
will use participatory modelling to refer to any of the approaches mentioned 
above. We define participatory modelling as: the act of building a model with 
a group of non-modeller ‘clients’ under the guidance of a model expert 
facilitator. Standa-Gunda et al. (2003) describe participatory modelling as a 
process through which members of a community identify a problem, collect 
and analyze data, and act upon the problem to find solutions and to promote 
social and political transformations in which a model is the medium for 
representing and communicating ideas. It is said that participatory modelling 
and modelling for learning was shaped by Donella Meadows and Jennifer 
Robinson’s book ‘The electronic oracle: Computer models and social 
decisions’ (1985). The book investigates the impact of computer models as 
applied to social policy and stresses the importance of exposing hidden 
assumptions and biases to make them discussable which would happen if all 
stakeholders involved have a full comprehension of the model.  
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Different modelling platforms 
 
Different modelling platforms have been used in participatory modelling. The 
author found cases where agent based modelling, Bayesian networks, fuzzy 
cognitive mapping, geographical information systems (GIS) and system 
dynamics modelling is used in participatory modelling. Agent based 
modelling, also referred to as multi-agent simulations, usually comprise 
spatial models. The models run simulations in which autonomous agents act 
and interact determining the behaviour of the whole system. Their actions 
may change as a result of events and interactions and simple rules may 
result in complex dynamics. Examples of participatory agent based modelling 
are Becu et al. (2008) and Bousquet and Le Page (2004). A Bayesian or 
belief network is a probabilistic static representation of conditional 
interdependencies between input variable states and the states of variables 
of interest. It is an accumulation of logical, intuitively easy conditional 
relations and can answer questions like ‘what is the probability of Y 
happening given X has happened?’. Lynam et al. (2002) and Mendoza and 
Prabhu (2006) evaluate their use in participatory modelling. Fuzzy cognitive 
mapping is a way to represent complex decision problems composed of 
interrelated dynamic entities within which the relationships between these 
entities can be used to approximate the strength of impact of these entities. 
The complex entities are represented as nodes and the causal links are 
represented by arrows with the direction of the arrow representing the 
direction of influence. An example of it’s use in forest management is given 
by Mendoza and Prabhu (2006). GIS is any system that presents data that 
are linked to location. Examples of participatory modelling or participatory 
mapping using GIS as platform are Castella et al. (2005), Brown and Reed 
(2009) and Robiglio et al. (2003).  
 
The most frequently used platform in participatory modelling is system 
dynamics modelling (see earlier paragraph for definition and background). 
Participatory system dynamics modelling has been used in a wide variety of 
situations: 
• In formulating business strategies (Akkermans & Vennix 1997; Vennix 
1996) 
• To improve understanding of oil market behaviour (Morecroft & Van 
der Heijden 1992) 
• To explore air quality problems in the city (Stave 2002) 
• To increase profit and reduce risk in agricultural production systems 
(Meinke et al. 2001) 
• In community based watershed planning (Cockerill et al. 2006; Tidwell 
et al. 2004) and river basin planning and management (Videira et al. 
2009) 
• To formulate water management strategies taking into account 
expected climate change effects on future water supplies (Langsdale et 
al. 2005) 
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• As negotiation and consensus building tool in coastal management, 
including model-sectors like tourism and pollution (Van den Belt et al. 
1998) 
• To explore policy impacts in the fishing industry (Otto & Struben 2004)  
• To ensure the protection of endangered species in land-use planning 
(Beall & Zeoli 2008) 
• To support environmental decision making (Cockerill et al. 2007; Van 
den Belt 2004; Videira et al. 2003) 
• To promote multi-stakeholder involvement in public decision making 
(Van den Belt et al. 2010) 
• To explore adaptation strategies to macro-economic changes for rural 
communities in woodland areas (Standa-Gunda et al. 2003) 
• In community based forest management (Kassa et al. 2009; Suwarno 
et al. 2009) 
• To explore the effect of policies and interventions on conservation and 
development outcomes in tropical forest landscapes and negotiate a 
commonly accepted strategy (this thesis) 
 
Complex versus scoping models 
 
Some modellers try to capture the underlying system as accurate as they can 
in an attempt to avoid uncertainty. The resulting models are very detailed 
and highly complex. Hisschemöller et al. (2001) note such a model is not 
necessarily as accurate as needed, particularly not for complex 
environmental issues on large spatial and temporal scales. Another downside 
of such complexity is that it is quite incompatible with participation thus 
leading to a lack of understanding of the internal model structure and a lack 
of trust in its outcomes. Such models have their value, especially when its 
aim doesn’t include those of participatory modelling like increased 
understanding and consensus building, but the models build in this thesis do 
not belong to this category and are better described as ‘scoping models’ 
(Costanza & Ruth 1998).  
 
Importance of stakeholder involvement in model building process 
 
Beall (2007) and Beall and Ford (2007) describe how participatory modelling 
often occurs at changing positions on what they call the ‘hands-on 
continuum’. On the one side of this continuum, models are built by experts 
using input from participants and perhaps reporting back the simulation 
outcomes, while on the other side of the continuum, software is used at 
workshops to assist with problem mapping. As suggested by Beall our 
positioning changes, but in general we locate ourselves more on the latter 
side of the continuum, where participants build model-sectors largely on their 
own later to integrate the sectors revealing linkages in the landscape system. 
Beall (2007) claims advantages of this side of the continuum to be that 
participants will trust the model more and get a better understanding of non-
linear system thinking. The process of building a model helps participants see 
important causal relationships in complex systems. On a similar note, Vennix 
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(1996) reports on the importance of involving clients in the model building 
process to increase their sense of ownership of the model without which the 
model results are not likely to be used. Policy makers are unlikely to trust a 
model they don’t understand, which is quite likely to happen if they have not 
been involved in its building (SME 2010). As described earlier, building a 
‘good’ model doesn’t necessarily result in uptake in the decision making 
process of its results but involvement in the model building process does 
increase its probability. Akkermans and Vennix (1997) evaluated six case 
studies using participatory modelling and found that five of those cases were 
successful in creating insight and building consensus and commitment. 
 
Participatory modelling as negotiation tool 
 
Several authors have used participatory modelling as a negotiation tool to 
build consensus among a range of stakeholders with different interests 
(Cockerill et al. 2006; Costanza & Ruth 1998; Van den Belt 2004) this 
thesis). Participatory modelling can help to gain a shared vision among 
stakeholders and according to Costanza (2000) a shared vision is key to 
change in the desired direction. Features of participatory modelling which 
make them particularly suitable as consensus building tool are that 
assumptions have to be made explicit and knowledge from a range of 
stakeholders is solicited increasing exchange and common understanding 
(Costanza & Ruth 1998). Videira et al. (2006 p9) describe ‘shared language’, 
‘openness’, ‘team learning’ and ‘knowledge integration’ as features proven to 
be promoted by participatory modelling. 
 
 
Objectives of this thesis 
 
The objectives of using participatory modelling in this thesis go further than 
creating better understanding only. We use participatory modelling to let 
stakeholders step away from their disciplinary paradigm to take a more 
overall systems view. This should foster understanding of different viewpoint 
and objectives. The modelling enables the quantification of trade-offs 
occurring between conservation and development and promotes exchange 
and collaboration between different stakeholders. The ultimate goal of the 
modelling is to create consensus among stakeholders with diverging and 
often conflicting interests and define a commonly accepted strategy to 
achieve satisfactory outcomes for all. Participatory modelling helps to get a 
grip on complex systems and understand its behaviour; it promotes a multi-
disciplinary approach, reveals how conservation and development are 
interlinked and stimulates strategic thinking. The concepts of multi-
disciplinarity, integrated conservation and development and strategic 
thinking are not new in the area of biodiversity conservation, but they have 
been notoriously difficult to integrate in our way of managing natural 
resources on the ground. We believe participatory modelling is one efficient 
tool, in a large toolbox of different approaches, which can help to implement 
a landscape approach.  
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ABSTRACT 
Addressing the all too familiar conflict between biodiversity conservation and 
enhanced human well-being is a complex exercise that attempts to fuse 
social, economic, cultural and biophysical perspectives. In most instances, a 
balance between conservation and development is sought whereby 
biodiversity is conserved and people’s livelihoods improve. However, most 
attempts fail because they don’t address system complexity, assume “win-
win” situations, fail to plan for the impacts of society-wide changes 
happening beyond the project landscapes, and use top-down approaches. In 
this paper we explore the use of participatory system dynamics modelling to 
implement a ‘landscape approach’. We advocate the use of ‘scoping models’ 
because of their ability to incorporate complexity and promote social-learning 
in a participatory environment, whilst increasing the capacity of local actors 
to manage complex social-ecological systems. We demonstrate their positive 
role in facilitating change in three landscapes in the tropics, particularly for 
policy making.  
 
Keywords: participatory modelling, social-ecological systems, livelihoods, 
tropical forests, landscape. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Over the last few decades, conservation and development agencies have 
adopted an approach which seeks to integrate the aims of biodiversity 
conservation while enhancing human well-being through economic 
development – so called integrated conservation and development projects 
(ICDPs) (Alpert 1996; Wells 2004; Wells & McShane 2004). This approach 
has become more popular as agencies and governments recognise that 
poverty and biodiversity conservation are highly interrelated in conservation 
landscapes and so need to be addressed simultaneously. Rarely however, has 
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this approach been successfully demonstrated to achieve the implied parallel 
aims of biodiversity conservation and improved livelihoods (Kremen et al. 
1994; Wells et al. 1999). Key issues reported to attribute to the failings of 
ICDPs are (1) using a ‘top-down’ approach during conceptualisation and 
implementation (Chapin 2004), (2) failing to recognise that trade-offs occur 
between conservation and development (Barrett & Arcess 1995; Young et al. 
2006), (3) failing to understand complex social-ecological systems behaviour 
(Sayer & Campbell 2004; Sayer et al. 2007) and (4) ignoring society-wide 
changes occurring beyond the borders of the landscape of interest (e.g. 
fluctuating global markets, new infrastructure projects) (McShane & Wells 
2004). In addition, sets of measurable indicators of system performance are 
rarely employed by ICDPs to assess their functionality (Sayer et al. 2007). 
 
The term ICDP has given way to the term ‘landscape approach’, the latter 
responding to the key issues identified to have attributed to ICDPs failings as 
reported above. That is, the landscape approach emphasises combining top-
down planning with bottom-up approaches, identifying trade-offs, making 
stakeholders look beyond their discipline at the system’s functioning and 
recognising society-wide trends as drivers of landscape change (Sayer 2007). 
 
So the question that remains is ‘how to implement a landscape approach?’ 
Social-ecological systems are highly complex, with many feedback loops 
created by the interactions that occur between the social and biophysical 
spheres (Ostrom & Nagendra 2006; Liu et al. 2007). Increasing the level of 
understanding of complex systems often involves creating models that 
attempt to describe the behaviour of variables in response to one, or many 
factors (Low et al. 1999). Though highly complex models can produce 
interesting outcomes, Greenberger et al. (1976) concludes most of the 
insights are gained during the model building process, rather then after. We 
therefore propose participatory modelling, i.e. building a system dynamics 
model of the landscape with conservation and development actors, to 
contribute to the implementation of a landscape approach. Such participatory 
models have been characterised as ‘throw-away models’ (Sayer & Campbell 
2004) or ‘scoping models’ (Van den Belt 2004). Though these models are 
rarely thrown away, the first term seeks to emphasize that the model in itself 
is not the goal; the objective is social learning through stakeholder 
interaction which takes place during the model building process. The second 
term, ‘scoping models’, refers to the roughness of the simulation outputs. 
First of all, this roughness is due to the models drawing on expert knowledge 
and estimates in case data is lacking (and data is always incomplete in these 
types of landscapes). Second, to be built and understood by a non-model 
expert public, the models need to compromise on complexity to gain on 
continuous stakeholder input and validation. The models thus include only 
those variables and relations which are thought crucial to outcomes, which is 
why the model is scoping or exploring rather than predicting the future. 
Precise predictions are practically impossible in social-ecological systems 
(Peterson et al. 2003), but we can gain understanding of major trends and 
driving factors of change in the landscape. Exploring plausible scenarios can 
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improve communication between different stakeholders and the model can 
be used to test the effectiveness of different policies or interventions. The 
simulations can help to understand how conservation and development 
outcomes influence each other, quantify trade-offs occurring and give insight 
on how external factors influence the landscape (chapter 8). We thus 
advocate the use of scoping models to contribute to taking a landscape 
approach because of their ability to incorporate complexity and promote 
social learning, whilst increasing the capacity of local players to plan for and 
manage complex social-ecological systems. 
 
In this paper, we describe the participatory process of developing scoping 
models to understand complex social-ecological systems, and how to use 
them for planning and managing landscapes, particularly in the tropical 
regions of the world where there is rapid change (Kassa et al. 2009). We 
demonstrate their role in promoting social learning, which includes increasing 
understanding of social-ecological systems by stakeholders, and in facilitating 
change in three landscapes in the tropics. We also discuss potential problems 
and pitfalls of the approach, again referring to the case studies as illustration. 
 
Scoping models and social-ecological systems 
 
Our definition of a scoping model encompasses quantitative system dynamics 
models of social-ecological systems that are conceptualised through 
stakeholder participation (i.e. participatory modelling) and built using easily 
understood computer software. All case studies used Stella (HPS 1996) as 
model building platform.  
 
Scoping models as platform for debate 
 
In social settings, where there is a cost or benefit associated with a particular 
set of scenarios, human emotions can have a significant influence on an 
individual’s decision about the allocation of shared resources (Sanfey 2003; 
Xio & Houser 2005; Koenigs & Tranel 2007). This is particularly evident when 
there is a real or perceived unfairness or inequity in the outcomes. A strong 
attribute of scoping models is their ability to expose the range of likely 
outcomes associated with different scenarios and to reduce the ability of 
some actors to advocate a position that is unfair or that disadvantages 
others. In other words, building scoping models, using a participatory 
approach, may provide a more balanced forum in which to debate the merits 
of future courses of action and negotiate desired outcomes for all (Van den 
Belt 2004; Cockerill et al. 2006). At the same time, the model gives a range 
of expected impacts, making one realize at some times win-win solutions are 
extremely rare (e.g. chapter 6), changing the focus of negotiations towards 
winning more and losing less.  
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Figure 1.  Process diagram for using participatory systems modeling in 
landscape approaches.  
 
 
Scoping models influencing policy making 
 
Scoping models can meld outputs from more complex models (e.g. 
population dynamics, hydrologic models, sediment transport) into one easily 
manipulated model with which stakeholders can interact. Complex predictive 
models can be highly informative for many purposes – for example they have 
provided insights into the setting of priorities for conservation of plant and 
animal species, conservation spending and protected areas management 
(Mills et al. 1999; McMahon & Burton 2005; Bradshaw et al. 2007). However, 
they are not driven by participatory processes and generally do not allow 
easy stakeholder interaction with them: in some cases they may have user-
friendly interfaces but the model generally remains a black box to 
stakeholders. At many scales (local, regional, and national), the delivery and 
uptake of recommendations stemming from such complex models can be 
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stifled because of their complexity since policy makers are likely to distrust a 
model they don’t understand (SME 2010).  
 
 
Figure 2. Conceptual diagram of a systems model built using scientific 
data and stakeholder knowledge. 
 
 
The process of building a scoping model 
 
Building scoping models in conservation and development contexts is carried 
out at the landscape level and involves local players throughout the process. 
The process is carried out in many steps divided in three stages (Fig. 1). The 
process begins with stakeholder engagement: attracting the critical local 
people, organizations, government officials and experts that can help with 
model building and are likely to be the actors with key information and 
making decisions. The second stage involves the collective identification of 
problems the landscape faces, which local interventions often are aiming to 
overcome. In this phase, we apply historical trends analyses and visioning 
techniques used in social science research (Sayer et al. 2007). Understanding 
past trends helps to understand system behaviour and identify drivers of 
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change. This is succeeded with the joint definition of visions of system 
futures, i.e. scenarios, and finishes with creating futures narratives. The third 
stage focuses on modelling: building, testing, and refining the model. An 
initial model is built in this stage, involving high level participation from the 
stakeholders to establish a qualitative system design. The purpose of this 
process is to establish the key relationships and interactions within the 
system and in doing so help to clarify the nature of the issue(s) of concern 
for the local players, scientists and practitioners. Expert opinion is used 
where information is insufficient (Fig. 1 & 2). Data availability from disparate 
research disciplines is scoped and fed into the model transferring from a 
qualitative to a quantitative model. Best bets in terms of assumptions, initial 
parameter settings, and frameworks can be identified and discussed. The 
scenarios defined earlier are now explored using the model which allows us 
to understand conservation and development trade-offs occurring under the 
different scenarios, and to test the scope of impact of specific interventions 
or policies. A quantitative assessment of the various scenarios envisaged by 
the stakeholders can be performed and critically discussed (Fig. 3). This is by 
no means the end of the process – the modelling is iterative and dynamic 
and the model can be refined through discussions and consensus among 
stakeholders.  Ideally, lessons learned from modelling are then used in 
landscape planning and decision making. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Schematic representation of the visualization of different scenarios 
explored with the model. 
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Prerequisites for building a scoping model  
 
Excellent facilitation is required to translate the system complexity into a 
simplified framework, and to narrow down to one or a few fundamental 
problems that become the focus of the modelling. The model should not aim 
at being all-inclusive but be designed to capture key processes of interest 
within the system. Using participatory modelling with a group of stakeholders 
may require 5-20 days of model building but this figure would depend largely 
on the availability of data and the time stakeholders can invest. The model 
sectors, major relations in the model and indicators of outcomes of interest 
are defined with the group, after which often some technical ‘fixing’ of parts 
of the model may be done by the modelling expert in absence of the 
participants. Following this, changes are communicated to participants and 
they continue to alter the model. The outcomes of a 5-20 day model building 
session include (1) clarification and a common understanding of the problems 
in the system, (2) exchange between stakeholders with different objectives 
and points of view (3) comprehension of relationships between the systems 
variables (4) increased understanding of trends and their underlying causes 
and (5) increased understanding of the system by stakeholders and (6) 
awareness of their capacities to intervene in the system.  
 
Modelling in practice 
 
Indonesian forests and oil palm 
 
The oil palm industry is a major driver of deforestation in Indonesia. It is not 
uncommon that companies acquire permits to clear land for oil palm 
production but instead cut the forest for timber without actually planting any 
oil palm (Wakker 2006). At the same time, the oil palm industry has 
contributed to economic growth and poverty alleviation (Susila 2004) 
although there are also people whose living conditions have worsened due to 
oil palm development. In Malinau district, government officials were 
discussing the possibility of 0.5-1 million ha of oil palm along the border with 
Malaysia to bring employment to the district and increase local revenues. At 
the same time, they declared that conserving forests is a priority of the 
district because of the heavy dependence by local people on forests for 
maintaining their livelihoods.  
 
In a recent exploration of this conflicting and highly emotive dilemma, 
Sandker et al. (chapter 5) built scoping models with district officials to 
explore the two main issues in dispute: the development of the Indonesian 
economy and the conservation of primary forest ecosystems. The simulation 
outcomes were discussed with the head of district. The simulations of larger 
scale oil palm development demonstrated that significant improvements in 
household income could be attained by some; that others were likely to be 
negatively impacted; while a significant forest area would remain in the 
district. Such large-scale oil palm development would drive significant 
immigration that could change the entire socio-political make-up in the 
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district. The discussion the modelling generated and the output of the 
modelling stimulated constructive thinking and debate. In particular, district 
officials were extremely nervous about potentially high immigration rates and 
discussed alternatives to oil palm development such as payments for 
environmental services related to carbon. At the same time, it became clear 
that ecotourism, which was presented as a prime activity to integrate 
conservation and development outcomes, was unlikely to do much for the 
local economy and as such wouldn’t satisfy development aspirations the way 
oil palm investments could. The potential benefits of carbon payments were 
much larger. The modelling raised the district head’s interest in carbon 
payments and he has now accepted an offer from international donors to 
preserve forest carbon instead of clearing forest for timber and oil palm 
plantations. 
 
Governance and anti-poaching in the Congo Basin 
 
African tropical forests are centres of high biodiversity with megafauna such 
as elephants (Loxodonta cyclotis: Matschie) and lowland gorillas (Gorilla 
gorilla gorilla: Matschie). They also support vast numbers of indigenous 
people that rely on natural resources to sustain their livelihoods. A tropical 
forest landscape in South East Cameroon forms an example of this situation. 
 
In a case study that addressed the dual conservation and development goals 
described above, Sandker et al. (chapter 6) built a scoping model of this 
landscape with personnel of a conservation organization, development 
agencies, government officials and donors, to examine how conservation and 
livelihoods interact. The widespread views and beliefs of conservation 
stakeholders were that poaching of animals was the most pressing factor for 
conservation and as such conservation non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) allocated a considerable budget to anti-poaching programmes with 
the assumption that these measures would provide best conservation 
outcomes. The study examined three scenarios that explored changes to 
ICDP budget allocations: (1) spend 85% of the entire budget on anti-
poaching (as occurs currently), (2) re-allocate 20% of the budget from anti-
poaching to improving governance of natural resource taxes to be used for 
local development, and (3) re-allocate 20% of the budget from anti-poaching 
to direct investment in local development. The simulations revealed that 
continued investment in anti-poaching measures would likely have good 
conservation outcomes contingent upon continued funding levels, if funding 
is reduced then conservation benefits are eroded quickly. Yet there would be 
very little local development under this scenario. Alternatively, governance 
reform at the district level (reduced corruption of forest concession taxes) 
would likely have almost as good conservation outcomes on the long term 
(i.e. reduced poaching) and may also improve livelihoods through increased 
household income. Direct investment in local development by the 
conservation NGO at the cost of anti-poaching gave poor outcomes for 
conservation, and hardly any improvement of local development. The 
modelling process initiated in this landscape stimulated much debate among 
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the local and national actors (parliamentarians, donors, NGOs) on the 
obstructions imposed by poor governance. Subsequently, the mayor 
siphoning off tax-money destined for local development lost the election to 
an opposition candidate that was advocating better governance as his 
election platform. The modelling stimulated local officials and NGO project 
managers to consider whether the project really integrated conservation and 
development or was mainly about conservation outcomes. Furthermore, it 
brought to question the sustainability of current interventions. 
 
Community forest management in Ethiopia 
 
The Chilimo forest is a dry Afromontane forest located in the central plateau 
of Ethiopia approximately 100 km from the capital, Addis Ababa. In 1991, 
state control over the forest was weakened and there was significant 
deforestation in the subsequent period: the forest once covered 
approximately 22,000 ha but has now been reduced to approximately 6,000 
ha. Approximately 3,000 households are present within, and immediately 
surrounding, the borders of the forest many of which rely on the forest to 
maintain their livelihood.  
 
Scoping models were built to explore the trade-offs between biodiversity 
conservation and improvement of local livelihoods (Kassa et al. 2009). The 
model was built with a group of researchers and simulation outcomes were 
discussed with policy makers at central government level. One scenario that 
was explored in the modelling process was that of joint management of 
Chilimo forest by the local Ethiopian authorities and the community. In this 
scenario the local community would be active in decision-making and other 
on-ground management tasks related to the forest. This scenario was 
modelled against the ‘business as usual’ scenario where forest management 
was retained by the authorities. The modelling showed that on the long term, 
household income levels were higher under the joint management regime 
compared to the status quo (Fig. 4). Although total household income 
decreases over time under both management structures, after approximately 
seven years, participatory forest management results in higher household 
incomes for the remainder of the projection. The simulation demonstrated to 
the stakeholders that the pay-off from participatory forest management is 
likely to take some time to eventuate. The legitimacy of some simulation 
outcomes was questioned; farmers disputed income from joint forest 
management to be lower on the short term. Discussing this further lead to 
the insight that many of those short term benefits modelled were likely 
captured by some elites, so most of the households would not capture the 
benefits simulated under state control (Fig 4). The modelling process and the 
simulations generated were used to engage government officials and other 
stakeholders in the management issues of the forest and to stimulate policy 
and legislation changes to improve the governance and management of state 
forests. This resulted in the approval of a law facilitating joint forest 
management (Kassa et al. 2009). 
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Figure 4. A thirty year projection produced by the scoping model featuring 
estimated average household income (cash + subsistence) for local people 
who use Chilimo forest, Ethiopia 
 
 
DISCUSSION  
 
Precipitating change 
 
By influencing the decision making process scoping models can result in 
impact. In Malinau carbon payment agreements have been signed. Such 
measures will also produce significant biodiversity conservation outcomes for 
the region (Strassburg et al. 2010). In Cameroon, the corrupt mayor ended 
in jail leaving the promise of improved governance with royalties being 
invested in development of the region. In Chilimo, the modelling precipitated 
change in the national legislation that resulted in greater community control 
over the forest (Kassa et al. 2009). These impacts appear to be largely due 
to the stakeholder group involved in the model building process, consisting of 
people with close connections to policy makers and thus creating an effective 
mechanism for change (chapter 9).  
 
The results furthermore show that building scoping models can influence 
established mindsets. In the Cameroon landscape, investment in anti-
poaching was perceived initially to be the best method of large mammal 
conservation. This was re-examined from the perspective of broader 
governance structures and alternative scenarios that brought better 
outcomes for people and nature. The ICDP personnel realized their 
interventions were largely biased on conservation, and they were doing little 
for development. They also realised anti-poaching was largely a holding 
operation. Corruption was identified as a major constraint in achieving both 
conservation and development. The severe corruption in Cameroon at most 
levels of society (Accessed March 2010 http://www.transparency.org/) 
present substantial barriers to conservation and development outcomes for 
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the landscape. Scoping models in this situation stress the importance of 
improved governance, which can be advocated by civil society organisations, 
international donors and conservation and development agencies (Sayer 
2009). In Ethiopia, the modelling made farmers realise that income per 
household would considerably decline unless they start to strategically plan 
for the future and identify other income generating opportunities.These 
examples demonstrate the utility of scoping models to promote social 
learning; increase local understanding of the political and natural landscape; 
provide a forum for debate; and change perceptions.  
 
We cannot claim that the successes documented here are due entirely to the 
participatory modelling process – it undoubtedly stems from a synergy 
between participatory processes per se and the construction of an interactive 
computer model. Building participatory scoping models is an engaging 
method that can conceptualize, and visualise social-ecological systems. 
Scoping models have a specific role to play in a much longer process of 
adaptive management of landscapes undergoing transformation (Holling 
2001; Sayer et al. 2008). 
 
Stakeholder involvement 
 
An increasing level of importance is being placed on stakeholder involvement 
in natural resource management (Pound et al. 2003). The selection of which 
stakeholders to include in participatory modelling is highly context specific. 
An ideal modelling process would somehow incorporate all views. However, 
there are practical limitations to the number of stakeholders involved in the 
model building. Stakeholder representation and participation is cited as one 
of the most important, but not easily resolved, problems of participatory 
modelling approaches in natural resource management (Hare et al. 2003). In 
building scoping models, like with most participatory processes, we must find 
the ideal number of stakeholders with the right skills, opinions, views and 
ability to influence in order to capture the context of landscape and produce 
a model with utility. As stated earlier, for the model to achieve impact it is 
critical that the stakeholders who are engaged in participatory processes are, 
or can influence agents of change in the landscape. Furthermore, to inform 
the decision making process we need people with crucial knowledge and 
visions.  
 
In Cameroon, local communities and especially Baka pygmies are often 
illiterate. It would be inappropriate to confront them with models and 
simulation graphs, rather other approaches can be used to include their 
vision on the future like rich pictures and participatory mapping (Sayer et al. 
2007). In the Malinau district, extreme power inequalities exist 
(Boedhihartono et al. 2007). Decision-making on natural resource 
management and development issues is almost entirely under the control of 
government. As a consequence, the modelling was conducted with a small 
range of stakeholders, limited to experts and government officials. Like with 
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most participatory processes, some stakeholders will be excluded from the 
modelling, by accident or purposefully.  
 
Weaknesses of scoping models 
 
Scoping models, like all models and participatory processes, have 
weaknesses that must be highlighted. Despite the user-friendliness of the 
system dynamics software Stella used in the examined cases, complexity is 
still identified by the participants as the largest impidiment in building 
scoping models (chapter 9). The case studies also illustrate that building 
scoping models excludes some stakeholders and is mainly a tool for 
stakeholders with decision making power. Certain features or details are not 
captured with the scoping models; the Malinau modelling for example has 
been criticised for not including soft variables like conflict (Dudley et al. 
2007). We believe that this is not a shortcoming of scoping models but of 
models in general, since a similar criticism holds for numerical or predictive 
models (Brook et al. 2002; Caswell 2001). The Ethiopian farmers raised the 
hidden detail of benefits captured by elites and such income differentiation 
not being captured by the projection of average household income. Thus the 
Chilimo model outcomes could be improved, but the insight is already gained 
through the discussion the modelling generated. We suggest a different 
forum, supplementary to the modelling, to discuss issues like the probability 
of arising conflicts, to include visions of stakeholders excluded from the 
modelling and to capture a higher level of detail. Modelling should be seen as 
one tool in a larger toolbox of approaches to contribute to landscape planning 
and decision making. 
 
Overall reflexion 
 
In this paper we have: advocated for the use of scoping models in 
conservation and development landscapes; explored their workings and 
utility in modelling complex social-ecological systems; presented three 
diverse cases studies to illustrate the approach.  
 
As with all participatory processes the number of participants is limited for 
various reasons such as complexity, logistics and the purpose of the 
modelling. Facilitation is crucial to overcome problems with complexity, while 
selecting stakeholders connected to the decision making process is crucial for 
the modelling to result in impact. 
 
The three case studies show that trade-offs occur between conservation and 
development outcomes which were visualized with the scoping models and 
discussed with the stakeholders. In all three of the case studies building 
scoping models with local stakeholders influenced decision making in some 
form either at the landscape level (e.g. Malinau district signing for carbon 
payments) or beyond (e.g. the incorporation of joint forest management in a 
new law decree in Ethiopia). Scoping models can make a strong contribution 
to the formulation of scenarios for landscapes, be it navigating the trade-offs 
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in conservation and development or testing the effectiveness of different 
management approaches. Significant changes in stakeholder understanding 
and perceptions of the social-ecological systems were achieved in the three 
case studies, and as such building scoping models contributed to the 
implementation of a landscape approach. These types of changes are needed 
if we are to achieve landscape management that embraces a form of 
sustainable development that improves peoples’ lives while remaining 
focussed on biodiversity conservation.  
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Response to Dudley et al. 2008. “Simulating Oil Palm Expansion Requires Credible Approaches that
Address Real Issues”
What Are Participatory Scoping Models?
Marieke Sandker 1, Bruce Campbell 1, and Aritta Suwarno 1
THE ELEMENTS OF A PARTICIPATORY
SCOPING MODEL
At the heart of our disagreement with Dudley et al.
(2008) is what constitutes participatory modeling.
For us, participatory modeling can be defined by a
number of elements, including types of stakeholders
engaged, and degree of engagement with those
stakeholders. Another element of disagreement
probably centers on the continuum from models as
predictive tools to model as tools to explore
scenarios. Part of the disagreement is tied up in
different approaches to “soft” variables.
TYPES OF STAKEHOLDERS ENGAGED
Dudley et al. (2008) raise questions as to exactly
what stakeholders were involved in developing the
model and how their needs and concerns have been
incorporated. Sandker et al. (2007) are very clear
that the participatory modeling was conducted with
officials from different government agencies.
Although in an ideal situation it would be
appropriate to work with many other stakeholder
groups as well, in Malinau this was not the aim.
Earlier work by Edmunds and Wollenberg (2001)
and later descriptions of activities in Malinau
(Wollenberg et al. 2007) indicate the difficulty of
multi-stakeholder platforms, and indeed warn
against such platforms in situations in which power
inequalities are extreme, as in Malinau. There is the
additional problem that simulation models can be
extremely complex and are perhaps not most suited
for engagement with communities in which even
computers are rare (Neil Collier, personal
communication, for work in aboriginal communities);
though the innovative work on combining role plays
and models is illustrative, e.g., Lynam et al. (2002).
For these reasons, we opted to work with
government officials, some of whom were
advocating for oil palm and other investments. The
model was built with them as well as with experts
who gave inputs into the different domains covered
by the model. We hoped that by exploring the pros
and cons with the officials, better decision making
would take place.
DEGREE OF ENGAGEMENT
The meaning of participation can range from almost
complete outside control with token involvement of
the local people, to a form of collective action in
which local people set and implement their own
agenda in the absence of outside initiators and
facilitators (Carter 1996, Nemarundwe and
Richards 2002). The range of steps is: passive
participation, cooperation, consultation, collaboration,
and collective action. The ideal in many
circumstances is collective action. We wanted to go
as far as possible to that ideal.
It is apparently quite common to talk of participatory
modeling but then to build models so complex that
they are black boxes to participants and take so long
to produce that the interest of some participants and
stakeholders have long waned. For example, van
Ittersum et al. (2008) also talk about participatory
modeling but in the context of exceptionally
detailed models, which can only be built by outside
experts. Such models have their place, but we prefer
the use of rapidly built models that can be used
almost immediately to provoke discussion on
topical issues. And we aim for our stakeholders to
participate in the model building. In the context of
Malinau this included some individuals spending
time learning to undertake the modeling. There are
pros and cons to such an approach; it does empower
stakeholders to use the tool and understand many of
1Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR)
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the domains inside the model, but on the other hand
the degree of complexity and sophistication in the
model is limited. We see the trade-offs but definitely
opt for simpler models with more engaged
participants.
Simplification
Dudley et al. (2008) query some of the model
assumptions. Many things could be modeled, and
some were, but within the confines of simplification
and a short paper only a few things could be touched
on by Sandker et al. (2007). In this reply, we look
at three aspects that Dudley et al. (2008) raise:
migration, deforestation, and negative impacts on
local people.
Dudley et al. (2008) query the migration
assumptions, and raise an interesting question as to
whether as land is converted to oil palm, will local
people who were formerly dependent on that land
for subsistence, be more likely, over time, to find
and accept work in plantations or processing
factories? The focus of some of the key decision
makers has been, and largely continues to be,
development at almost any cost. Large-scale
plantation development is a real interest. If that goes
ahead, there are insufficient people in the district to
provide the necessary labor, and, in any case locals
are the ones least likely to secure jobs in such
development (see also Potter 2004, Boedhihartono
et al. 2007). In the model, migration is driven by the
new jobs created. In the short term development will
mean more immigration. The threshold for migrants
to leave if employment drops is set high because we
believe a large number of migrants will stay.
Lowering the threshold, with migrants leaving
already when employment drops below 60%, for
example, would make practically no difference in
the first 20 yr of the simulation, and after 40 yr the
number of migrants will be 60 times the number at
the start instead of 80 times, both equally large
numbers. One can dispute whether the exact levels
of immigration modeled are too high or too low, but
the fact is that the installation of large-scale
plantations will boost immigration (Benoit et al.
1989). Dudley et al. (2008) make a valid point that
the migration consequences expected from money
inflows from payments for environmental service
(PES) should also be discussed with the decision
makers, though the scale of immigration would be
much smaller than with large scale plantations.
Another concern raised by Dudley et al. (2008) is
that deforestation might be much higher than
modeled. We did model a negative feedback in the
plantation scenario through an increase in
agriculture outside the plantations, leading to an
additional 300,000 to 550,000 ha of primary forest
loss besides the forest lost for oil palm clearing. We
agree that there is a possibility that more forest could
be lost than modeled, especially if large-scale fires
would occur. However, since the remaining forest
is located on steep slopes and harder to access, it is
perhaps less likely to be converted.
Dudley et al. (2008) mention concerns of advocacy
groups about the negative impacts of oil palm on
local people, and query why we did not consider
these. In the referee process of earlier drafts of the
paper we were asked not to use the results from
certain advocacy groups, as there was a disbelief in
their veracity. It is clear there is limited data
available on the local impacts of oil palm
development, but there are now quite a few research
projects that will provide this data in years to come
(John McCarthy, personal communication, Patrice
Levang, personal communication, Lisa Curran,
personal communication).
Including soft variables
Dudley et al. (2008) state that we should go beyond
simple scenarios and that we should include
components such as likelihood of ethnic strife and
level of local peoples involvement, as encouraged
by writers such as Sterman (1991). One aim of
participation is consensus as to what should be in
the model. We have often tried to introduce soft
system variables into models, and the earliest
versions of the Malinau model had such variables,
e.g., strength of village level institutions. But during
model development they were weeded out. In other,
very different, contexts we have also found
stakeholders unhappy to include soft variables. In
Central Africa when dealing with nongovernment
(NGO) officials, they were highly skeptical of
including soft variables such as international
commitment to biodiversity and degree of good
governance in the landscape. They argued that such
variables were not measurable, and that they would
not believe the model outcomes if they were
included in the model. They were not arguing that
such variables were not important. They preferred
examining the implications of such variables in
different scenarios, e.g., model runs under poor
Ecology and Society 13(1): r2
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governance/high corruption vs. model runs with
good governance. Thus, the soft variables were not
dynamic variables but rather distinct scenarios.
MODELS AS TOOLS FOR EXPLORING
AND DISCUSSING SCENARIOS
We are not in the business of predictive modeling;
given some of the technical points raised by Dudley
et al. (2008), we query whether they have moved
very far along the continuum of models as predictive
tools to modes as tools for exploring and discussing
scenarios. We come close to what van den Belt
(2004) refers to as a scoping model. In such a model,
a group of stakeholders interactively scope out a
complex problem. The model serves to increase
understanding but does not attempt to make
predictions. This is illustrated in our earlier work
with van den Belt (2004), in which a forest
landscape in southern Zimbabwe was examined for
its multiple goods and services, which were the
interest of different stakeholders (Campbell et al.
2000). Scenarios that were explored included
changing the rules related to landscape use, and what
this meant for local livelihoods and for the forest
industry.
The Malinau model served its purpose: provoking
some useful debate amongst the real decision
makers in the area. The technical points raised by
Dudley et al. (2008) on time spans and soft variables
are largely irrelevant to the intended purpose.
Examining longer time periods
Dudley et al. (2008) call for examining the model
over a longer period, given that plantations are
involved and given that a so-called simple test of
model validity is to run the model for a longer
period. We disagree. Our stakeholders were local
officials whose time horizon is closer to 3 yr than
the 100 yr that Dudley et al. (2008) call for. Even
our selected 40 yr time frame is pushing what is
relevant to the local stakeholders in terms of the
decisions they are making each year. We did not
build the model for 100 yr, and if we did we would
have had to include extra elements, e.g., limits to
agricultural expansion. To illustrate this point, we
made the changes requested by Dudley et al. (2008)
for land area. However, it made no difference to the
model outcomes that we displayed in the paper (see
re-posted model http://www.cifor.cgiar.org/conserv
ation/_ref/research/research.2.5.htm).
Soft variables
We return to soft variables. Dudley et al. (2008)
would prefer that such variables be imbedded in the
model: “Although the authors report that local
leaders are concerned about immigration, this
concern is .... (not) imbedded in the model.” We
assume that Dudley et al. (2008) would prefer that
a variable “concern about immigration” be
imbedded in the model and changes decision-maker
policies that influence immigration. We do not see
this as useful for our purpose. We are talking to
decision makers and running scenarios using
outcome variables that are important to them. It is
not useful to try and have a model sector that
incorporates their decision-making process in the
model. It is more useful to run scenarios that show
different immigration levels based on different
assumptions, and then the decision makers can use
the model results as one element in their real-life
decision-making process.
CONCLUSION
The model is merely a case of: if x, y, and z is
assumed then this is what will occur. If, through
engagement with stakeholders, concerns are raised
and decision makers think more deeply about
different options for the future, then the purpose of
the modeling will have been achieved. Although it
would have been ideal to perform a similar exercise
with other Malinau stakeholders, especially local
communities, this was not part of the original
agenda. Participatory modeling, especially the type
that deeply involves the stakeholders, is
challenging. We note the recent steps taken by the
Malinau district down the conservation and carbon
pathway, e.g., http://regserver.unfccc.int/seors/file_
storage/cwjg41fo28xz50m.pdf) and hope that
participatory scoping models have a role to play in
examining future scenarios.
Responses to this article can be read online at:
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol13/iss1/resp2/responses/
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ABSTRACT 
This paper reports on combining the system dynamics software STELLA with 
the spatial simulation software GEOMOD (IDRISI) in order to visualize 
simulated forest cover changes produced by STELLA on maps. A socio-
ecological model has been built in STELLA for Kaimana district including 
spatial and many non-spatial components. The model is built in a 
participatory manner with district officials and non-governmental 
organization personnel. We used it to explore environmental and social 
impacts of large scale plantation investments or payments for Reducing 
Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD). We focused on 
the socio-economic consequences district level decisions would have for local 
livelihoods. The simulated outcomes are fed into a strategic discussion 
aiming to better inform the decision making process in Kaimana. We report 
on advantages and shortcomings of combining the two simulation programs 
and give an overview of the conservation and development outcomes under 
each of the scenarios explored for the Kaimana district. 
 
Keywords: Landscape modelling, Participatory modelling, System dynamics, 
STELLA, GEOMOD, IDRISI, REDD, Kaimana. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Participatory modelling is the act of building a model with a group of non-
modellers under the guidance of a model expert facilitator (Van den Belt et 
al. 2006). In various landscapes this method has been applied in order to 
exchange knowledge between different stakeholders, increase understanding 
of landscape dynamics, explore scenarios, visualize trade-offs between 
conservation and development outcomes and create a shared vision to 
achieve change in the desired direction (Beall & Zeoli 2008; Sandker et al. 
2009; Sandker et al. 2010). This form of modelling seeks to envision 
alternative futures rather than extrapolate past trends (e.g. Sandker et al. 
2007), a key criticism of Costanza (2000) on current futures modelling 
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practices. Participatory modelling seeks to balance simplicity with accuracy: 
the model doesn’t give new insights if it is either too simple or too complex 
(Sandker et al. 2010). A constraint of the system dynamics software STELLA, 
used to build the participatory models in the mentioned studies of Sandker et 
al., is that it’s not spatially explicit (even though it simulates land-cover 
change). Simulation outcomes are therefore presented in graphs or tables, 
not in the form of maps. Maps and spatial representations are strong tools to 
envision and discuss preferred future landscape scenarios (Costanza & 
Voinov 2004), which is why we explore the presentation of participatory 
STELLA modelling land-use simulation results as maps in a simple way. 
 
Spatial models are often highly complex, limiting participation of non-
modellers and demanding a large amount of time investment in its creation. 
Many (spatial) model projections of future (land-cover) changes focus on 
extrapolating past trends (Costanza 2000), which might give accurate 
predictions of land-use changes in many developed country landscapes but 
wouldn’t do so in the situation of many forest landscapes in developing 
countries at the verge of transition. Sayer (2007) claims changes in 
landscapes are generally not orderly or predictable, something which 
stakeholders with landscape scale objectives should take into account. 
 
Examples exist of future projections obtained in a participatory way but 
producing purely spatial simulation outcomes (Castella et al. 2005; Hulse et 
al. 2004; Nelson et al. 2009). An advantage of participatory system 
dynamics modelling over spatial modelling is the simulation of many non-
spatial elements fundamental to understanding outcomes in a landscape, like 
household income and even less tangible features like corruption (e.g. 
Sandker et al. 2009). This allows participatory modelling to extend deeper 
into the socio-political context of decision making. 
 
A spatial dimension is added to system dynamics modelling in the software 
SIMILE (Muetzelfeldt & Massheder 2003), though this seems to be either 
simple, for theoretical learning of a single feature displayed on square plots, 
or highly complex and time consuming thus allowing little participation (Legg 
2003; Vanclay et al. 2003). Costanza & Maxwell (1991) combined STELLA 
system dynamics modelling with Geographic Information Systems (GIS), 
each stock in STELLA representing one grid cell on the map. This forms the 
basis of an integrated environment for high performance spatial modelling 
called SME (Spatial Modeling Environment) (Costanza & Voinov 2004). This 
again is highly complex and time consuming, e.g. to run the model eight 
parallel processors were needed. Furthermore, extensive information is 
needed to feed into the model. One would have to question whether the 
spatial representation of the explored scenarios would be worth the large 
time investment and whether we have enough spatial data for such a model 
to make sense. We opted to explore a much simpler and faster visual 
representation of the scenarios by combining the model platforms STELLA 
and GEOMOD (IDRISI).  
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We explore the spatial presentation of STELLA land-use simulation results for 
the district Kaimana in Papua, Indonesia. Papua is a location where the 
future will most likely bring radical changes, nothing like the landscape has 
experienced in the last decades, and visioning future land-cover changes in 
this situation is all but an extrapolation of past forest conversion trends. The 
local policy makers are faced with options which would have major 
consequences for (the spatial aspect of) the landscape. With participatory 
modelling we explored the consequences of major oil palm investments and 
payments for Reducing Emissions from Forest Degradation and Deforestation 
(REDD) and their consequences for forest dependant livelihoods and forest 
cover in Kaimana, Papua. 
 
 
METHODS 
 
Kaimana district, livelihoods and land-use history 
 
The Kaimana district is located in Papua (Figure 1), East-Indonesia, sharing a 
border to the East with Papua New Guinea. Kaimana district extends over 
17,298 km2, and is sparsely populated (2.4 people/km2) with a high 
concentration of people (50% of the total population) in and around the 
 
 
Figure 1. Forest cover of Kaimana district in 2005 
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district capital Kaimana Town. There are few roads in the district and the 
main transport means for the rural population consists of canoes, using the 
vast river network or the sea. Almost all villages are located on the river 
shores. The local rural population is largely dependant on the forest, followed 
by small scale agriculture and fishing (Table 1). They use the forest for 
hunting, to collect non-timber forest products (NTFPs) and some villages are 
involved in community logging. All villages have forest gardens (often 
abandoned agriculture plots) where they grow certain NTFPs like nutmeg 
(Shepherd 2009). Forest re-growth on the agricultural plots is very important 
to restore soil fertility in the absence of fertilizers and plots are only 
productive for about two years (Shepherd 2009). We use mean subsistence 
and cash income of the local rural population as indicators of the 
consequences of a REDD policy or oil palm investments in the district on 
forest dependant livelihoods. 
 
Kaimana district is currently for ~95% covered with forest (Table 1). There 
are currently six logging concessions with a license. The logging activities 
result in the conversion of primary into secondary forest, not in forest 
clearing. We consider primary logged-over forest as secondary forest.  
 
 
Table 1. The model sectors with a summary of the information in each 
sector 
Model 
sector 
Information Source 
Total district area Kaimana= 17,298 km2 
(100%) 
Administrative classification (indicating use 
destination): 
Other land uses (APL)= 900 km2 (5%) 
Conversion forest (HPK)= 2,844  km2 (16%) 
Production forest (HP)= 3,106 km2 (18%) 
Limited production forest (HPT)= 5,120 km2 
(30%) 
Protected area = 5,273 km2 (30%) 
Unclasified = 55 km2 (<1%) 
Forestry Master 
Plan, 2008 
Land-use 
Total districts’ secondary forest in 2010= 
~4,050km2 
Total districts’ primary forest in 2010= ~12,398 
km2 
Actual deforested area= ~850 km2 
Forestry Master 
Plan, 2008 ; 
compared with data 
Kelompok 
Pemangku Hutan 
Papua Barat 
Kaimana 
APL forest conversion for small scale 
agriculture= current area + new local 
households (hh)*1ha + number of unemployed 
migrants hh*1ha 
After 2 years agriculture land becomes fallow 
After 5 years fallow land becomes secondary 
forest 
Expert estimation 
in line with historic 
deforestation trend 
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Forestry Master 
Plan 2008 
Total industrial timber production Kaimana 
district = ~640,000 m3/year 
Timber extraction= 32 m3/ha 
Annual conversion of primary to secondary 
forest= ~200km2 
Expert estimation 
based on historic 
data 
Parts of APL, HPK, HP and HPT are converted to 
oil palm and HTI depending on the scenario, 
part of APL is converted to forest garden  
See scenario 
description 
Total population Kaimana district 2008= 41,660 
people 
Kaimana Statistics 
Centre 2008 
Population 
and 
employment 49% of the population is urban (of which 55% is 
local, the rest migrant) 
51% of the population is rural (of which 90% is 
local, the rest migrant) 
Combination of 
expert estimate 
and Kaimana 
Statistics Centre 
2008 
Birth rate= 1-4% (lowest for urban migrant 
population, highest for rural local population) 
Death rate= 1% 
Immigration rate= 2% (of migrant population) 
Extrapolation of 
population growth 
2007 – 2008 from 
Kaimana Statistics 
Centre 2008, 
modified with 
expert judgment  
Immigration provoked by jobs= new jobs to 
migrants*1.5 
New jobs= new jobs in IPK, oil palm and HTI 
Of new jobs, only 5% can go to local population 
Maximum jobs local population= %age people of 
working age and gender * %age skilled local 
working age people * total local population 
%age people of working age and gender= 20% 
%age skilled local working age people=  
20% now and increasing to 80% in 20 years 
from now (scenario 1) 
20% now and increasing to 50% in 20 years 
from now (scenario 2) 
10% now and increasing to 30% in 20 years 
from now (scenario 3) 
Expert estimates 
Average annual salary (future) jobs = 10 million 
Rp (local) and 12 million Rp (migrant) 
Jobs in land clearing (IPK) = 0.48 worker/ha 
Jobs in oil palm (Sawit), acacia plantation (HTI) 
and logging (HPH)= 0.2 worker/ha 
Approximations 
based on practices 
in North Sumatera 
and Jambi, 
modified with 
expert judgment 
Rural local 
household 
income 
Total mean income per capita= 4 million Rp in 
2009 
Rp = Indonesian Rupiah, 1US$ = 9,328 Rp 
(February 2010) 
Expert estimate 
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Of total income 45% is cash and 55% 
subsistence 
Forest products make up 43% of income, 41% 
of cash income in 2009 
Agriculture make up 39% of income, 42% of 
cash income in 2009 
Fisheries make up 15% of income, 11% of cash 
income in 2009 
The remainder is made up of salaries, fees and 
other 
Shepherd et al. 
2009 
Cash from agriculture is simulated to increase 
linearly with the increase in jobs growing to a 
maximum of 85% of total agricultural income 
Expert estimate 
 
Scenarios 
 
Papua has a history of relatively low deforestation rates. However, the 
district head (bupati) has 25-30 proposals for oil palm plantations waiting on 
his desk while at the same time he has been approached by international 
investors interested in buying carbon stored in the forest to sell on the future 
REDD market (pers. com. vice-bupati 2009). Discussion with district officials 
and non-governmental organization (NGO) personnel resulted in the 
identification of three scenarios they thought plausible for Kaimana:  
 
Scenario 1) “Small is beautiful-growth with conservation”: as of year two in 
the simulation, each year 10,000 ha are allocated to oil palm and 10,000 ha 
are allocated to acacia plantation. The limit for suitable oil palm area is set at 
190,000 ha (rePPProt unpublished) and the limit for suitable acacia 
plantation area is set at 260,000 ha outside the suitable oil palm area 
(Ministry of Forestry, unpublished). A medium investment in NTFPs is made; 
each year ‘25ha + 0.1ha*increase local rural households’ is converted to 
forest garden.  
 
Scenario 2) “Building an industrial future”: as of year two in the simulation, 
each year 20,000 ha are allocated to oil palm and 20,000 ha are allocated to 
acacia plantation. The limit for suitable oil palm area is set at 320,000 ha 
(inspired by Conservation International suitability map) and the limit for 
suitable acacia plantation area is assumed 260,000 ha outside the suitable oil 
palm area. A low investment in NTFPs is made; each year ‘0.1ha*increase 
local rural households’ is converted to forest garden. 
 
Scenario 3) “A future of forests-A focus on environmental services”: as of 
year two in the simulation, each year 1,000 ha are allocated to oil palm and 
5,000 ha to acacia plantation. We believe the introduction of plantations in 
Kaimana is inevitable and under the most conservative scenario the 
expansion is limited, not zero. A high investment in NTFPs is made; each 
year ‘50ha + 0.1ha*increase local rural households’ is converted to forest 
garden. The conservationists’ scenario could be a consequence of 
implementation of a REDD policy. Ideally, under such a scenario, the local 
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population receives a share of REDD payments but given the situation of 
local people remotely distributed over the district and given high corruption 
levels in Indonesia we explore this scenario without any REDD payments 
received by the local population. 
 
Participatory modelling with STELLA 
 
Participatory modelling is the act of building a model with a group of non-
model experts under guidance of a model facilitator. The objectives of 
participatory modelling include increasing understanding of complex dynamic 
systems (landscape in this study), thinking through drivers of change 
responsible for past and future trends of landscape aspects and promoting 
inter-disciplinary exchange of information and visions (Sandker et al. 2009, 
2010; Van den Belt 2004). Data is often lacking in landscapes such as 
Kaimana and information gaps are filled with data from unpublished reports 
or local expert estimates. The simulated outcomes are therefore of indicative 
value, they explore future landscape pathways rather than predict precise 
outcomes. However, the model is conceptualized and the simulation results 
are validated by, and at the same time disseminated among, local experts. 
The participatory model has been built using the system dynamics software 
STELLA (HPS 1996). This icon-based model building tool makes system 
dynamics modelling accessible to a wider public and is readily understood by 
non-model experts (Van den Belt 2004). The Kaimana model consists of 
three sectors, given in Table 1 together with their most important variables, 
equations and information sources. 
 
Spatial projections with GEOMOD (IDRISI) 
 
When spatially projecting with GEOMOD, the forest cover change is simulated 
by STELLA, while the location of change is simulated by GEOMOD. GEOMOD 
is a land-use change simulation model that predicts the locations of grid cells 
that change over time (Eastman 2009 p. 84). The simulations can occur 
either forward or backward in time, we only use the forward simulation.  
 
We entered in GEOMOD a map of beginning time, the 2005 map in Figure 1 
being the most recent available to us, which has been re-classified into two 
categories ‘forest’ and ‘non-forest’. The beginning time is thus set to 2005; 
the ending time of the simulation is set to 2030, coinciding with the ending 
time of the STELLA simulation.  
 
GEOMOD can use two decision rules for simulating the location of change, 
one rule being based on proximity, the other on suitability. We exclude the 
decision rule based on proximity. Its inclusion would allow only cells on the 
boarder of forest and non-forest to be converted. If large-scale plantations 
will be installed in Papua, deforestation patterns will not be anything like the 
district has seen in the past, current deforested patches will not influence the 
location of future change. The suitability map is created instantaneously in 
GEOMOD by entering a number of driver maps (Figure 2). The driver maps 
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can be given different weights, we weighed elevation as highest (higher 
altitudes being most limiting to oil palm expansion), followed by slopes, 
distance from the sea and major rivers (to include transportation costs for oil 
palm companies) and finally the administrative limitations (categorizing 
national parks as less suitable). One could explore different scenarios with 
different weights for the administrative limitations map to explore different 
‘governance scenarios’ where national parks are always excluded or where 
 
 
Figure 2. Driver maps entered in GEOMOD and resulting suitability map 
 
they can be degazetted to give way to oil palm companies. The driver maps 
we prepared, their weights given in GEOMOD and the resulting suitability 
map created by GEOMOD and used to predict the location of changing grid 
cells are given in Figure 2. 
 
Results and discussion 
 
Land-use changes 
 
The land cover projections of the three scenarios suggest that Kaimana is at 
the verge of forest transition. The forest cover decreases from 16,450 km2 in 
2009 to 12,780 km2, 10,320 km2 and 15,350 km2 under scenario 1, 2 and 3 
respectively in year 2030 (Figure 3). These forest cover changes are the 
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 simulation result of STELLA 
where total forest cover is 
the sum of secondary and 
primary forest. Even under 
the most conservative 
scenario (scenario 3), the 
local district officials still 
expected 1,080 km2 to 
become plantation after 20 
years.  
 
 
Figure 3. Maps produced by 
GEOMOD projecting forest 
cover in 2030 under the 
three scenarios explored 
 
 
Under the industrial 
scenarios it is likely that a 
new major town will be 
created in the western part 
of the district as this is 
where the plantations are 
likely to concentrate (Figure 
3). Furthermore, there is a 
risk of national parks being 
degazetted in the Western 
part of the district. Indeed, 
under both industrial 
scenarios (1 & 2), the 
national park near the sea 
shore in the Western part of 
Kaimana is not respected 
(Figure 2 and 3). 
 
Population increase 
 
At the end of the simulation, 
the total population of 
Kaimana has increased from 
41,660 people in 2010 to 
460,000; 740,000 and 
187,000 under scenario 1, 2 
and 3 respectively. Even 
under the most conservative  
scenario, the total population increases by 350%, mainly the result of people 
attracted to Kaimana by the jobs created in the plantations (Table 1). Under 
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scenario 3, if one were to assume substantial REDD payments being received 
by the entire Kaimana population (not excluding migrants), one can imagine 
people being attracted to the district to share in some REDD cash. There is a 
possibility that such enormous invasions of the district by migrants as 
suggested by the scenarios would result in increased conflicts, e.g. over 
access to land for agriculture or over benefit sharing from the plantations and 
REDD investments.  
 
Income simulations 
 
Total per capita income and per capita cash show similar trends under the 
three scenarios increasing with 30-50% (Figure 4a) and 60-150% (Figure 
4b) after 20 years. The income differences under the three scenarios are 
more marked in terms of cash. This is due to the simulated negative effects 
of large scale conversion of forests to oil palm causing loss in subsistence 
income. Negative effects simulated are pollution of the rivers and loss of 
forest. Water pollution causes income from fisheries to decrease with ~60% 
under the ‘industrial future’ scenario and with ~30% under the ‘growth with 
conservation’ scenario (Table 2). Forest loss causes income from forest  
 
 
Figure 4. Simulation outcomes from STELLA of (a) total per capita income 
(subsistence and cash) and (b) per capita cash income for the local rural 
population of Kaimana 
 
products to decrease by 25% and 35% under the ‘growth with conservation’ 
and ‘industrial future’ scenarios respectively. These negative effects on 
subsistence income are experienced by all people, while the benefits in terms 
of salaried jobs are only received by some. Under all scenarios, the current 
mainly subsistence economy converts into a cash economy; where now cash 
makes up for 45% of total income, it will consist of 70, 80 and 60% after 20 
years under scenario 1, 2 and 3 respectively. 
 
Under the three scenarios, the total amount of jobs increase radically, from 
around 500 jobs now to 82,000; 120,000 and 25,000 jobs for scenario 1, 2 
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and 3 respectively after 20 years of simulation. We expected though, the 
capture of jobs by local people to be limited, at best circa 10% of the total 
jobs go to local people but the most common percentage lies between 1-5%. 
 
Table 2. Share of different activities (in %) of total per capita income 
for the local rural population of Kaimana now and at the end of the 
simulation under the three scenarios explored 
 Agriculture Forest Fisheries Salaries Other 
Now 46 36 17 1 1 
Scenario 1 after 
20 years 37 19 9 35 <1 
Scenario 2 after 
20 years 34 15 4 47 <1 
Scenario 3 after 
20 years 39 26 12 23 <1 
 
Agriculture remains an important income source under all scenarios. Under 
scenario 1 and 2, we simulated agriculture to commercialize (Table 1) with 
the increased demand for food products from the huge population of salaried 
workers and with reduced transportation costs as a consequence of roads 
opening up the area. The production potential remains limited though 
because of low soil fertility. We assumed only the suitable land in the legally 
allocated area for forest conversion by local people is used for small-scale 
agriculture but given the enormous increase in population under the 
scenarios, much more forest might be converted. 
 
REDD 
 
The total amount of carbon prevented from being emitted after 20 years 
under scenario 3 is 46 million ton C when assuming a baseline based on 
carbon emissions under scenario 1 or 89 million ton C assuming a baseline 
based on carbon emissions under scenario 2. If we were to approximate a 
payment based on these carbon quantities, assuming a price of 150,000 Rp 
(16 US$)/ton CO2 and 5% of the total REDD pay being equally captured by 
the local population, the annual per capita REDD pay would amount 1.5-2.9 
million Rp the first year, going down to 0.3-0.6 million Rp after 20 years due 
to the growing population the REDD pay is shared among. Such payments 
would provide local people with a significant amount of cash.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
REDD potential in Kaimana 
 
A scenario where REDD policies would result in less conversion of forest into 
large scale plantations in Kaimana would avoid negative consequences from 
such large scale plantation invasion for the strongly forest-dependant local 
rural population though they would loose out on some extra cash. If local 
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people would also receive a share of the REDD payments they would be 
economically better off than under the industrial growth scenarios (1 & 2), 
with higher incomes and comparable cash inflow. Whether such payments 
would reach all remote villages is doubtful, but these remote villages are at 
the same time less likely to benefit from jobs and more likely to suffer 
negatively from consequences of large scale plantations. 
 
Combining participatory system dynamics modeling with GIS simulation 
 
GEOMOD proved relatively simple to handle and manipulate. One can change 
the selection of driver maps and their weight creating different suitability 
maps and running different simulations in less than 10 minutes, as long as 
these input driver maps are prepared beforehand. This preparation was more 
complicated and time consuming though, since the maps had to be converted 
into a format which could be read and understood by IDRISI. This proved to 
be time consuming for a spatial software expert without specific knowledge 
of IDRISI. A constraint of the projection is formed by the limitation of only 
two land-use types. Distinguishing between large scale plantation and small-
scale agriculture, and between primary and secondary forest would probably 
have enriched the strategic discussion on Kaimana’s future more. 
Within the constraint of avoiding much complexity to keep the possibility of 
modeling in a participatory way, the combination of the GEOMOD (IDRISI) 
and STELLA model platforms proved promising. GEOMOD has provided a 
spatial dimension to the participatory model built in STELLA, moving the 
strategic use of the methodology a step forward in visualizing future 
landscape scenarios. 
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Chapter 5 
Will Forests Remain in the Face of Oil Palm Expansion?        
Simulating Change in Malinau, Indonesia 
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Will Forests Remain in the Face of Oil Palm Expansion? Simulating
Change in Malinau, Indonesia
Marieke Sandker 1, Aritta Suwarno 1, and Bruce M. Campbell 1,2
ABSTRACT. The severe tensions between conservation and development are illustrated by events in
Malinau Dstrict (Kalimantan, Indonesia). Conservationists decry proposed plans for logging and conversion
of pristine tropical forest to oil palm (Elaeis guineensis). Although the local government is willing to declare
the district a “conservation district,” at the same time, it shows interest in oil palm conversion. This article
explores the impact of the potential conversion of 500 000 ha of forest to oil palm on forest cover, in-
migration, and the local economy in Malinau. The simulation model was developed using STELLA®
software, and relies on a combination of empirical data, data from the literature, and stakeholder perceptions.
If a company were to clear the forest for timber without planting oil palm (as commonly happens), poverty
levels are likely to rise rather than decline over the long term. If large-scale oil palm plantations were to
be established, they could yield significant benefits to local authorities. However, such development would
induce massive employment-driven migration, with wide-ranging consequences for the current inhabitants
of the region. By visualizing and quantifying these trade-offs between conservation and development, the
model stimulates debate and information exchange among conservationists, development actors, and district
authorities so that well-informed choices can be made.
Key Words: Decentralization; district revenue; forest cover; landscape dynamics; livelihoods; oil palm;
participatory model; primary forest
INTRODUCTION
Environmentalists worldwide are concerned about
the conversion of pristine Indonesian rainforests to
oil palm (Elaeis guineensis). Between 1980 and
2000, global palm oil production increased by 360%
to 20.9 million tonnes in 2000 (Koh and Wilcove
2007) and it is forecast that global demand will
double in the next 20 to 30 years (Sargeant 2001,
Reinhardt et al. 2007). Mittermeier and Bowles
(1993) consider the forests in Kalimantan to be one
of the world’s 15 tropical rainforest hotspots.
Malinau is one of the newly designated districts in
East Kalimantan Province, Indonesia (Fig. 1). Over
95% of the 4.3 million-ha area is still covered with
forest (Badan Pusat Statistik (BPS) Malinau,
unpublished data). The local authorities recognize
its value and have declared Malinau a “conservation
district” (one of only three in Indonesia), although
at the same time, they have welcomed palm oil
investments.
In June 2005, the Indonesian Minister of Agriculture
revealed a government proposal for the world’s
largest oil palm plantation of 1.8 million ha along
the Malaysia–Kalimantan border, cutting through
three national parks. Campaigns and lobbying by
civil society, Indonesian media and foreign
diplomats forced the Indonesian government to
revise its position on the mega-project but, although
the Indonesian president acknowledges that
conservation concerns should be considered, he
continues to support oil palm development (Wakker
2006). This is understandable considering the role
of palm oil in the Indonesian economy. In 2004, the
export value of palm oil in Indonesia comprised
US$4.1 billion—or 1.7% of the Indonesian gross
national income (Koh and Wilcove 2007)—and
roughly 4.5 million people rely on palm oil estates:
900 000 people through direct employment and
another 3.6 million through downstream processing,
service industries, and remittances (Sargeant 2001).
Susila (2004) found that oil palm activities
1Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR), 2Charles Darwin University (CDU)
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Fig. 1. Geographical features of Malinau District (Source: Topografi Kodam (TOPDAM) 2004 and
Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah (Bappeda) 2002).
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contribute 5–11 million IDR yearly or over 63% of
smallholder household incomes in Kampar (Riau)
and Musi Banyuasin (South Sumatra), and stated
that the small proportion of poor people (<10%) in
oil palm communities in these sites is an indication
of the commodities’ contribution to poverty
alleviation. Conservationists face big challenges
given the monetary benefits of oil palm.
For Malinau, we examine the scenario of clearing
500 000 ha of forest for oil palm and its
consequences for local livelihood income, district
revenue, and land-cover change. Given the
employment created by such development, we also
examine potential migration into Malinau. The aim
of the paper is to simulate landscape dynamics in
order to understand conservation and development
trade-offs from the perspectives of different
stakeholders.
METHODS AND PROCESS
Simulation models and participatory modeling can
be useful in stimulating discussion about the future,
and can contribute to decisions about complex
landscapes (Sayer and Campbell et al. 2004). Sayer
and Campbell (2004) argue for the use of
exploratory or scoping (as opposed to predictive)
models, with model building and outcomes
stimulating discussion amongst different stakeholders
who have different perspectives on the trade-offs
between conservation and development. We stress
that this is a scoping model, not a predictive model.
The scoping model was built using the dynamic,
userfriendly modeling software STELLA® v.8
(High Performance Systems 1996). Initially, the
elements for a model were shared with researchers
from the Center of International Forestry Research
(CIFOR) and a scoping model was produced that
simulated land-cover change (Sayer and Campbell
2004, Lynam et al. 2003). The results of the early
simulations were discussed with researchers and
staff of the district, including the district head
(Bupati). This gave the modelers feedback on
priority issues, and the model was then further
developed. A workshop was then convened with 12
representatives from the district agencies at which
available information and data were shared and
discussed. This was followed by smaller workshops
and modeling training with those officials interested
in pursuing the modeling. In early 2007, the results
were presented to CIFOR researchers and generated
much discussion. In late 2007, the scenario results
were shared with district officials and the district
head. More information on the modeling procedure
can be found at: http://www.cifor.cgiar.org/conserv
ation/_ref/home/index.htm.
The model includes variables covering land use,
human populations, employment, forest and
plantation economics, and district income. To
identify the current status of livelihoods in Malinau
district, we used data from the district statistical
office (Badan Pusat Statistik, BPS) and data from
CIFOR researchers working in Malinau between
2000 and 2007. All monetary values are reported in
Indonesian Rupiah (IDR), where ca. US$1 = IDR
9500. The sensitivity of the model’s response to
some key variables (income from agriculture, oil
palm, and timber salaries, emigration and
immigration rate) has been explored by changing
their values +/-20%.
LAND USE, LAND-USE SCENARIOS, AND
LAND-COVER CHANGE
Main Land Use and Forest Types
With decentralization in 1999, land-use allocation
has come increasingly under the control of the
district government, although allocation in the
forestry service area is still legally under the central
government. Conservation and protection forest
form a large part of Malinau, dominated by the
Kayan Mentarang National Park (Table 1). The
forests in the non-forestry service area and
“conversion” forest are forests allocated for
conversion to other uses (e.g., agriculture,
plantations).
For the model, we have divided forests into primary
forest, logged-over primary forest, secondary
forest, and degraded forest (Fig. 2). Degraded forest
comprises <5-year-old bush fallow (following
abandoned swidden cultivation) and land cleared
for mining. Based on the district offices’
documentation on shifting cultivation for the years
2002–2006 and on the mining area, degraded forest
occupies about 16 000 ha at the start of the
simulation. Secondary forest comprises between 5-
and 40-year-old bush fallow and very intensely
logged forest. The intensely logged forest is largely
a consequence of large- and small-scale conversion
permits—IPK and IPPK, respectively. Based on
documentation in the district offices and estimation
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Table 1. Land-use allocation for Malinau (source: Dinas Kehutanan dan Perkebunan Kab. Malinau 2006,
TGHK revised 2002 for mining area)
Land-use allocation 2006 Area (ha)
Total Area, Malinau District 4 262 070
Non-Forestry Service land 518 927
Of which:
Mining concession (2002) 19 919
Currently under swidden agriculture (dryland paddy) 6 131
Currently under permanent agriculture (wetland paddy, crops, vegetables,
fruits, and estate crops)
12 816
Forestry Service land 3 743 143
Of which:
Conversion forest 225 828
Production forest 453 653
Limited production forest (on steep slopes) 1 280 836
Protection forest (national park and forest reserves) 1 782 825
of land under swidden cultivation over the period
1967—2002, secondary forest covers about 120 000
ha at the start of the simulation.
Secondary forest >40 years old is categorized as
logged-over primary forest, although under the oil
palm simulations, we assume no secondary forest
is converted to primary forest due to increased forest
clearing. Roughly 20% of the landscape (about 950
000 ha) was logged by 2004 (logged-over primary
forest). The remaining 75% of the landscape (about
3 157 000 ha) is categorized as primary forest at the
start of the simulation.
Logging and Conversion Permits
With decentralization, district officials gained
greater control over forest resources, often
extending well beyond their official legal authority.
They started issuing logging permits for small
concessions (IPPK) in areas supposedly classified
as conversion forest (Obidzinski and Barr 2003).
There was minimal regulation of the subsequent
logging. Barr et al. (2001:13) report on the
enthusiasm of a palm oil company manager about
the decentralization process stating, “...operations
will be much smoother and more efficient if
companies can deal straight with the Bupati.”
A frequent practice observed in Indonesia is that
IPK (permit for large-scale forest conversion)
concession holders do the logging, but have no
intention of converting the area into plantations. Of
2.5 million ha cleared for oil palm in East and West
Kalimantan, only 20% had been planted by 2005
(Wakker 2006), with the remaining area thought to
be cleared mainly for its timber. In the neighboring
district Berau, the governor is under prosecution for
“abuse of power” because, between 1999 and 2002,
he issued a permit to plant a million hectares of oil
palm, and the company that received the permit
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Fig. 2. Major land-use sectors captured in the model, showing the potential land-use transformations.
cleared the land, made use of the wood, but never
planted oil palm (Castaño 2006). In Malinau, there
have also been major proposals for oil palm where
land is regarded as not suitable for oil palm, being
remote, very steep, and with infertile soils (Basuki
and Sheil 2005, Lynam et al. 2006), leading to the
belief that the proposed development of oil palm is
a guise for timber harvesting. Neighboring districts
closer to the sea with extended lowlands would be
more cost-effective investments for oil palm in the
short term. However, the road network is rapidly
expanding, with new roads now linking Malinau to
Nunukan and Bulungan districts, so markets are
effectively becoming more accessible and oil palm
investments more likely to happen, although some
believe that the land capacity is such that oil palm
will not be economically viable (Basuki and Sheil
2005).
Oil Palm Scenarios
Currently there are no plantations in Malinau. In our
simulation, we assume the development of oil palm
will start in 5 years’ time (2012). To explore the
potential future impact of oil palm development, we
have used four scenarios:
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1. No oil palm development (as at present);
 
2. Forest clearing, but no oil palm planted (as
has occurred elsewhere);
 
3. Forest clearing and oil palm plantation,
assuming low employment rates, and
 
4. Forest clearing and oil palm plantatin,
assuming high employment rates.
 
 In all scenarios, HPH/IUPHHK logging (large-
scale concessions using less intensive logging)
occurs throughout the simulation, starting with
current levels and increasing by 50% toward the end
of the simulation.
In scenarios 2–4, five logging permits for forest
conversion are issued for an area of 100 000 ha each.
Permits for plantation production are usually given
for a 25- to 30-year period, and after that, they can
be extended or terminated. The timber clearing
through IPK permits in scenarios 2–4 is assumed to
take place over a period of 20 years (from 2012–
2032 in the simulation), increasing in intensity over
time (too few workers and equipment are available
in the first years). Thus, after 25 years, 500 000 ha
of forest will be cleared.
Under scenario 2, we simulate “timber speculators,”
who do intensive logging in primary logged-over
forest, converting it to secondary forest. We assume
that they mainly use the non-forestry service area
and the area allocated as conversion forest (Table
1) although there will be some use of the permanent
forest domain (about 70 000 ha). Furthermore, we
assume that the company gives logging jobs to
migrants only, and only pays a minimum
compensation fee of IDR 5000/m3 to villages (see
below).
In scenarios 3 and 4, we simulate more responsible
companies that plant the full 500 000 ha, 40% from
secondary forest and 60% from primary logged-
over forest, all of which is non-forestry service area
and conversion forest. We assume the plantations
are largely located in lowlands closer to transport
routes (e.g., close to Malinau town). Scenario 3
assumes an employment of 0.1 jobs per ha of oil
palm, which corresponds to current employment
figures in Malaysian oil palm plantations (van
Noordwijk, pers. comm. 2007). Scenario 4 assumes
an average of 0.2 jobs per ha of oil palm,
corresponding with Indonesian contexts (Sargeant
2001). It is assumed villages get a fee of 20 000
IDR/m3 for the timber removed.
The timber compensation fees of IDR 5000–20 000/
m3 are a low to moderate estimate as Palmer (2004)
mentions that fees can go up to IDR 50 000/m3, and
Barr et al. (2001) measured up to IDR 30 000 IDR/
m3. The IDR 5000 fee follows an example in
Malinau mentioned by Barr et al. (2001: 32).
Agriculture
For many years, livelihoods in Malinau district have
been dominated by agriculture, hunting, and
gathering. Of the local population, about 75% live
outside the district capital, with the majority being
swidden cultivators. A few are hunter-gatherers, but
at least 80%–85% of these Punan households
undertake farming (Levang et al. 2005). Despite the
prevalence of agriculture, its formal contribution to
the district’s economy was only 6% in 2002 (BPS
2003 in Andrianto 2006). The population sub-model
drives the rate of increase or decrease in farming
households, and this feeds directly to the area
farmed. A slight shift from jobs in agriculture to
jobs in the service and trade industry is modeled as
a result of urbanization.
We distinguish between permanent and swidden
cultivation (Table 1). The former is intensive crop
and tree production. Swidden cultivation is
prevalent. It starts with the conversion of logged-
over primary forest to dryland rice cultivation. After
about 2 years, when crop yields are low and weed
infestation increases, farmers abandon the field and
it becomes bush fallow. At the moment, the pressure
on the land is so low that bush fallow is left to grow
into secondary forest, which is only turned into
swidden fields again when it is very old and
resembles primary forest. However, under the oil
palm scenario, primary and old secondary forest in
the vicinity of the villages will become scarce, and
thus, farmers will be forced to reduce the fallow
period, which will result in higher levels of weed
infestation and lower per hectare swidden yields
(modeled to drop by 30%).
Mining
A small portion of the landscape is allocated to coal
mining (Table 1), but of that, only about 30% has
been mined. Recently mining activities ceased
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because of the costs of extraction. It is difficult to
predict future mining activities, but given the high
transport costs in Malinau, we have assumed only
a small annual increase in the area mined (e.g., from
1000 to about 2000 ha/year under scenario 4). This
increase is due to population increase, where a
proportion of the unemployed commence artisanal
mining.
Forest Products
People in Malinau depend heavily on forest
products for their livelihoods. Levang et al. (2005)
found that 72% of the local Punan people collect
forest products, but only 16% rely on it for their
main cash income. Their study shows that the mean
annual income of a Punan household from
agriculture is IDR 1.67–2.25 million, whereas that
from forest products is IDR 1.72–4.56 million,
depending on the remoteness of the villages. These
figures apply better to the more remote hunter-
gatherer communities. According to Pambudhi et
al. (2004), oil palm and pulp plantations often
displace villagers and their rattan gardens. An
increase in IPK logging and plantations is assumed,
in the model, to result in decreased availability of
non-timber forest products (NTFPs). We assume in
the model that about 70% of local people are
involved in forest product collection, but that only
10% of migrants collect forest products.
Simulated Land-cover Changes
Under the no plantation development scenario, we
assume that the current secondary forest (about 120
000 ha) can grow into primary logged-over forest
during the simulation, whereas under the other
scenarios, we assume no such land-cover change
because of the high pressure on the forest. Without
plantation development, there is a loss of only about
5% of primary and primary logged-over forest over
40 years, largely as a result of on-going small-scale
agriculture (Fig. 3). The simulations where forest
conversion permits are issued (2–4) suggest a loss
of about 20% of the primary and primary logged-
over forest over 40 years.
Agriculture comprises a very small part of the
landscape initially because of the low population
numbers and the low commercial demand for
agricultural products. With the forest clearance
scenarios, agricultural area increases 4.5 to 11 times
(scenario 2 and 4, respectively), because of
expanding populations (see next section). As land
will become scarce in the legally available area,
between 200 000 and 360 000 ha of forest in the
permanent forest domain will be converted into
agriculture under scenarios 2, 3, and 4. Degraded
forest covers 16 000 ha at the start of the simulation,
but this expands to about 60 000, 85 000, 100 000,
and 140 000 ha in scenarios 1, 2, 3, and 4,
respectively, mainly as a result of the increase in
bush fallow.
Fire is not included in the model, and has not been
a feature of Malinau. As such, the amount of forest
lost could be underestimated in the oil palm
scenarios. Fire is a significant threat in other parts
of Indonesia, and forest concessionaires and those
seeking to establish tree crop plantations are
considered major contributors to fire frequency
(Gönner 2000, Food and Agriculture Organization
(FAO) 2003). Once fire enters the system, it may
remain as a permanent feature (du Toit et al. 2004).
The Department of Forestry and Plantations (1998,
in Casson 2000) holds oil palm expansion partly
responsible for the 1997–1998 forest and land fires
that affected more than 5 million ha of forest in
Kalimantan.
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Population Numbers
The total population in Malinau district was 59 212
in 2006 (BPS Malinau, unpublished data) and has
increased by 6.5% yearly over the last 8 years (cf.
Bappeda Tk II Bulungan 1998 in Barr et al. 2001;
BPS Malinau, unpublished data). This high annual
rate of increase is mainly caused by in-migration
related to new economic opportunities. The average
increase in the urban Malinau sub-district was
8.5%–9% compared with 3% in the rural sub-
districts. The model simulates natural growth and
in-migration, and differentiates between local
people and transmigrants. CIFOR researchers
estimate that of the 59 212 in the district about 7000
are immigrants, most living in Malinau town and
some in Long Loreh, where the mining company
was active. In-migration in the model is largely
driven by jobs in IPK logging and oil palm
plantations, where we assume that three people
immigrate for each new job filled by a migrant,
causing the migrant population to rise sharply with
plantation development scenarios (Fig. 4). The total
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Fig. 3. A 40-year simulation of land cover in Malinau district: (a) Scenario 1, No clearing permit given
out; (b) Scenario 2, Forest clearing without oil palm planted; (c) Scenario 4, Plantation development
(high employment).
population in Malinau under the plantation
development scenario will increase by 4.7 (scenario
2) to 13.5 times (scenario 4) after 40 years. After
year 2027 of the simulation, the employment drops
because of the sharp decrease in timber jobs (2027)
when IPK logging stops. For the model, we assume
that, where migrant employment drops under 35%
(meaning less than 35% of employable migrants are
employed), this results in out-migration rates as high
as 2%. Under scenario 4, the now modest number
of 7000 migrants will increase by a factor of 80 after
40 years. Although the local Dayak people are
currently in the majority, they will be a minority if
500 000 ha are planted with oil palm.
Financial Compensation from Logging
Companies to Local Communities
Decentralization not only resulted in district
governments securing a greater share of forestry
revenues, but also had implications for local
communities. A 2000 law entitles communities to
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Fig. 4. A 40-year simulation of total local population (blue lines) and migrant population (red lines) in
Malinau district, under the four different scenarios (1= no plantation; 2 = IPK clearing without
plantation development; 3 = plantation development assuming low employment; and 4 = plantation
development assuming high employment.
demand compensation for timber harvesting from
concession holders, although this law is open to
dispute because of weak enforcement of property
rights (Engel et al. 2006). Andrianto (2006) records
greater conflicts among communities, and
environmental degradation following the implementation
of the new regulations regarding logging, and he
concludes that, in West-Kutai and Malinau districts,
the policies have failed to increase the standard of
living of poor communities. On the contrary, Palmer
(2004) states decentralization has undoubtedly led
to higher capture of logging rents by the Sekatak
community in Malinau. Palmer (2004) and Barr et
al. (2001) indicate mixed outcomes from local
negotiations, Barr et al. (2001:30) noting that many
agreements are “absurd or have been unfulfilled.”
Palmer (2004) mentions IPPK fees of around IDR
50 000/m3 of timber going to local communities.
Although this is low, it is five times more than those
paid by the large logging companies that dominated
the logging industry before decentralization.
Household Income
At the start of the simulation, the percentage of
households was highest in the agricultural sector
(76%) (Table 2). With the exception of scenario 4,
agriculture remains the most important sector
throughout the simulations, although under
scenarios 2–4, the number of households in the
timber sector increases more than tenfold after 20
years (mainly because of IPK). In 2027, the most
substantial number of households will be active in
the oil palm sector in scenarios 3 and 4, although by
2047, this will have shifted to the agriculture and
the trade and services sectors because the number
of jobs in the oil palm sector does not continue to
increase after 25 years even though the population
does. The creation of employment in the region is
substantial under the oil palm scenario, even when
a low employment rate in oil palm plantations is
used. With scenario 1, the total number of formal
jobs available (in mining, timber and civil service)
does not exceed 10 000. In the other scenarios, the
number of formal jobs reaches as high as 22 000
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(scenario 2), 71 000 (scenario 3), and 120 000
(scenario 4).
The significant amount of income generated by
employment in oil palm in year 2027 under
scenarios 3 and 4 is shown in Table 3. There are also
associated expansions in other sectors, driven by the
plantation economy. The income from agriculture
increases substantially, for example. With an
increase in employment, we assume a high demand
for agricultural products and roads opening up the
area improve market access. Where most of current
production is for auto-consumption, we expect an
increase in permanent agriculture and the demise
(in proportionate terms) of swidden cultivation.
Levang et al. (2005) undertook household surveys,
sampling 254 Punan households in six different
settlements in Malinau and neighboring districts.
They found 83% of the sampled households live
under the US$1/day poverty line. Average
household incomes are improved under the oil palm
scenarios (3 and 4), increasing by 60%–150%, but
increasing <10% in scenario 1 without oil palm
(Table 3, last row). Household incomes are also
raised with forest clearing without oil palm
(scenario 2) after 20 years, but once forest clearing
stops, the average incomes decline, and after 40
years, average household incomes are lower than
when no IPK forest clearing had occurred (scenario
1).
The above figures hide the differentiation between
local and migrant households. The activity portfolio
differs substantially for migrant and local
households. Migrants are currently largely urban,
with a high percentage of households active in the
trade and service industries (Table 4). Jobs in the
timber and plantation sector typically go to
migrants, who often have higher schooling levels.
Local people, however, are currently given priority
for all jobs in the civil service, and they are the ones
receiving compensation fees for logging (Table 4).
Local people receive short-term benefits from
scenario 2 (2027), with more commercialized
agriculture, more civil service jobs, and timber fees.
After 40 years, however, they are left with hardly
any forest in proximity to their villages, reducing
their income from forest products and shortening
their fallow periods in shifting cultivation, and
consequently lowering their yields. Migrants will
receive most of the short-term benefits, getting most
jobs in IPK forest clearing. After 40 years, the high
unemployment for migrants will cause some out-
migration, although most are expected to remain; a
portion will buy a piece of agricultural land and start
farming for much lower earnings. This scenario is
expected to cause high levels of conflict.
Scenarios 3 and 4 improve incomes for both local
people as well as migrants. Local people’s incomes
increase most in year 2027 when timber fees
increase >20 times (scenario 4 in Table 3), and drop
thereafter when IPK logging ends. Local household
incomes remain 30%–65% higher than under
scenario 1 at the end of the simulation, mostly
because of commercialization of agriculture,
although jobs in the civil service, trade, and the
service industry also contribute to higher incomes
(Table 4a). Migrants’ incomes are also highest in
year 2027 because of jobs in IPK logging (Table
4b). After the sharp decline in IPK employment,
some of the migrants will obtain employment on the
plantations and some will buy some land for
agriculture. Although incomes may have increased
under oil palm development, overall well-being is
more difficult to judge. Koczberski et al. (2001) and
Casson (2000) report cases of local resentment ove
benefits from oil palm plantations going to
outsiders. Colchester et al. (2006) give examples of
increased social and financial costs with oil palm
arrival. For example, there were social costs of
resolving conflicts over land and benefit sharing
associated with oil palm estates. Air quality
declined, and there was a worrying increase in
alcohol abuse in local communities. More research
is needed on the negative and positive impacts on
local people of oil palm plantations.
District Development
Since Malinau was declared a new district in 1999,
district income has increased dramatically from
only IDR 5.8 billion in 2000 (Barr et al. 2001) to
IDR 405 billion and IDR 615 billion in 2002 and
2003, respectively (Andrianto 2006). Using per ha
and per m3 payments applied to IPPK in Malinau
(Barr et al. 2001), the issuance of IPK permits for
the clearance of 500 000 ha forest will provide the
district with a cumulative income of IDR 703 billion
over 20 years. Under scenarios 3 and 4, an additional
IDR 102 billion is provided over the 40-year
simulation by oil palm production fees. However,
the district income will increase by more than these
fees alone, as the increased economic activity is
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Table 2. Employment in different sectors (number of households per sector), and total population in Malinau
district
No. of Households†
Start Simulation results
2007 2027 2047
Primary a-
ctivities of
households:
1. No
plantation
development
2. Forest
clearing 
without oil
palm plan-
ting
3. Plantation
development
with 0.1
jobs/ha
4. Plantation
development
with 0.2
jobs/ha
1. No
plantation
development
2. Forest
clearing 
without oil
palm plan-
ting
3. Plantation
development
with 0.1
jobs/ha
4. Plantation
development
with 0.2
jobs/ha
Agriculture
and NTFPs
9 900 17 700 21 800 24 700 28 500 31 500 43 000 54 800 76 600
Timber C-
oncession
1 000 1 200 11 100 11 100 11 100 1 500 1 500 1 500 1 500
Plantation 0 0 0 21 100 42 200 0 0 31 600 63 200
Mining 200 300 300 300 300 500 500 500 800
Gov. offic-
ials and
civil serva-
nts
1 300 2 400 3 500 4 200 5 300 3 700 4 300 6 200 9 800
Trade and
service in-
dustries
1 400 4 300 8 900 15 400 22 400 11 300 18 300 35 200 58 700
Total hou-
seholds‡
12 900 23 300 35 700 53 500 72 500 42 200 58 000 95 900 148 400
Total population
60 000 108 600 166 300 249 200 338 100 196 500 270 200 446 700 691 500
† Average numbers of workers per household for the specified sectors are assumed to be as follows:
agriculture – 3; mining and trade – 1; timber plantation and civil service – 1.5 workers per household.
‡ The total of households involved per activity can be higher than the total households because some
households are involved in more than one activity.
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Table 3. Total income (in billions IDR) per sector for all households in Malinau, with the last row showing
averages per household
Simulation results – 2027 Simulation results – 2047
Primary a-
ctivities of
households:
Start of
simulation
(2007)
1. No
plantation
2. Forest
clearing 
without oil
palm plan-
ting
3. Plantation
development
with 0.1
jobs/ha
4. Plantation
development
with 0.2
jobs/ha
1. No
plantation
2. Forest
clearing 
without oil
palm plan-
ting
3. Plantation
development
with 0.1
jobs/ha
4. Plantation
development
with 0.2
jobs/ha
Agriculture 27 51 89 155 245 93 131 382 845
Forest Pro-
ducts
26 45 21 38 36 76 0 17 15
Timber co-
ncessions
13 16 165 162 162 20 20 20 20
Plantation 0 0 0 300 600 0 0 449 899
Mining 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.7
Gov. offic-
ials and
civil service
24 44 66 79 98 68 79 115 181
Trade and
service in-
dustries
16 48 130 248 374 122 249 553 975
Timber fees 2.5 3.0 15.4 52.6 52.6 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7
Total 109 207 485 1034 1569 383 483 1540 2939
Average per
hh
(in millions
IDR)
8.5 8.9 13.6 19.3 21.6 9.1 8.3 16.1 19.8
expected to substantially augment tax payments in
the district. The simulated additional tax payments
over 40 years for scenarios 2–4 are IDR 22 billion,
IDR 149 billion, and IDR 276 billion, respectively.
DISCUSSION
Are Payments for Environmental Services a
Viable Economic Option for the District?
Given the economic attractiveness of the oil palm
development scenario to district and national
government stakeholders, as well as to key local
people (e.g., those who may benefit from land sales
or various illegal transactions), the question is
whether conservationists have alternative development
scenarios. Much is made of direct payments for
environmental services (PES) (Ferraro and Kiss
2002), and one could argue that the global
community interested in biodiversity could change
the incentive structure for local and district
stakeholders by paying for biodiversity services
provided by Malinau. However, the area is vast and
the size of payments (needed to get household
income increases similar to those offered by the oil
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Table 4. Average annual cash income (millions IDR) for (a) local households, and (b) migrant households;
and percentage contribution of each activity to annual income, under four different scenarios
Simulation results – 2027 Simulation results – 2047
(a) Local households Start of
simulation
(2007)
1. No
plantation
2. Forest
clearing wi-
thout oil
palm planting
3. Planta-
tion dev-
elopment
with 0.1
jobs/ha
4. Planta-
tion dev-
elopment
with 0.2
jobs/ha
1. No
plantation
2. Forest
clearing wi-
thout oil
palm planting
3. Plantation
developm-
ent with
0.1 jobs/
ha
4. Plantation
development
with 0.2
jobs/ha
Average annual hh
income
(in millions IDR)
7.8 8.2 9.3 14.6 16.6 8.4 6.7 10.7 13.8
Share from:
Agriculture 28% 27% 32% 27% 28% 27% 34% 41% 43%
Forest products 29% 26% 10% 11% 9% 24% 0% 4% 2%
Timber, plantation,
and mining jobs
7% 4% 4% 15% 20% 3% 4% 12% 17%
Civil service jobs 24% 23% 31% 19% 19% 20% 29% 21% 21%
Trade and service 9% 17% 15% 10% 9% 26% 33% 21% 16%
Timber fees 3% 2% 8% 18% 15% 1% 1% 1% 1%
Simulation results – 2027 Simulation results – 2047
(b) Migrant
households
Start of
simulation
(2007)
1. No
plantation
2. Forest
clearing wit-
hout oil
palm planting
3. Planta-
tion dev-
elopment
with 0.1
jobs/ha
4. Planta-
tion dev-
elopment
with 0.2
jobs/ha
1. No
plantation
2. Forest
clearing w-
ithout oil
palm plan-
ting
3. Planta-
tion dev-
elopment
with 0.1
jobs/ha
4. Plantation
development
with 0.2
jobs/ha
Average annual hh
income
(in millions IDR)
13.8 13.6 19.4 22.3 23.6 13.8 11.2 19.5 21.8
Share from:
Agriculture 11% 13% 10% 10% 12% 14% 20% 19% 26%
Forest products 2% 2% 0% 1% 0% 2% 0% 0% 0%
Timber, plantation,
and mining jobs
37% 24% 54% 57% 57% 16% 5% 37% 34%
Civil service jobs 11% 12% 2% 3% 3% 10% 3% 3% 3%
Trade and service 39% 49% 34% 30% 28% 58% 71% 41% 37%
Timber fees 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
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palm scenarios) would range between US$25–50
million/year. This is probably beyond most budgets
for conservation. The difficulty of securing
biodiversity payments is illustrated by Wunder et
al. (2004).
Carbon (C) PES may have the highest potential for
influencing district decisions regarding forest
conversion. For C payments to provide the district
(i.e., excluding household income considerations)
with the same level of district income as scenario 4,
an average yearly payment of IDR 27 billion would
be needed (about US$3 million/year). According to
de Bruijn (2005), the C content of 1 ha primary forest
is roughly 300 ton C/ha, whereas the C content for
oil palm is 50–125 ton C/ha. A modest estimate of
the amount of C to be saved from being emitted if
the forest is not converted to oil palm plantation is
thus 175 ton C/ha, equivalent to 647 ton CO2/ha(assuming it is mostly primary forest that is lost).
For a total 500 000 ha of primary forest that would
be lost in the plantation development scenario, it
would be possible to recoup the foregone district
income with a C payment, as, at US$2/ton CO2, in
excess of $15 million/year could be generated if the
payments were structured over 40 years. Karky
(2006:14) mentions a “conservative price
assumption” of US$2/ton CO2 on the Clean
Development Mechanism (CDM) market. Avoided
deforestation is not currently part of the CDM, so
the price would probably be lower, but others talk
of vastly higher prices in the future. Transaction
costs on avoided deforestation would be high. For
example, an elaborate monitoring system would
need to be established to check compliance, but even
then it is possible that C could compete with oil palm
for district income. This PES scenario would not
lead to jobs and higher economic development in
the district. PES scenarios whereby some money is
paid directly to communities would also need to be
explored.
Can Ecotourism and Forest Product
Certification Provide an Economic Alternative
to Oil Palm Development?
Approximate calculations indicate that Malinau
would have to host 50 000–150 000 tourists each
year to generate the household income that the oil
palm scenarios produce (assuming tourists stay on
average 10 days and spend US$30/day that goes to
Malinau households). Malinau has much to offer
tourists with its vast intact forest and cultural
diversity, but despite 19 years of lobbying by a
conservation NGO, Kayan Mentarang National
Park registers fewer than 40 tourists a year
(Iskandar, pers. comm. 2007). Ecotourism will not
be able to compete with oil palm, at least in the
foreseeable future. Furthermore, even under the oil
palm scenarios, most of the district will remain
forested so ecotourism development is not excluded
from these scenarios.
Fair trade labels and natural product labels for forest
products can increase prices, but not to the extent
that would be required if forest products were to
compete with plantations as a source of income for
districts and households. To compete, incomes from
forest products would have to grow at least by five-
to seven-fold. Paz Soldan and Walter (2003) give
an example of certified Brazil nuts in Chile, which
after certification, had a 1.7–2.2 times higher price.
Conservation and Development Trade-offs
Malinau district illustrates the tensions that exist
between conservation and development, but also
illustrates how these trade-offs are perceived
differently by the various stakeholders. Malinau,
with its vast forests is one of the rainforest
biodiversity hotspots of the world (Mittermeier and
Bowles 1993), and conservationists are up in arms
over the proposed plans for logging and conversion
to oil palm (e.g., see Wakker 2006, a study
commissioned by Friends of the Earth). Even
though the head of government in Malinau is willing
to declare the district a “conservation district” (one
of three in Indonesia), he sees no conflict between
this declaration and his support for large-scale
conversion to oil palm. When asked, local people
are all in favor of some form of conservation
measures being taken (Padmanaba and Sheil 2007),
but local people also want the benefits of
development (Levang et al. 2007).
Researchers have witnessed massive change in
Malinau over the last decade (Sayer and Campbell
2004), and it is conceivable that land-use change is
likely to be widespread and accelerating, largely
driven by decisions made in the district capital and
beyond. And these decisions will inevitably involve
logging and plantation development, but perhaps
also mining. Allocating primary and secondary
forest to plantations and other intensive land uses
can be to the benefit of many stakeholders, but it
can simultaneously increase poverty for others. The
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behavior of the plantation concessionaires is crucial
as to the outcomes for local people. Careful
decisions have to be made when selecting
companies for land clearing, and contracts have to
be watertight so that companies deliver on promises.
If companies were to plant oil palm, some local
people see the promise of jobs with higher cash
incomes. District officials see greater economic
activity, more immigrants, and larger district
budgets. Migrants from other more populous
districts see jobs. Some of the income gets back to
the national coffers and the nation’s politicians and
officials see development occurring, which is a
major aspiration. Even with 500 000 ha of forest
cleared, most of the district would remain under
forest at the end of the 40-year simulation period.
If this is the case, then, many would argue that
plantation development scenarios are not at odds
with the district proposal of a conservation district.
But such development does have its risks. First, we
assumed logging stops after 20 years. Second, we
have not factored in fire; if large forest fires enter
the system, as happened in 1997–1998 in other parts
of Kalimantan, then forest quality could be
substantially reduced. Third, with such a large
migrant population under the oil palm scenarios,
future pressures on the environment (e.g., artisanal
gold panning) are likely to increase.
On the basis of economic argument, part of the forest
is likely to be converted, although remoteness and
poor soil quality may keep plantations out of
Malinau for some time. There are social and
environmental costs, not captured in the economic
argument. For example, Koczberski et al. (2001)
and Casson (2002) have both recorded resentment
by local people toward migrants with jobs in
plantations. In Malinau, this could be more extreme
as local people will be quickly outnumbered by
migrants. Colchester et al. (2006) report local
people’s complaints about plantations in other parts
of Kalimantan where individual profit seeking has
replaced traditions of communality and solidarity.
However, Sheil et al. (2006) mention “decision
makers prefer to focus on the general rather than the
particular,” so whether these negative aspects are
taken into account when the decision on
development is made remains to be seen.
If conservationists don’t like the idea of large-scale
land-cover change, do they have alternatives for
those hungry for development? Certification of
forest products and ecotourism alone are not likely
to provide incentives to halt forest conversion.
Carbon payments could conceivably bring district
benefits as high as those derived from logging and
plantations. However, the science and politics of
avoided deforestation is poorly developed, and
requires urgent and major research investment.
Decisions about developing plantations today will
not wait for the long process of international
negotiation on mechanisms for C payments.
The Modeling Process
We reiterate that the model is not meant as a
predictive tool—its primary use is to promote dialog
about alternative trajectories of change. Like any
model, ours makes many assumptions and
simplifications. We have endeavored to make these
assumptions and simplifications as reasonable as we
can, based on the information available to us.
Nonetheless, whether our model yields a credible
representation of Malinau can be questioned by
those who disagree with these choices or who would
emphasize unknowns or uncertainties. For example,
our model cannot be taken as evidence that 500 000
ha of oil palm developments in Malinau will be
commercially successful—this would require field-
based land-suitability evaluations, for example.
Furthermore, a more thorough accounting of the
impacts in each scenario would require
environmental and social impact assessments
focused on the specific areas to be planted in light
of the specific development plans proposed and the
management standards applied—something that we
make no claim to have done. We would obviously
expect that normal processes of civil society
participation should underlie all decision making
and that Indonesian laws regarding the changes in
the status of land be respected.
The modeling process has already achieved some
of its objectives. Debate within CIFOR was
generated by the conflicting perspectives on oil
palm development: as a source of economic
development, and as a cause of forest destruction
and negative impacts on forest-dependent people.
Some scientists pointed to particular reports that
needed to be cited showing the negative impacts of
oil palm, and others requested that those references
be removed because they were based on advocacy
rather than scientific analysis. Very few detailed
impact studies are available, and given the increased
interest in oil palm for biofuel, research on the social
and economic impacts of oil palm is urgently
required.
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The discussions at the district level tended to focus
on in-migration and C payments. District officials
were exceptionally nervous about the immigration
rates that large-scale oil palm plantations would
stimulate, as the district is currently dominated by
Dayaks (who also hold positions of power) and this
could change with high in-migration. The model
filled its role as a means to stimulate discussion, and
helped officials see some of the potential negative
sides of large-scale oil palm development. The
model supported policy changes on land use in
Malinau, tempered local government’s enthusiasm
for oil palm (mostly in relation to migration), and
spurred their interest in PES schemes as an
alternative to oil palm development (Dwi, pers.
comm. 2007). The district head requested help in
using some of the model outputs at the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
in Bali in 2007, so that he could argue the case for
avoided deforestation and a C market. Modeling has
demonstrated its power in generating ideas and
fostering shared understanding, allowing some of
the ramifications of different courses of action to be
explored. It also increases transparency in decision
making. The model identified a number of areas
where further research will be needed if sound land-
allocation decisions are to be made in Malinau.
Responses to this article can be read online at:
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol12/iss2/art37/responses/
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Abstract Integrated conservation and development projects (ICDPs) have had limited
success in addressing the often conflicting objectives of conservation and development. We
developed a model with local participants to explore the trade-offs between conservation
and development in southeastern Cameroon, where illegal hunting is regarded as the
greatest challenge to conservation. We simulated the effects of different ICDP strategies by
varying the degree of focus on antipoaching activities, anticorruption measures and direct
development investments, and by varying the overall budget for such activities. Our out-
come variables were numbers of selected wildlife species and household incomes. The
model outcomes from the different scenarios were used to stimulate debate among
stakeholders. Contributing to poverty alleviation while maintaining current animal popu-
lation sizes will be extremely difficult and will require long-term external financial support.
Devoting greater attention to improving local environmental governance emerged as the
highest priority for this investment. We used the model outputs to inform some of the
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major policy makers in the region. Participatory modeling is a valuable means of capturing
the complexities of achieving conservation at landscape scales and of stimulating inno-
vative solutions to entrenched problems.
Keywords Cameroon  Corruption  Environmental governance  ICDP 
Integrated conservation and development project  Participatory modeling 
Trade-offs  Simulation models
Abbreviations
ICDP Integrated conservation and development project
NGO Nongovernmental organization
SE TOU South east technical operational unit
Introduction
Reconciling conservation and development is notoriously difficult and the pursuit of this
objective has led to polarized positions and contentious debate (e.g., Guha 1997; Oates
1999; Chapin 2004). A number of reviews suggest that integrated conservation and
development projects (ICDPs) have not reconciled conservation and development agendas,
and both conservationists and social scientists have harshly criticized ICDPs (e.g., Wells
et al. 1998; Neumann 1998; Agrawal and Gibson 1999). Many believe integrated
approaches have failed to deliver on their potential or promise. For example, in a review of
36 ICDPs, only five contributed directly to wildlife conservation (Kremen et al. 1994).
McShane and Wells (2004) provide a comprehensive account of the difficulties of inte-
grating conservation and development at the site level. Ferraro (2001) suggests that the
indirect approach favored by ICDPs of providing alternative sources of products, income,
or social benefits as a means of encouraging communities to cooperate in conservation
initiatives is best described as ‘‘conservation by distraction’’.
There are many advocates of disaggregating conservation and development initiatives.
The proponents of the so-called preservationist or ‘‘fortress conservation’’ approach
advocate focusing project investments on protection measures and largely excluding the
economic and development aspirations of local people (Janzen 1986; Oates 1999; Terborgh
et al. 2002; Sanderson and Redford 2003). However, critics argue that by pursuing a
preservationist approach, local stakeholders are alienated (Chan et al. 2007), which ulti-
mately leads to social conflict and noncompliance with conservation-related regulations
(Ferraro and Kiss 2002; Romero and Andrade 2004; Robbins et al. 2006).
Some authors (Salafsky and Wollenberg 2000; Brown 2002; Malleson 2002) attribute
the lack of success in integrating conservation and development interventions to the failure
of conservation organizations to recognize that trade-offs exist and must be fully under-
stood if they are to be reconciled. For example, it is argued there has been a persistent
failure to provide communities with sufficient and appropriate alternative economic ben-
efits to offset the restrictions on access to conservation areas (Ferraro 2001; Cernea and
Schmidt-Soltau 2006). More specifically, Malleson (2002, p 100) suggests that, ‘‘[I]t is not
the basic ICDP concept that has caused so many problems for Korup (National Park,
Cameroon). Rather it is the lack of willingness among conservation biologists to support
the devolution of the control of forest resources to communities and their failure to accept
that difficult trade-offs have to be made between the interests of forest users, other key
actors and the global concerns of conservation biologists.’’
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We examined the trade-offs and potential synergies between conservation and develop-
ment in a case study in southeastern Cameroon, an area characterized by dire poverty and an
exceptional diversity of large mammals (Mittermeier et al. 2005). We explored the use of a
participatory systems modeling approach (Sayer and Campbell 2004) that involved the key
conservation and development stakeholders in the region. We explored whether such an
approach can stimulate discussion among the key stakeholders and promote action that
generates conservation and development synergies. We take up the challenge of Cowling
et al. (2004) of ensuring that the social aspects of conservation issues are tackled. In particular,
we examined livelihood and governance issues for people in conservation landscapes.
Study area
Our model focused on the ‘‘South East Technical Operational Unit’’ (SE TOU) in Cameroon
(Fig. 1). Part of this area is included in the Tri National de la Sangha landscape that extends
Fig. 1 Land use in the South East Technical Operational Unit of Cameroon (from maps from the German
Development Cooperation and World Wildlife Fund)
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into the Central African Republic and Congo-Brazzaville. The Tri National de la Sangha is
one of 11 ‘‘landscapes’’ identified as conservation priorities under the Congo Basin Forest
Partnership launched at the Johannesburg Earth Summit in 2002 (CBFP 2005). The area has
outstanding assemblages of forest megafauna, including forest elephants (Loxodonta cycl-
otis), western lowland gorillas (Gorilla gorilla gorilla), chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes
troglodytes), and bongos (Boocercus euryceros).
The total area of the SE TOU is 33,571 km2 (26% national parks, 52% logging con-
cessions, 3% commune forests, and 19% agroforests and community forests). Commune
forest is for use by a commune—a local government unit headed by a mayor. It cannot be
converted for agriculture but can be logged. Community forest can be converted and is
subject to a management agreement between the state and local communities, through
which the communities receive use rights, responsibilities and financial benefits from forest
management. Sixty-five percent of the landscape is allocated to safari hunting (11,202 km2
being community-managed and 10,722 km2 state-managed), and these zones are super-
imposed on agroforestry and concession areas. The landscape is sparsely populated (ca. 4
people/km2) with many different ethnic groups. In the systems model we characterized
them as Baka-pygmies (ca. 43%), and indigenous and migrant Bantu (ca. 50 and ca. 8%,
respectively) (GTZ 2001). Logging is the main economic activity and concessionaires
contribute significantly to infrastructure development.
Methods
We held four annual workshops (2004–2007), each with 15–25 experts from conservation
and development agencies working in the study area. During these workshops we con-
ducted visioning and modeling exercises. We based the participatory modeling approach
on methods described by Lynam et al. (2002), Sayer and Campbell (2004), Sandker et al.
(2007), and described on http://www.cifor.cgiar.org/conservation/_ref/research/index.htm.
The model was built in Stella (version 8) (HPS 1996), a user friendly modeling language
with an icon based interface. As early as the first workshop in 2003 a model was produced
showing the impact of various interventions on forest conservation and livelihoods. At
subsequent workshops the model was further refined and we incorporated new sectors,
data, and insights and explored new scenarios.
An idealized sequence of steps can be identified from our approach although as in many
multi-stakeholder processes there was plenty of iteration, backtracking, and changes in
direction from one workshop to the next (Fig. 2). In the first step, we developed visions of
the future around topics of interest. As a prelude to visioning, we encouraged participants
to think about change by discussing historical events that affected conservation and
development outcomes. We examined underlying trends in ecological and socioeconomic
variables. We then identified some potential major drivers of change, and developed
positive and negative scenarios from poverty and biodiversity perspectives. In so doing, we
identified the key issues for future modeling.
The second step consisted of identifying conservation and development outcome
indicators so we could be sure to cover these in the model. Because deforestation rates
were low, most conservation efforts focused on preventing poaching of large mammals.
Thus we used the population of forest elephants and western lowland gorillas as
indicators of biodiversity conservation performance. We also included the populations
of duikers (Cephalophus spp.) as biodiversity indicators because they are the most
important species for (legal) subsistence hunting (Nzooh 2003). Hunting pressure on
2878 Biodivers Conserv (2009) 18:2875–2892
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duikers is high. We considered four individual species of duikers: Peter’s duiker
(Cephalophus callipygus), bay duiker (Cephalophus dorsalis), blue duiker (Cephalophus
monticola) and yellow-backed duiker (Cephalophus sylvicultor). Duikers differ from
elephant and gorilla in that they have very high birth rates and are largely hunted for
subsistence and local sale, whereas elephants and gorillas have low birth rates and are
mainly hunted for external commercial markets. Poaching of elephants for their tusks is
largely by outsiders, or by locals temporarily employed by outsiders, whereas gorillas
are poached to provide bushmeat for far-off urban centers. Due to the value of ivory,
the hunting pressure on elephants is considerably higher than that on gorillas. As
indicators of local development, we used average household cash income and the
effective local development budgets (consisting mainly of forest taxes and wildlife
royalties). Cash income is highly sought after by local people, and the local devel-
opment budgets—the budgets actually used for development projects, so excluding the
share which is misappropriated are regarded as a good indicator of access to health and
education facilities.
The third step consisted of conceptualizing the landscape; this involved defining the major
sectors for the model (see Table 1), the spatial dimensions, and the major connections
between sectors and the key external drivers. This step is conducted on paper or in Stella’s
‘‘map layer’’. The fourth step was the detailed model building in Stella: defining the main
variables (stocks and converters in model terms) in each sector, collecting the initial values
for these variables, and defining how variables influenced each other. Small groups of
stakeholders worked on different sectors according to their specific knowledge, e.g., the
governance sector of the model (on misappropriation of natural resource taxes) was built
through a forum of local nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) working in the area.
Table 1 specifies the main stocks and the data sources for initial values, and the main flows.
These flows can be in- and out-flows to stocks (e.g., birth and death of human population) or
flows between stocks (e.g., forest is converted into agriculture). We collected additional
primary data through 50 household surveys among Baka-pygmies and Bantu in three villages
in 2006 to fill information gaps.
The fifth step consisted of reality checks, running the model under different con-
ditions and exploring how simulations compared to what is known by stakeholders. The
simulations often led to revisions of assumed variables and relationships and revealed
the need for additional data, for instance in this study data from household surveys.
Fig. 2 The modeling process
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Table 1 Overview of the sectors of the landscape model, and some of main stocks and flows
Sector Stocks (with information sources) Flows (with driving factors or information sources)
Land-use Current land-uses (2003 landsat images, GFW 2005) Land-use changes (driven by population increase)
Human population Baka, local Bantu and immigrant populations (GTZ 2001),
employment rate (jobs in other sectors), hunters (determined by
population size and employment rate) and employment
In- and out-migration (driven by employment and loss of income),
urbanization (UN 2006), natural population growth (UNFPA
2007; GTZ 2001)
Household income Current average household income for Baka, local Bantu and
immigrants (2006 household surveys, CEFAID 2005)
Income from various activities broken down by the three types of
households (2006 household surveys, logging employment,
bushmeat hunting)
Wildlife Current population sizes of elephants, gorillas and duikers (Nzooh
2003; Nzooh et al. 2005; Ekobo 1998)
Natural birth and death rates (Cowlishaw et al. 2004, estimates by
biologists), carrying capacities (estimates by biologists),
extraction by hunting
Bushmeat hunting Current number of elephants and gorillas poached per year, current
number of snares for duiker hunting (estimates from ecoguards;
2006 household surveys)
Change in hunting (determined by numbers of hunters, loss of
income, and directly affected by animal density, awareness
creation, antipoaching activities)
Safari hunting Current wildlife royalties paid (safari director interview),
employment in safari sector (GFW 2005; safari director
interview)
Change in wildlife royalties payment (depending on the number of
safari hunters coming in each year, which will decrease if some
key safari hunting species, like elephant, become rare)
Logging concessions Current timber extraction (GFW 2005), logging employment
(concession director and worker interviews), timber royalties
(MINEFI unpublished), contribution to antipoaching (only if
certified)
Change in extraction (depending on sustainability harvest—
certification), employment and royalties (depending on
extraction), and cost-effectiveness of the concession
Governance Development budgets commune and communities (mainly timber
tax and wildlife royalties), budget spent per development
activity, and misappropriation (budget statements, NGO
estimations)
Budget inflows (royalties paid, direct development investment) and
budget spending (better governance)
ICDP interventions Current ICDP budget (conservation NGO), current share spent on
antipoaching, ecomonitoring, awareness creation, better
governance, direct development investment, certification
Change in ICDP budget: three scenarios explored; change in
budget spending: three scenarios explored (Table 2)
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Once the model simulations were found to be realistic by all stakeholders, we moved to
the final step of exploring scenarios. In some circumstances consensus was not reached by
the stakeholders. In such situations we explored scenarios with alternative assumptions. To
explore the existing and potential ICDP interventions in the landscape we introduced them
in the model and defined their expected impact pathways. We defined the impact of each
ICDP intervention—ranging from zero to a maximum expected impact—as a function of
the budget spent on the activity (e.g., when US$ 1.5/ha or more is spent on antipoaching, a
maximum of 80% of snares will be removed). This data was supplied by those working on
these issues in the landscape. The scenarios were explored by varying the budget alloca-
tions to the different activities (antipoaching, anticorruption measures, and direct
development investments) and by changing the overall ICDP budget.
We explored trade-offs and synergies between conservation and development by
developing conservation and development indices (Fig. 5). The conservation index is the
mean of standardized values for elephant, gorilla, and duiker numbers, with standardization
performed using minimum and maximum numbers for each variable. The development
index is the mean of standardized values for household income and for local development
budgets. We then plotted the mean index values for three time periods.
Toward the end of the model building process, we presented the results to a forestry
donor forum and to parliamentarians in the capital, Yaounde´, to stimulate discussion on
possible solutions to the problems identified.
Funding and implementation scenarios
The current donor budget for conservation-development activities in the SE TOU is under
the control of one large international NGO and is about US$ 1.7 million/year. In most
donor-funded contracts for ICDPs there are objectives, activities or conditions related to
the sustainability of interventions. The donor funds are meant to set in place systems and
processes that will remain after the projects are completed. For this reason, and because
participants from the conservation NGO did not believe the current funding levels could be
maintained indefinitely, participants suggested that a reduced-funding scenario be
Table 2 Share of total ICDP budget spent on different interventions under the three management strategies
explored
Interventions Management strategy
Antipoaching Better governance
direct
Development
investment
Antipoaching
Inside park (%) 24 19 19
Outside park (%) 36 28 28
Ecological monitoring (%) 24 19 19
Awareness creation (%) 5 5 5
Sustainable forest management (%) 10 10 10
Lobbying for redistribution of royalties/taxes
and activities that strengthen community
governance (%)
0 20 0
Local development budget (%) 0 0 20
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simulated. We explored the outcomes from activities under three different budget sce-
narios: a fixed high ICDP budget over the next 25 years, a diminishing ICDP budget
dropping gradually to 30% of the current budget over 25 years, and a ‘‘no ICDP budget’’ in
which no donor funds are available for conservation-development initiatives.
After much discussion at the workshops, we settled on simulating three intervention
strategies. The first and current strategy was called the antipoaching strategy in which the
bulk of the ICDP budget is spent on antipoaching and ecological monitoring (Table 2). In
the second strategy, the governance strategy, some of the budget goes to lobbying at the
central government level to redirect forest taxes to community organizations without the
funds passing through the local administration and to improving the governance of these
community organizations. In the third intervention strategy, the direct development
investment strategy, governance activities are not undertaken; rather, funds are allocated
directly to the communities for local development initiatives.
Governance of forest taxes and wildlife royalties
Companies pay taxes for the exploitation of timber, which includes taxes on forest rents,
timber production, and product export. The most substantial of these are the forest rent
taxes or area fees. They comprised 51% of the total amount of taxes paid by forest
concessions from 2001 through 2005, and in 2005 the annual area fees amounted US$
7.5 million in the SE TOU (MINEFI, unpublished data; MINEFI 2005). According to the
Cameroonian forest law of 1994, a portion of the area fees should flow back into the
communes and communities from which the resources were exploited. For example, 40%
of the area fees should be made available to the communes (for development projects
executed by the communes) and 10% should be made available to the communities (for
development projects in villages).
The forest taxes generate considerably more local income than the wildlife royalties. In
2005 in the SE TOU, US$ 59,000 in wildlife royalties was received by communities
(Ngono, personal communication), which is insignificant when compared with the 10% of
forest area fees of US$ 752,700 for the same year (MINEFI, unpublished data; MINEFI
2005). However, the redistributed forest area fees are often not managed transparently, and
the bulk is misappropriated. The scale of misappropriation is estimated during the mod-
eling by NGOs at 80–85% of the money destined to the communes and 75% of the money
destined to communities. The recently established community-managed hunting zones
bypass local administrations and the wildlife royalties and go directly to community
structures that use it for local development projects. However, the effectiveness of this
community-based approach is also of concern. For example, the amount of money spent on
the administration of the funds is relatively high (33% of the total budget for the period
2001–2005) and Baka-pygmies receive few benefits from the disbursements (CEFAID
2004). However, according to the NGOs so far the level of misappropriation is significantly
reduced under this arrangement.
The better governance scenario simulates strengthened community control and reduced
levels of misappropriation. Although stakeholders thought governance could be improved
if funds flowed directly to communities, they did not think misappropriation of commune
forestry taxes could be halted. Thus, we simulated two governance scenarios, a more
‘‘optimistic’’ one in which misappropriation was reduced by 40% for both commune and
community forestry taxes and a more ‘‘realistic’’ one in which only the misappropriation of
community forestry taxes could be reduced, but not that of communes.
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How to interpret the model’s outcomes
In modeling landscapes such as the Tri National de la Sangha, there are numerous data
gaps. In these cases we used expert knowledge and key informant interviews to estimate
missing values (Table 1). Where possible, we got estimates from different sources to cross-
check values, e.g., the number of animals poached per year was assessed through the 2006
household surveys and through ecoguard estimates. The figures entered in the model were
midpoints. Where there were major discrepancies we conducted additional interviews.
Nonetheless, it was impossible to fully remove all subjectivity from the model. For
example, many stakeholders believed that if greater monetary benefits from natural
resources could flow to local people, communities would work with authorities to reduce
poaching. There is evidence that this is happening on a small scale, but many expressed
doubt that this will apply at a larger spatial scale. Many of the stakeholders building the
model were making budget decisions regarding the activities in the Tri National de la
Sangha, preparing work plans, and implementing actions on the ground. Thus, their
extensive local knowledge was already being used to drive conservation and development
actions, and the simulations were what stakeholders believed to be happening, or might
happen, on the basis of their knowledge.
Results
Human population growth
The simulation of human population in SE TOU showed a 1.6 times increase over
25 years. This increase was mainly due to birth rate because in- and out-migration is
estimated to be about equal at the beginning of the simulation. Out-migration was simu-
lated as increasing in the future because we assumed a continuation of the present trend for
people to migrate to cities.
Animal population dynamics
The increase in human population resulted in increased pressure on animals as a source of
bushmeat for consumption and cash. However, with the current fixed high ICDP budget and
an antipoaching strategy, the ICDP activities seemed sufficient to maintain large populations
of the selected large mammals over 25 years even though there would be continuing modest
declines in numbers of elephant and duiker (Fig. 3). If there was a diminished ICDP budget,
wildlife populations, especially elephants, would decline more rapidly.
The different intervention strategies lead to different outcomes for elephants and duikers
(Fig. 4) but not for gorillas because they experience limited poaching. With a fixed high
ICDP budget, an antipoaching strategy lead to 28% higher elephant numbers after 25 years
compared with the realistic governance strategy (because the application of the strategy
does not relate strongly to elephant hunting, given that the latter is driven by outsiders).
With the optimistic governance strategy, larger sums of money made their way back to
households and communities who, it was hypothesized, would see the benefits of wildlife
and natural resources and thus work closely with the authorities and observe regulations to
reduce poaching. The effect was greater for duikers because local people drive this
hunting. The direct development scenario is not shown because it was intermediate in its
effects between the antipoaching and governance scenarios.
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For a diminished ICDP budget the outcomes for elephant numbers were 20% lower after
25 years for the antipoaching and realistic governance scenario compared with the opti-
mistic governance scenario. The differences among intervention scenarios for duikers were
Fig. 3 Simulation of a elephant, b gorilla, and c duiker numbers under three different integrated
conservation and development project (ICDP) budget scenarios: no ICDP budget, fixed high budget, and
diminishing budget. An antipoaching strategy is followed in all simulated ICDPs (i.e., a large proportion of
funds goes toward antipoaching)
Fig. 4 Simulation of a elephant and b duiker numbers for three different intervention strategies:
antipoaching, optimistic governance, and realistic governance, assuming a fixed high ICDP budget
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more marked. The budget for antipoaching diminished but this was offset by improvements
in local governance and better local stewardship.
Household income and local development budgets
The household surveys revealed an average cash income in the SE TOU of US$ 250 per
capita per year. Thus, poverty levels are considerably higher than in the rest of Cameroon,
where the average annual per capita income is US$ 1010 (World Bank 2006). Of the
households surveyed, 70% live below US$ 1 per person per day. The difference between
the Bantu and Baka average cash income was significant: US$ 1,966 and US$ 864 per
household per year, respectively. For the Bantu, agriculture was the most important cash
source, whereas for Baka the collection of forest products, bushmeat hunting, and agri-
culture were equally important.
Of all the intervention strategies, only the optimistic governance scenario substantially
improved household incomes in the long-term (Table 3). The increase was a result of the
increased development budgets of which a share was spent on improving agricultural
production and market linkages. Agriculture is more important for the Bantu, so their
household income increased by 24%, whereas that for the Baka only increased by 13%.
The direct development scenario was not as good at delivering household benefits in the
long-term because the development budgets did not grow as strongly as they did in the case
of the optimistic governance strategy.
Although the antipoaching scenario did not show improved household incomes, it did
indicate a positive effect on the local development budgets. The local development budgets
dropped by\5% after 25 years (Table 3), whereas with no funds directed to antipoaching
these budgets would drop by almost 30%. This decrease was due to elephants becoming
increasingly scarce and this scarcity subsequently leading to safari companies leaving the
zone and no longer contributing to the local development budgets. The impact of the
governance reforms, especially the optimistic reform scenario, was huge (Table 3). Where
the ICDP budget was reduced, only better governance scenarios could lead to increases in
local incomes. Governance problems appeared to be at the heart of the underdevelopment
in the area. In the optimistic better governance scenario, there was a tenfold increase in
local development budgets, and the scenario was set up to only assume a 40% reduction in
misappropriation of funds.
Synergies and trade-offs
Exploring trade-offs and synergies between conservation and development was not simple
because trade-off conditions change over time and different indicators of conservation
(e.g., elephant vs. duiker) and development (e.g., local development budgets vs. household
incomes) show different patterns. The conservation and development indices (see methods)
show little potential for win-win situations (Fig. 5). For the first 6 years of the simulation
conservation thrived and development stagnated. Positive results for both conservation and
development were only achieved under the optimistic governance scenario with a fixed
budget (Fig. 5a). The long-term outcomes for conservation under all the other scenarios
were not promising, with declines in the conservation index, especially when the ICDP
budget diminished (Fig. 5b). The different ICDP interventions did not do much for local
development, except under the optimistic and to a smaller extend the realistic governance
scenarios.
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Table 3 Simulation results of average annual household income and annual local development budgets from forestry taxes and wildlife royalties for the three management
strategies explored assuming a fixed integrated conservation and development budgets
Management strategy
Antipoaching Better governance Direct development investment
Optimistic scenarioa Realistic scenarioa
Household
income (US$)
Development
budget (US$)
Household
income (US$)
Development
budget (US$)
Household
income (US$)
Development
budget (US$)
Household
income (US$)
Development
budget (US$)
Now 1,452 241,071 1,452 241,071 1,452 241,071 1,452 241,071
In 5 years 1,443 242,849 1,452 252,037 1,424 245,856 1,611 586,583
In 10 years 1,399 244,074 1,487 512,414 1,459 399,261 1,554 585,829
In 15 years 1,436 240,657 1,760 1,901,321 1,550 688,522 1,543 584,199
In 20 years 1,417 240,468 1,765 2,332,497 1,513 677,929 1,509 564,521
In 25 years 1,388 233,323 1,666 2,352,880 1,497 670,066 1,446 525,767
a The optimistic governance scenario assumes that under the better governance strategy misappropriation is reduced by 40% for both the commune and community forest area
fees; the realistic governance scenario assumes misappropriation is reduced by 40% for community forest area fees only
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Promoting dialogue
The model building promoted considerable discussion among the workshop participants.
Initially the scenarios focused on the typical conservation concerns: animal numbers and
how antipoaching could be organized. Only through questioning by the facilitators did the
governance issues surface. The discussions made conservation agents question two of their
underlying assumptions: they were effectively combining conservation and development,
and their work would yield sustainable outcomes. In the case of the first assumption,
project documents and presentations from conservation agencies characterized their
approach as ‘‘conservation and development’’. The model outputs questioned whether the
development outcomes were being considered seriously because most of the modeled
scenarios did not contribute to lifting people out of poverty. An analysis of project budgets
showed clearly how the bulk of the work was directed to conservation activities, such as
antipoaching and ecological monitoring. Another refrain from conservation agencies was
that their projects are sustainable, yet the diminished ICDP budget scenario showed clearly
that long-term outcomes could not be assured once external funding is withdrawn. Cur-
rently, different donor and stakeholder forums in the region are discussing how to assure
long-term funding.
The NGO participants who were shown the modeled results were shocked by the
simulated difference between the potential commune budget for development and what
was actually spent on development projects. They indicated their intention to use the
simulated budget graphs to create awareness among the population and government about
the misappropriation taking place. In fact, during the last municipal elections in Cameroon
in July 2007, the then mayor of Yokadouma lost his local constituent support and a new
mayor advocating better governance was subsequently elected.
Fig. 5 Trade-offs between conservation and development for different intervention strategies assuming a a
fixed high ICDP budget and b a diminished ICDP budget. Only the present (start), 6-year, and 25-year
scenario values are shown (see methods for axis derivation)
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Discussion
Role of participatory modeling
Participatory modeling is an efficient way to gather information and, more importantly, to
stimulate discussion among different stakeholders (van Noordwijk et al. 2001; Bousquet
et al. 2007). Because data is often lacking on the relationships among components of
modeled socioecological systems, such simulations largely reflect local expert opinion.
Various points of view and subjective criteria elicited from different local experts are made
explicit in the modeling process so as to improve understanding and shared representation
of the problems at hand and to provide an improved basis for negotiation when views are
divergent (Bousquet et al. 2007; Castella et al. 2007). Understanding of the trade-offs and
synergies between conservation and development improves during the modeling process
and this encourages participants to seek alternative solutions. Models can help capture the
complexity of conservation landscapes (Castella et al. 2007). We found that although
discussions are useful to change ways of thinking at the project level it is often impossible
for local implementing agencies to change projects drastically because project activities
and budgets are largely fixed externally. The discussions with donors, parliamentarians,
and local development NGOs emerged as major opportunities for influence because they
were in a better position to facilitate change. The model was useful in redirecting dis-
cussion toward livelihoods in conservation projects hitherto largely focused on animal
populations, antipoaching, and ecological monitoring. The model encouraged project
implementers to consider long-term perspectives.
Possible scenarios for improving conservation outcomes
The antipoaching strategy did little for local people and in many ways was only a holding
operation. McShane and Wells (2004) conclude most ICDPs need ongoing financial sup-
port or they collapse. In the case of the SE TOU, if conservation funds became unavailable,
and antipoaching efforts had to be scaled back, animal populations would decline dra-
matically. We therefore question the long-term impact of such short-term interventions.
Securing biodiversity with the current approaches will require continuing external funding.
Unfortunately, the funding for most ICDPs is relatively short-term and few institutional or
fiscal mechanisms exist to ensure long-term support for protected and surrounding areas
(Emerton et al. 2006).
Our results suggest that a conservation-development approach that does not give
attention to governance does little for people in the long-term and will do little for animal
populations unless donor investments continue. Investing solely in livelihood projects
without governance reform (the direct development scenario) will also do little to secure
long-term outcomes for people and nature. Our model suggests that the only hope for
improving long-term conservation and development is if considerable effort is given to
governance reform. Some of the workshop participants did not believe the governance
work would be successful, especially at the commune level, where misappropriation is
endemic (see also Oyono et al. 2006). And even if it was successful, many participants
thought satisfactory management of the local development budgets was only possible if
civil society could exert pressure through NGOs. Decentralization brings increased vul-
nerability to misappropriation by local elites (Assembe-Mvondo 2006). This negative
aspect of decentralization is well documented in Indonesia (Fritzen 2007; Duncan 2007)
and other countries (Ribot 2007).
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Integrated sustainable-use approaches that focus on empowering local communities to
improve livelihoods on the basis of sustainable management of biological resources have
gathered ground in recent years (e.g., Wilshusen et al. 2002; Hutton and Leader-Williams
2003; Bennett et al. 2007). In some cases, large amounts of funding allocated for local
conservation and development activities are misappropriated by local elites (Fritzen 2007;
Ribot 2007). It is therefore surprising that the conservation-development literature gives so
little attention to governance (Barrett et al. 2001; Smith and Walpole 2005). Many authors
have sought to explain why ICDPs do not reach their dual objectives but they have
generally failed to recognize weak governance as one of them (Alpert 1996; Chape 2001;
Schmidt-Soltau 2004; Christensen 2004). There are few empirical studies that explicitly
highlight the linkages between corruption and conservation (Smith et al. 2003a; Ferraro
2005), and some suggest that the perceived linkages are more complex than previously
thought (Barrett et al. 2006), with causality remaining unclear. Our work shows that the
impacts of poor governance can be simulated in models and that, in the case of south-
eastern Cameroon, none of the present approaches to conservation and development
problems will succeed in the absence of improved governance. Combating corruption is
complex and difficult especially in countries with weak governments (Smith et al. 2003b;
Palmer 2005) and worldwide there is little progress on improving governance (Kaufmann
2003). However, Cameroon does show a very modest but positive trend in improving
governance between 1996 and 2007 and examples of other African countries like Tanzania
and Madagascar show corruption can be controlled significantly in a short period (Kauf-
mann et al. 2007). The replacement of the corrupt mayor by one promoting better
governance is a positive signal for the SE TOU landscape and might indicate that it is on
the road towards truly integrating conservation and development.
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Abstract
Strategies for reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation
(REDD) could become an important part of a new agreement for climate
change mitigation under the United Nations Framework Convention on Cli-
mate Change. We constructed a system dynamics model for a cocoa agrofor-
est landscape in southwestern Ghana to explore whether REDD payments are
likely to promote forest conservation and what socio-economic implications
would be. Scenarios were constructed for business as usual (cocoa production
at the expense of forest), for payments for avoided deforestation of old-growth
forest only and for payments for avoided deforestation of all forests, including
degraded forest. The results indicate that in the short term, REDD is likely to
be preferred by farmers when the policy focuses on payments that halt the
destruction of old-growth forests only. However, there is the risk that REDD
contracts may be abandoned in the short term. The likeliness of farmers to opt
for REDD is much lower when also avoiding deforestation of degraded forest
since this land is needed for the expansion of cocoa production. Given that it
is mainly the wealthier households that control the remaining forest outside
the reserves, REDD payments may increase community differentiation, with
negative consequences for REDD policies.
Introduction
Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degra-
dation (REDD) is considered as a possible means for
mitigating climate change (UNFCCC 2007). Payments for
decreased CO2 emissions from deforestation and degra-
dation is considered one possible mechanism, with pay-
ments based on the difference between realized emissions
and projected emissions from a historical emission base-
line (Kanninen et al. 2007; Righelato & Spracklen 2007).
A concerted effort of policies and payments for envi-
ronmental services can reduce deforestation (e.g., Pagi-
ola 2007). However, in many tropical landscapes gover-
nance is weak and funds for payments for environmental
services schemes are limited. In addition, in many trop-
ical landscapes commercial agriculture is the main agent
of deforestation (oil palm, cocoa, rubber, and soy) (Lam-
bin et al. 2001). Under these circumstances, can REDD
payments provide the incentives to halt deforestation?
We examined this question for southwestern Ghana, a
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region where forest has been and continues to be lost to
cocoa production. Ghana receives support for develop-
ing early REDD activities from the World Bank’s Forest
Carbon Partnership Facility. Using simulation modeling,
we examine whether REDD payments to farmers would
provide the necessary incentives for farmers to opt for
reducing deforestation and forest degradation instead of
cultivating their land. We also examine some of the socio-
economic implications of REDD, given that many policy
makers are driven by development issues rather than en-
vironmental issues.
Methods
The landscape
The Wasa Amenfi West district in southwestern Ghana
covers an area of 34,646 km2 of which 25% is natu-
ral forest. The district experienced heavy in-migration by
farmers growing cocoa, the most important cash crop, re-
sulting in a population of 156,260 inhabitants in 2000
(District Report 2005, unpublished). Forest reserves ac-
count for 12% of the total landscape and are largely
managed by private logging companies. A smaller part
of the reserves are Globally Significant Biodiversity Areas
(NRMP 1999), which are excluded from any extractive
use, just as the sacred forests outside the reserves. De-
forestation in the landscape has occurred mainly outside
forest reserves, driven by local farmers clearing for cocoa
production.
Participatory modeling
Participatory modeling consists of building a model to-
gether with actors from the landscape with the aim of ex-
ploring future landscape pathways. The aim of this spe-
cific model building exercise was to assess the current
state and dynamics of the Wasa Amenfi West landscape,
sketch expected future dynamics, compare REDD pay-
ments with the opportunity costs of cocoa production in
this setting and feed this into expert discussion. REDD’s
feasibility will depend strongly on local government and
landholders’ motivation to participate. Through participa-
tory scenario exploration these actors directly communi-
cate foreseen obstacles and likely preferences. To be built
in a participatory way, the model needed to compromise
on complexity to gain in continuous participant input and
validation. The simulation outcomes therefore are rough
indications rather than precise predictions, but they are
validated by expert opinion.
The model building was initiated in a workshop setting,
involving a district official from the Ministry of Food and
Agriculture, cocoa farmers, a representative of a timber
company, personnel from local and international envi-
ronmental NGOs, and remote sensing and modeling ex-
perts. Data were obtained from a study on land cover
change (Fo¨rster 2009), district reports and the literature
(e.g., for carbon stocks). The model was produced using
the best available data, whenever data was lacking a me-
diated estimate was made by the local experts (Table 1).
The system dynamics model was built using the stock-
and-flow model software STELLA (HPS 1996). With its
icon-based interface, STELLA is readily understood by
participants without a modeling background (Sandker
et al. 2007, 2009; Van den Belt 2004). The model struc-
ture consisted of several submodels or “sectors” repre-
senting components of the social-ecological system such
as land-use change, population dynamics, carbon dynam-
ics, income, and REDD payments (Table 1).
In the model, deforestation is driven by growth in ru-
ral population and in line with forest conversion rates as
for the period 2000–2007. We modeled the conversion
of forest to cocoa plantations for large and small land-
holders. Some of the large landholders have old-growth
forest on their land, while smallholders have only access
to secondary forest. When available, 90% of the large
landholders’ demand for cocoa land will be taken from
old-growth forest; after depletion of the old-growth for-
est, the entire demand will shift to secondary forest. Lit-
tle off-farm employment exists in this remote rural part
of southwest Ghana. As a result, farmers all stated that
growing enough food for the family and making some
cash from cocoa were the two main farming goals (G.
Shepherd and S. Nyame 2009, personal observation). We
modeled all households to reserve at least one ha of land
for food crops.
Farmer income was modeled calculating the net in-
come from the cocoa plantations. The time to matura-
tion of cocoa is 8 years, followed by a 20 year production
period. In the first 2 years the cocoa saplings are inter-
cropped with food crops. Average values are used in the
model, e.g., for cocoa production per ha. Further assump-
tions and data inputs are provided in Table 1 and the full
model details are given in Appendix S1.
Farmer decision making was not modeled since there
was not enough information on how this occurs (see Wil-
son 2007 on the complexity of farmer decision making).
Rather, we explored what would happen to farmer in-
come and carbon stocks if farmers opted for or did not opt
for REDD. To compare the scenario’s attractiveness we
used the discounted value of per capita cash income over
20 years, referred to as net present value (Appendix S1),
though this is only one element of a very complex de-
cision making process. We also approximate after how
many years in the simulation the net present value of the
REDD scenario would drop below the net present value
of cocoa cultivation, indicating likely contract breaking,
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Table 1 Model structure, data input and assumptions
Model sector Contents Assumptions and data Information source
Land use dynamics Main land-uses: young cocoa intercropped with food
crops, productive cocoa agroforest systems,
secondary (tree height<25 m) and old growth forest
(tree height>25 m) outside the reserves; reserves,
timber and rubber plantations. Conversion is mainly
from primary and secondary forest to cocoa, driven by
the rural population
District size is 346,462 ha of which 12% is forest reserve
Land cover outside forest reserves in 2008: 2% urban and
bare soil, 3% non forested fallow, 8% food crops, 6%
food crops intercropped with young cocoa, 19%
2–8-year-old cocoa, 42% productive cocoa, 0% forested
fallow, 5% timber and rubber, 10% secondary forest, and
5% old growth (of which one quarter is sacred forest)
We assume deforestation of old growth forest to
continue linearly with the same annual quantity as seen
between 2000 and 2007
Sacred forest is not converted
Old growth forest is located on the land of the large
landholders as well as 80% of the secondary forest
Smallholders have average parcel sizes of 6 ha of which
on average 5 ha are currently in use (including fallow),
4.5 ha being cocoa
Large landholders have average parcel sizes of 30 ha of
which on average 21 ha are currently in use, 18 ha
being cocoa
Cocoa starts to produce after 8 years, remains productive
for 20 years followed by a fallow period of 3 years
For the ﬁrst 2 years, young cocoa is intercropped with
food crops
The food crop area will be at least 1 ha per rural
household
There is a preference for converting old growth forest
rather than secondary forest into cocoa by large
landholders. Without restrictions 90% of their demand
for new cocoa land is assumed to come from old
growth forest
Timber and rubber area remain ﬁxed
District report 2005
Mediated estimates using Aster 2007 images and
2009 household surveys
Mediated estimates using Aster 2007 and Landsat
2000 images
Local expert knowledge
Mediated estimates based on 2009 household
surveys and local expert knowledge
Rural population
dynamics
Population increase is mainly caused by birth in the
district as the in- and out migration was expected to be
minor
Population size 2008 = 190,400 people
Population growth rate = 2.5%
85% of the population is rural
Average household size = 5 people
14% of the households are large landholders, 86%
smallholders
Mediated estimate using district report 2005 data
and local expert knowledge
Average from data collected in 2000
Local expert estimates
Continued
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Table 1 Continued
Model sector Contents Assumptions and data Information source
Carbon The carbon stock is calculated for the land-uses on the
off-reserve area which is currently covered with old
growth forest (for scenario 2) and with old growth and
secondary forest (for scenario 3)
Average carbon contents (ton C/ha) per land-use: Urban,
bare soil = 0; nonforested fallow = 15; food crops =
30; food crops intercropped with young cocoa = 50;
3–8 year old cocoa = 70; productive cocoa = 100;
forested fallow = 130; timber and rubber = 135;
secondary forest = 160; old growth = 200
Mediated estimations from Swallow et al. (2007),
Wauters et al (2008) and De Bruijn (2005)
Income Proﬁt from cocoa = productive cocoa area ∗ average
production per ha ∗ net proﬁt per ha (income minus
costs fertilizer and pesticides) REDD income is
calculated in the REDD payments sector
The Ghanaian cocoa prices of 2007 and 2008 (US$ 1.14
and 1.37/kg) are compared to global market prices to
calculate the percentage going to the government
(44%)
Cocoa price is projected to 2030 following and extending
the trend of the World Bank forecast to 2020 resulting
in a 40% decrease in 20 years
Average production per hectare: 11.8 bags (=767 kg)
Costs are 20% of proﬁt
Cocoa proﬁt contributes> 90% of rural cash income
Cocoa income is used as proxy for total rural cash income
excluding cash from REDDWe assume labor is not paid
and the cost of this is not included in the model
Information from district ofﬁcial and cocoa farmer,
and World Bank (2009a)
World Bank (2009b)
Data from Technoserve Extension Ofﬁces in the
district
Estimation district ofﬁcials
Expert judgment
REDD payments Total carbon payment is calculated by: CO2 stock (tons) of
land-uses in 20 years from now on land now covered
with off-reserve old growth forest (scenario 2) and
secondary forest (scenario 3) minus carbon stock old
growth forest (scenario 2) and secondary forest
(scenario 3) multiplied by the price farmers would
receive per ton CO2
We assume an international carbon price of US$ 10/ton
CO2 paid by investors, We obtained this number
mediating the average contracted price throughout
2007 and early 2008 on the Clean Development
Mechanism market (US$ 13.60/ton CO2) and the
average price on the voluntary market (US$ 4.40/ton
CO2)
Transaction costs of REDD are presumed high and thus
we assume only 25% will reach the farmers (US$ 2.5/ton
CO2), We adapted this number from Indonesian
transaction costs which can be as high as 80%
We assume a 20-year contract with: 20% paid up front;
large payments paid every 5-years (10%) and 20% paid
after 20 years if there is contract compliance; and
regular small payments in other years (2%)
Capoor and Ambrosi (2008) for CDM price, and
Butler et al (2009) for voluntary market price
CarbonPositive (2009) for Indonesian transaction
costs
How REDD contracts will be constructed has yet to
be determined. We assume a large up-front
payment in order to attract sellers of carbon and
provide ﬁnance for start-up costs of sellers
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Figure 1 Total carbon stock in the off-reserve area for (a) area currently covered with old-growth forest under “business as usual” (scenario 1) and
“avoided deforestation of old-growth forest” (scenario 2); and (b) area now covered with secondary and old-growth forest under “business as usual” and
“avoided deforestation of standing secondary and old-growth forest” (scenario 3).
and at what carbon price this would not happen
(Appendix S1). In general, discount rates are high among
low-income farmers (Campbell et al. 2006). However,
Richards & Asare (1999) argue discount rates to be low
among Ghanaian cocoa farmers, since many see cocoa
farming as a type of old age pension, suggesting a dis-
count rate of 6%. We used discount rates of 6 and 20%.
Three scenarios were modeled. Scenario 1 explores
business as usual: old-growth and secondary forest are
converted into cocoa plantations extrapolating the lin-
ear trend for the period 2000–2007. Scenario 2 explores
avoided deforestation of old-growth forest. In this sce-
nario, we assume all large landholders with old-growth
forest on their land opt to receive REDD payments and
no old-growth forest is converted into cocoa plantations.
Scenario 3 explores avoided deforestation of all forest. In
this scenario, we assume all farmers with standing old-
growth and secondary forest on their land opt to receive
REDD payments and no forest is converted into cocoa
plantations. Only degraded cocoa plantations and non-
forested land is used for new cocoa plantations.
Payments are simulated only for forest outside reserves
since the forest reserves are already under a national
forest conservation strategy and are not available to lo-
cal farmers. We assume an international carbon price
of US$10/ton CO2 to be paid by investors (Table 1), of
which 75% is lost to transaction costs (Table 1) and thus
US$ 2.5/ton CO2 would be received by the farmer re-
ducing emissions on his land. For the payments we as-
sumed a 20 year payment contract, with a high up-front
payment because of the start-up costs involved in REDD
(Table 1).
Results
Land use changes and carbon
For scenario 1, carbon stock declines rapidly over 20 years
(Figure 1). These scenarios (Figure 1a and b) are used
as the baseline for the calculation of REDD payments.
The carbon stock on the land now covered with old-
growth forests outside reserves decreases by 37% from
3 to 1.9 million ton C (Figure 1a) and for old-growth and
secondary forest together the carbon stock decreases by
40% from 7.9 to 4.8 million ton C (Figure 1b). Already
after 3 years, all old-growth forest outside the reserves is
converted into cocoa plantation, excluding sacred forests.
Once old-growth forest is gone, secondary forest cover
decreases faster as it gives way to new cocoa plantations.
The total cocoa area expands approximately 10% after
11 years to 220,000 ha after which there is no secondary
forest or other land for further expansion. After 20 years
the food crop area per household has decreased by 10%
due to population growth and cocoa expansion.
Under scenario 2, the expansion of cocoa comes to an
end after 7 years, when cocoa has increased by 4% to
212,000 ha. At the start of the simulation the farmers
with old-growth forest shift their demand for new co-
coa land to secondary forest resulting in the depletion of
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Figure 2 Income per capita for the rural population in the district under
three scenarios: (1) business as usual, (2) no conversion of old-growth
forest, and (3) no conversion of standing secondary andold-growth forest.
secondary forest after 6 years. Under scenario 2, 1.2 mil-
lion ton C is prevented from being emitted compared to
business as usual (Figure 1a).
Under scenario 3, after 1 year, all nonforested fallow
land has been converted to cocoa plantations reaching
their maximum cover of 205,000 ha. The rest of the sim-
ulation the cocoa area decreases as old cocoa turns into
fallow land left unused for 3 years. The food crop area
per household drops by 15% after 20 years because of
the limitations placed on forest conversion. Some sec-
ondary forest regenerates into old-growth forest. Under
scenario 3 carbon in the off-reserve area currently cov-
ered by old-growth and secondary forest increases from
7.9 to 8.3 million ton C (Figure 1b) and 3.5 million ton C
is prevented from being emitted compared to business as
usual.
Rural income and opportunity costs
The average per capita income under scenario 1 decreases
from US$ 710 to 340 over 20 years for Wasa Amenfi
West’s rural population (Figure 2). This is partly due
to the decrease in cocoa price, dropping by 40% after
20 years following the World Bank’s forecast (Table 1).
It is also due to the shortage of land for new cocoa plan-
tations and declining soil fertility, while at the same time
land has to be shared among the expanding future gen-
eration. It is likely that migration out of the district will
increase in this situation, though this was not simulated.
Smallholders have no access to old-growth forest and
are therefore not receiving payments for halting defor-
estation. Under scenario 2, average annual REDD pay-
ments vary between US$ 18–180 per ha, while average
annual cocoa net income varies between US$ 388–563
per ha. For the first 7 years of the simulation large land-
holders have enough land without old-growth forest to
continue cocoa expansion at the current rate. Since co-
coa is simulated to become productive after 8 years, the
cocoa planting restrictions after year seven only impact
income after year 15 when it drops below income under
business as usual (Figure 2).
Under scenario 3, average annual REDD payments vary
between US$ 16–159 per ha, while average annual co-
coa net income varies between US$ 388–563 per ha.
Cocoa expansion is already restricted after 1 year, impact-
ing income after 9 years (Figure 2). However already af-
ter 2 years, average per capita income under scenario 3
drops below business as usual caused by the lack of food
crop land for smallholders. Smallholders are simulated to
shorten their cocoa cycle, converting older productive co-
coa to food crops, in order to maintain the minimum food
crop plot of one ha per household.
The opportunity costs of cocoa production are not met
by REDD payments. However, since REDD payments
would be received immediately while cocoa starts pro-
ducing after 8 years, discounting the income flows in-
creases REDD’s attractiveness. There is little to choose
between the scenarios in terms of net present value
(Table 2, first column), though scenario 3 appears to
provide the least incentives. Scenario 2 becomes slightly
more attractive to business as usual applying a high dis-
count rate; big future losses in income can be compen-
sated by a small up-front payment when discounting. The
low level of net present value variation among the sce-
narios is largely due to the fact that limiting cocoa ex-
pansion affects income with an 8-year delay, the time for
cocoa to start producing.
Alternative assumptions
Changing some assumptions on cocoa and carbon prices
in the model, result in the net present values given
in Table 2 (the alternative assumptions columns). The
outcomes appear sensitive to the discount rate applied,
though scenario preferences do not change with alter-
ing cocoa prices. When applying a 20% discount rate,
increasing the carbon price paid by investors from US$
10 to 15, net present values for scenario 1 and 3 are
about equal and doubling the carbon price, scenario 3
even gives a slightly higher net present value.
Contract breaking and the price of stopping
deforestation
If the farmers conserving their old-growth forest (sce-
nario 2) would merely aim at profit maximization they
would break the contract after year five and continue the
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Table 2 Net present values (US$) for 20 year income ﬂows under the three scenarios with current and alternative model assumptions applying a 6 and
20% discount rate
Net present value – 6% discount rate Net present value – 20% discount rate
Alternative assumptions Alternative assumptions
Cocoa price for
farmer ﬁxed at
US$1.46/kg
(price 2009)
Cocoa price
increasing
with 40% over
20 years
Carbon price
paid by
investors
US$15
Carbon price
paid by
investors
US$20
Cocoa price for
famer ﬁxed at
US$1.46/kg
(price 2009)
Cocoa price
increasing
with 40% over
20 years
Carbon price
paid by
investors
US$15
Carbon price
paid by
investors
US$20
Scenario 1 5,169 7,455 8,677 5,169 5,169 2,405 3,270 3,608 2,405 2,405
Scenario 2 5,170 7,437 8,641 5,186 5,202 2,419 3,283 3,619 2,428 2,437
Scenario 3 4,922 7,013 8,092 4,974 5,026 2,377 3,198 3,512 2,405 2,432
conversion to cocoa. This scenario results in some delay
in carbon emissions but not in net emission reduction or
conservation of old-growth forest over 20 years. To stop
the deforestation of old-growth forest, a carbon price of
at least US$ 55–60/ton CO2 is needed. Deforestation of
old-growth and degraded forest is stopped at a minimum
of US$ 70–75/ton CO2.
Discussion
Assuming an annual REDD payment, farmers are likely to
accept REDD initiatives, especially if a large up-front pay-
ment is planned as may occur with REDD funds pouring
into new initiatives (Angelsen 2008, p. 128). But soon
after the up-front payment is made, there may be a high
incentive to break the contract, given the higher financial
benefits from cocoa production. To keep avoiding defor-
estation after the contract period, payments should con-
tinue after 20 years increasing the price per ton CO2. If
cocoa prices remain at current values or increase, oppor-
tunity costs of cocoa will be even higher and therefore
carbon prices should be even more than US$ 55/ton CO2
to stop deforestation of old-growth forest. Price fluctua-
tions in tropical agricultural commodities are high (e.g.,
World Bank 2009a and b), providing a difficult context
for REDD which has to be based on long-term contracts.
If farmers opt for REDD this will likely widen the gap
between rich and poor given that 90% of the carbon is
stored in forest on large landholdings owned by <14%
of the rural population. Furthermore, poor people who
lease land may lose access to the land as large landholders
may claim back their leased-out land for REDD purposes.
The food crop area per capita decreases more under sce-
nario 3 than under business as usual, and they may opt
for cash cropping rather than growing enough food ex-
posing households to greater food insecurity. If REDD has
negative impacts on human wellbeing, and it increases
rural differentiation, then policy makers may not support
REDD, given their overriding concern with development
and not environmental issues. A potential source of con-
flict is the unclear tenure over carbon; agreements on ac-
cess to carbon payments and benefit sharing need to be
negotiated.
If REDD becomes an option it is likely that some land-
holders will opt for REDD and others wont, unlike our
scenarios where all do. There may be forest patches with
lower cocoa suitability and thus lower opportunity costs
where REDD is more attractive (e.g., on steep slopes).
However, in our simulation REDD payments are so far
from competing with opportunity costs of cocoa that even
low-productive areas may be preferred for cocoa than
REDD.
In landscapes comparable to this study, with little re-
maining unprotected old-growth forest, high population
pressure, and lucrative income from cash crop produc-
tion, REDD payments based on current carbon prices
would not outcompete agricultural production. REDD in-
vestments based on current carbon market conditions
made in such landscapes would most likely be received
with some enthusiasm, perhaps initially shift deforesta-
tion from old-growth to degraded forest, for the strategy
to be abandoned after some years. Such an investment
would not result in long-term reduction of carbon emis-
sions. That high prices for cash crops (including biofuels)
can undermine REDD strategies has also been shown in
Asia (Butler et al. 2009), while in some parts of Africa,
e.g., where shifting cultivation is practiced, REDD could
be a more lucrative option than current land uses (e.g.,
Bellassen & Gitz 2008).
Acknowledgments
This article is a product of a participatory modeling work-
shop held in Ghana, 2008. The workshop was sponsored
120 Conservation Letters 3 (2010) 114–121 Copyright and Photocopying: c©2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
M. Sandker et al. REDD payments to prevent forest loss
by the International Union for Conservation of Nature
(IUCN) and facilitated by the Center for International
Forestry Research (CIFOR) and Charles Darwin Univer-
sity (Australia).
Supporting Information
Additional Supporting Information may be found in the
online version of this article:
Appendix S1 Full description of the method, model
structure and dynamics.
Please note: Wiley-Blackwell is not responsible for the
content or functionality of any supporting materials sup-
plied by the authors. Any queries (other than missing ma-
terial) should be directed to the corresponding author for
the article.
References
Angelsen, A. (2008) Moving AHEAD with REDD: issues, options
and implications. CIFOR, Bogor, Indonesia.
Bellassen, V., Gitz V. (2008) Reducing emissions from
deforestation and degradation in Cameroon—
assessing costs and benefits. Ecol Econ 68, 336–
344.
Butler, R.A., Koh L.P., Ghazoul J. (2009) REDD in the red:
palm oil could undermine carbon payment schemes.
Conserv Lett 2, 67–73.
Campbell, B.M, Gordon I.J., Luckert M.K., Petheram L.,
Vetter S. (2006) In search of optimal stocking regimes in
semi-arid grazing lands: one size does not fit all. Ecol Econ
60, 75–85.
Capoor, K., Ambrosi P. (2008) State and trends of the carbon
market 2008. World Bank, Washington, DC.
CarbonPositive. (2009) Indonesia reveals REDD revenue
shares. Available from: URL http://www.
carbonpositive.net/viewarticle.aspx?articleID=1602.
Accessed 17 September 2009.
De Bruijn, A. (2005) Carbon dynamics simulation in Malinau
Research Forest, Borneo, Indonesia. Thesis, Wageningen
University, The Netherlands.
Fo¨rster, J. (2009) The potential of reducing emissions from
deforestation and degradation (REDD) in Western Ghana.
Thesis, University of Bayreuth, Germany.
HPS (High Performance Systems). (1996) STELLA and STELLA
research software. HPS, Hanover, NH.
Kanninen, M., Murdiyarso D., Seymour F., Angelsen A.,
Wunder S., German, L. (2007) Do trees grow on money?
The implications of deforestation research for policies to
promote REDD. Center for International Forestry Research
(CIFOR), Bogor, Indonesia.
Lambin, E.F., Turner B.L., Geist H.J. et al. (2001) The causes
of land-use and land-cover change: moving beyond the
myths. Glob Environ Change 11, 261–269.
NRMP (Natural Resource Management Programme). (1999)
Globally significant biodiversity areas ‘fure head waters’
and ‘fure river forest reserves’ in Wasa Amenfi West
District gazetted by NRMP, Ghanaian Ministry of Lands
Forests and Mines.
Pagiola, S. (2007) Payments for environmental services in
Costa Rica. Ecol Econ 65, 712–724.
Richards, M., Asare A. (1999) Economic Incentives for Cocoa
Farmers to Tend Cocoa Trees in Southern Ghana.
Unpublished Report for UK Department for International
Development (DFID) Forestry Research Programme.
Overseas Development Institute, London.
Righelato, R., Spracklen D.V. (2007) Carbon mitigation by
biofuels or by saving and restoring forests? Science 317, 902.
Sandker, M., Campbell B.M., Nzooh Z. et al. (2009) Exploring
forest wildlife conservation scenarios in Central Africa.
Biodiversity Conserv 18, 2875–2892.
Sandker, M., Suwarno A., Campbell B.M. (2007) Will forests
remain in the face of oil palm expansion? Simulating
change in Malinau, Indonesia. Ecol Soc 12, 37.
Swallow, B., Noordwijk M., van Dewi S. et al. (2007)
Opportunities for avoided deforestation with sustainable
benefits. An Interim Report by the ASB Partnership for the
Tropical Forest Margins. Nairobi, Kenya.
UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change). (2007) Decision 2/CP.13 Reducing emissions
from deforestation in developing countries: approaches to
stimulate action. Pages 8–11 in FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1.
Report of the Conference of the Parties on its thirteenth
session, held in Bali from 3 to 15 December 2007,
Addendum Part Two: Action taken by the Conference of
the Parties at its thirteenth session. Bonn, Germany.
Available from: http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2007/
cop13/eng/06a01.pdf#page=8. Accessed 1 December 2009.
Van Den Belt, M. (2004) Mediated modeling. A system dynamics
approach to environmental consensus building. Washington DC,
USA.
Wauters, J.B., Coudert S., Grallien E., Jonard M., Ponette Q.
(2008) Carbon stock in rubber tree plantations in Western
Ghana and Mato Grosso (Brazil). Forest Ecol Manage 255,
2347–2361.
Wilson, G.A. (2007) Multifunctional agriculture: a transition
theory perspective. Trowbridge, UK.
World Bank. (2009a) Commodity price data (pink sheet).
Available from: URL
http://go.worldbank.org/2O4NGVQC00. Accessed 17
September 2009.
World Bank. (2009b) Prospects for the global economy:
commodity forecast. Available from: URL http://go.
worldbank.org/9VQJ4ACJZ0. Accessed 17 September
2009.
Editor: Dr. Robin Naidoo
Conservation Letters 3 (2010) 114–121 Copyright and Photocopying: c©2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. 121
Fe de erratas 
 
On dissertation page 103 / article page 115: the Wasa Amenfi West district 
area should be 3,465 km2 instead of 34,646 km2 
 
 
Appendix I. Full description of the method, model structure and 
dynamics 
 
In this appendix we give a full description of the steps taken in the 
participatory model building process and explain the basics of the model 
language STELLA. After this, we describe the full structure and dynamics of 
the model built of the Wasa Amenfi West district by providing a list of all 
variables and equations. Finally, we describe how we obtained the contract 
breaking year if we assume the farmer would make his decisions merely 
based on profit maximization (searching the highest net present value of 
income) and how we obtained the price at which deforestation can be 
stopped. 
 
Steps taken in the participatory model building process 
 
We describe an idealized sequence of steps in the participatory modeling 
process (Fig. 1) although as in many multi-stakeholder processes there was 
some iteration and backtracking during the workshop. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. 
Sequence of 
steps in 
participatory 
modeling process 
modified from 
Sandker et al. 
2009 
 
In the first step, we developed visions of the future around topics of interest. 
As a prelude to visioning, we encouraged participants to think about change 
by discussing historical events that affected conservation and development 
outcomes in the landscape (Wasa Amenfi West district). We examined 
underlying trends in ecological and socioeconomic variables. We then 
identified some potential major drivers of change, and developed positive 
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and negative scenarios from poverty and biodiversity perspectives. In so 
doing, we identified the key issues for modeling. 
 
The second step consisted of identifying what model parameters we are 
interested in; their outcomes are plotted on graphs. For the scenario for 
Reducing Emissions from forest Degradation and Deforestation (REDD) this is 
the amount of carbon prevented from being emitted by deforestation and 
forest degradation, and the cash income for the farmers that preserve this 
carbon on their lands. 
 
The third step consisted of conceptualizing the landscape; this involved 
defining the major sectors for the model, the spatial dimensions and the 
major connections between sectors. This step is conducted on paper or in 
STELLA’s “map layer”. 
 
The fourth step was the detailed model building in STELLA. We defined the 
main variables (stocks and converters in model terms) in each sector and 
collected the initial values for these variables. We defined how these 
variables changed over time (adding flows to the stocks) and how variables 
influenced each other (adding action connectors). Small groups of 
stakeholders worked on different sectors after which they were presented 
and discussed as a group and linked together in one landscape model. 
 
The fifth step consisted of reality checks, running the model under different 
conditions and exploring how simulations compared to what is known by 
stakeholders. The simulations often led to revisions of assumed variables and 
relationships and revealed the need for additional data; data which was 
collected in the beginning of 2009 by household surveys.  
 
Once the model simulations were found to be realistic by all stakeholders, we 
moved to the final step of exploring scenarios and asking ‘what if..’ 
questions. Accordingly assumptions can be changed in the model, e.g. ‘what 
happens to farmer income patterns if the carbon price is US$ 20 instead of 
US$ 10/ton CO2?’. On the basis of the simulation outcome (e.g. displayed in 
a graph) the participants discuss potential obstacles and likely farmer 
decisions. 
 
The modeling language STELLA 
 
The system dynamics model of the Wasa Amenfi West district was built using 
the software STELLA (HPS, 1996). STELLA’s interface has three levels: the 
equation level, the model level and the interface level. The model level is 
quantitative but can be switched to qualitative (then referred to as map 
instead of model) to display only the relationships among variables without 
adding their values. The equation level gives the mathematical description 
(see ‘Detailed description of model equations) of the elements constructed in 
the model level. The interface level gives an overview of the model sectors 
and their connectedness. The equation level is generally the least used, the 
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model is built at the model level and the interface level is used for 
navigation. 
 
 STELLA models are built using four basic elements of construction: ‘stocks’, 
‘flows’, ‘action connectors’ and ‘converters’ (Figure 2). 
 
 
 
Figure 2. A 
STELLA model 
for population (in 
STELLA’a model 
level) 
 
Stocks (e.g. ‘Population’ in Figure 2) represent conditions within a system; 
they are a quantity of something with one single unit (e.g. km2, persons, 
m3). Stocks are represented with the following equation:  
X(t) = X (t-dt) + (Inflows – Outflows) * dt 
where t= time and dt = the time step 
 
None of the stocks in the Wasa Amenfi West model are allowed to have a 
negative value. There are different stock variants, of which two are used in 
this model. We used the ‘classic’ stock, called a ‘reservoir’ (‘Population’ in 
Figure 2, and ‘Secondary forest’ in Figure 3), and a ‘conveyor’ to simulate 
aging (‘Fallow land’ in Figure 3). 
 
 
 
Figure 3. A STELLA model 
for re-growth of fallow land 
into forest using a 
conveyor 
 
The initial value entered in the conveyor is considered to be of different ages 
spread equally over the transit time. For example, in the example of Figure 3 
we entered a transition time for re-growth of 5 years; when t=0 and the 
initial value of fallow land=100ha, then during the first 5 years of the 
simulation, 20 ha will grow into secondary forest each year. After the first 
transit time in the simulation has passed, the outflow equals the inflow with 
one transit time delay; in our example this would be outflow (t) = inflow (t-
5).  
 
Flows (‘Population increase’ and ‘Population decrease’ in Figure 2 and 
‘Regrowth’ in Figure 3) represent the activities that cause conditions to 
 112 
change and add dynamics to the values of stocks. Flows do not have a 
predetermined equation structure but have the same unit as the stock with 
which they are connected per time step (e.g. km2/year, persons/year). 
In a metaphor HPS (2003) suggests that if stocks are nouns and flows are 
verbs, then converters (‘Birth rate’ and ‘Death rate’ in Figure 2) are adverbs. 
Converters add information and are often used to define flows and convert 
their units correctly. They have no predetermined equation structure and can 
have single (e.g. ha, elephants) or combined units (e.g. elephants/ha; 
m3/year). Often they are constant values but their values can also be defined 
as functions or ‘graphical functions’. When a converter is a graphical function 
its value can change in a non-linear manner over time or with the values of 
stocks, flows or other converters in the model. E.g. one can make a graphical 
function of Birth rate making its value depend on Population; we can enter a 
constant value until the population reaches a certain number after which we 
can lower the value of Birth rate with an S-shaped curve. The graphical 
function is designed by the modeler. 
 
The last element of the STELLA language is the action connector (the arrows 
in Figure 1). Action connectors transport information from stocks, flows and 
converters to flows and converters. E.g. if the flow ‘Population increase’ is 
determined by ‘Birth rate’ x ‘Population’, then action connectors are needed 
from ‘Birth rate’ and ‘Population’ to ‘Population increase’. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Sectors 
of the Wasa 
Amenfi West 
model and slider 
for running 
different scenarios 
(in STELLA’s 
interface level) 
 
 
A landscape model is often sub-divided in different model sectors, just to 
make it easier to navigate the model and to keep a degree of overview when 
the model gets more complex. The sectors of the Wasa Amenfi West model  
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are displayed in Figure 4. The arrows between the sectors indicate 
information from the sector from which the arrow departs is used in the 
sector the arrow points at. 
 
Located below the model sectors one can see a slider called ‘REDD Scenarios’ 
(Figure 4). A slider is a converter which can take different values. The slider 
in Figure 4 can take the value 1, 2 and 3. The incremental step is set at 1 so 
the slider in this example cannot take intermediate values (e.g. 1.5). Sliders 
are usually used so one can easily run different scenarios or to change the 
value of a parameter whose influence on the model outcomes we’d like to 
explore.  
 
In the Ghana model the three scenarios explored are obtained by changing 
the slider ‘REDD Scenarios’ as follows: 
REDD Scenarios= 1: ‘Business as usual’, forest is being converted to cocoa 
plantations 
REDD Scenarios= 2: ‘Avoided deforestation of old-growth forest’, none of the 
current area covered with old-growth forest is converted 
REDD Scenarios=3: ‘Avoided deforestation of all forest’, none of the current 
area covered with old-growth or secondary forest is converted 
 
Detailed description of the model equations 
 
In this section the equations used to model the landscape are described per 
sector. The equations are ordered as stocks, flows and converters though 
some sectors only include converters (carbon, cocoa production, REDD 
payments and Income and net present value). The stocks, flows or 
converters which are underlined originate from a different sector (causing the 
arrows between the sectors in Figure 4). 
 
 
SECTOR: Rural population 
 
Only the rural population is included in this model since the urban population 
is not involved in REDD and will not affect deforestation much. Rural 
population increase is mainly caused by births in the district as the in- and 
out migration was expected to be minor. There might be a possible shift from 
rural people becoming urban (farmers changing to the service sector) and/or 
one might experience an increase in rural people migrating out of the district, 
especially with land becoming scarce. However this is not of major 
importance for the outcomes of REDD and was not included in the model.  
The rural households are divided into large landholders (LL) and smallholders 
(SH) because these are differently affected by REDD payments.  
 
Stocks: 
 
LL_households(t) = LL_households (t - dt) + LL_hh_increase – 
LL_hh_decrease 
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SH_households(t) = SH_households (t - dt) + SH_hh_increase – 
SH_hh_decrease 
 
Flows: 
 
LL_hh_increase = Birth_rate * LL_households * dt 
LL_hh_decrease = Death_rate * LL_households * dt 
SH_hh_increase = Birth_rate * SH_households * dt 
SH_hh_decrease = Death_rate * SH_households * dt 
 
Convertors: 
 
Birth_rate = 0.04 
Death_rate = 0.015 
Total_hh = LL_households + SH_households 
Total_rural_population = Total_hh * 5 
Change_in_hh_LL = LL_hh_increase - LL_hh_decrease 
Change_in_hh_SH = SH_hh_increase - SH_hh_decrease 
 
 
SECTOR: Land transitions 
 
Deforestation in the landscape has occurred mainly outside forest reserves, 
driven by local farmers clearing for cocoa production. This land cover change 
dynamic is our main interest which is why this conversion is modeled in more 
detail. It is unclear whether timber and rubber plantations would increase or 
decrease to make way for cocoa; these areas are presumed to remain 
constant. The demand for new cocoa land is modeled in such a way that the 
cocoa area per household remains the same as long as there is enough land 
available. Thus deforestation is driven by population increase and by the 
demand for land replacing old cocoa plantations for which a fallow period is 
modeled. 
 
Large landholders’ (LL) land: 
 
Stocks: 
 
Old_growth_off_reserve_LL(t) = Old_growth_off_reserve(t - dt) + 
(Regeneration – Old_growth_into_cocoa) * dt 
  Old_growth_off_reserve(0) = 11,400 ha 
Sec_forest_LL(t) = Sec_Forest_LL(t - dt) + (Fallow_to_sec_LL - 
Cocoa_planting_on_sec_LL - Regeneration) * dt 
 Sec_forest_LL(0) = 24,406 ha 
Productive_cocoa_LL(t) = Productive_cocoa_LL(t - dt) + (Cocoa_over_8yrsLL 
- Cocoa_deterioration_LL) * dt 
 Productive_cocoa_LL(0) = 51,394 ha 
Food_crop_LL(t) = Food_crop_ LL(t - dt) + Crops_on_cocoa_land_LL * dt 
 Food_crop_LL(0) = 9,946 ha 
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Non_forested_fallow_LL(t) = Non_forested_fallow_LL(t - dt) - 
Cocoa_on_fallow_LL * dt 
 Non_forested_fallow_LL(0) = 3,661 ha 
 
Conveyor stocks: 
 
Cocoa_&_food_LL(t) = Cocoa_&_food_LL(t - dt) + 
(Cocoa_planting_on_sec_LL + Old_growth_into_cocoa + 
Cocoa_on_fallow_LL - Cocoa_over_2yrsLL) * dt 
Cocoa_&_food_LL(0) = 7342 
Transit time = 2 years (Conveyor outflow ‘Fallow_to_sec_LL’) 
Cocoa_2_to_8_yrs_LL(t) = Cocoa_2_to_8_yrs_LL(t - dt) + 
(Cocoa_over_2_yrsLL - Cocoa_over_8_yrsLL) * dt 
Cocoa_2_to_8_yrs_LL(0) = 22842 
Transit time = 6 years (Conveyor outflow ‘Cocoa_over_8_yrsLL’) 
Forested_fallow_LL(t) = Forested_fallow_LL(t - dt) + 
(Cocoa_deterioration_LL - Fallow_to_sec_LL) * dt  
 Forested_fallow_LL(0) = 0 
Transit time = 3 years (Conveyor outflow ‘Cocoa_over_2yrsLL’) 
 
 
Figure 5. Model for dynamics of land uses on large landholders’ land 
(elements in dotted lines are model elements calculated in other model 
sectors and ‘copied’ to this sector maintaining its dynamics) 
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Flows: 
 
Regeneration = if REDD_Scenarios=3 then Sec_forest_LL/Yrs_40 else 0 
Old_growth_into_cocoa = if REDD_Scenarios=1 then 
Demand_for_new_cocoa_land_LL*0.9 else 0 
Fallow_to_sec_LL = Conveyor outflow 
Cocoa_planting_on_sec_LL = if REDD_Scenarios=3 then Fallow_to_sec_LL 
else Demand_for_new_cocoa_land_LL-Old_growth_into_cocoa 
Cocoa_on_fallow_LL = Demand_for_new_cocoa_land_LL - 
Old_growth_into_cocoa - Cocoa_planting_on_sec_LL 
Cocoa_over_2_yrsLL= Conveyor outflow 
Cocoa_over_8_yrsLL= Conveyor outflow 
Cocoa_deterioration_LL = Productive_Cocoa_LL(t)/Yrs_20 
Crops_on_cocoa_land_LL = if Food_crop_area_per_LL_hh <1 then (1- 
Food_crop_area_per_LL_hh) * LL_households(t) else 0 
 
Convertors: 
 
Demand_for_new_cocoa_land_LL = Change_in_hh_LL * 
Land_per_new_LL_hh + Cocoa_deterioration_LL 
Food_crop_per_LL_hh = (Food_crop_LL + Cocoa_&_food_LL)/LL_households 
Land_per_new_LL_hh = 21 ha 
This value is obtained by (Cocoa_&_food_LL + Cocoa_2_to_8_yrs_LL 
+ Productive_Cocoa_LL + Food_Crop_only_LL + Forested_Fallow_LL + 
non_forested_fallow_LL)/LL_households at t=0 
Yrs_20 = 20 years 
Yrs_40 = 40 years 
Timber_&_rubber_LL = 6102 ha 
 
 
Smallholders’ (SH) land: 
 
Stocks: 
 
Sec_forest_SH(t) = Sec_forest_SH(t - dt) + (Fallow_to_sec_SH - 
Cocoa_planting_on_sec_SH) * dt 
Sec_forest_SH(0) = 6,102 ha 
Productive_cocoa_SH(t) = Cocoa_hh_SH(t - dt) + (Cocoa_over_8yrsSH - 
Cocoa_deterioration_SH - Old_cocoa_into_food_crop) * dt 
 Productive cocoa_hh_SH(0) = 77,091 ha 
Food_crop_ SH(t) = Food_crop_ SH(t - dt) + Crops_on_cocoa_land_SH * dt 
 Food_crop_ SH(t) = 14,918 ha 
Non_forested_fallow_SH(t) = Non_forested_fallow_SH(t - dt) - 
Cocoa_on_fallow_SH * dt 
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Conveyor stocks: 
 
Cocoa_&_food_SH(t) = Cocoa_&_food_SH(t - dt) + 
(Cocoa_planting_on_sec_SH + Cocoa_on_fallow_SH - 
Cocoa_over_2yrsSH) * dt 
Cocoa_&_food_SH(0) = 11013 
Transit time = 2 years (Conveyor outflow ‘Cocoa_over_2_yrsSH’) 
Cocoa_2_to_8_yrs_SH(t) = Cocoa_2_to_8_yrs_SH(t - dt) + 
(Cocoa_over_2_yrsSH - Cocoa_over_8_yrsSH) * dt 
Cocoa_2_to_8_yrs_SH = 34263 
 Transit time = 6 years (Conveyor outflow ‘Cocoa_over_8_yrsSH’) 
Forested_fallow_SH(t) = Forested_fallow_SH(t - dt) + 
(Cocoa_deterioration_SH - Fallow_to_sec_SH) * dt 
 Forested_fallow_SH(0) = 0 
Transit time = 3 years (Conveyor outflow ‘Fallow_to_sec_SH’) 
 
 
Figure 6. Model for dynamics of land uses on smallholders’ land 
 
 
Flows: 
 
Fallow_to_sec_SH = Conveyor outflow 
Cocoa_planting_on_sec_SH = if REDD_Scenarios=3 then Fallow_to_sec_SH 
else Demand_for_new_cocoa_land_SH 
Cocoa_on_fallow_SH = Demand_for_new_cocoa_land_SH - 
Cocoa_planting_on_sec_SH 
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Cocoa_over_2_yrsSH = Conveyor outflow 
Cocoa_over_8_yrsSH = Conveyor outflow 
Cocoa_deterioration_SH = Productive_cocoa_SH(t)/Yrs_20 
Crops_on_cocoa_land_SH = if Food_crop_area_per_SH_hh<1 then (1-
Food_crop_area_per_SH_hh) * SH_households(t) else 0 
 
Convertors: 
 
Demand_for_new_cocoa_land_SH = Change_in_hh_SH * 5.2 + 
Cocoa_deterioration_SH 
Food_crop_area_per_SH_hh = 
(Cocoa_&_food_SH+Food_crop_SH)/SH_households(t) 
Land_per_new_SH_hh = 5.1 ha 
This value is obtained by (Cocoa_&_food_SH + Cocoa_2_to_8_yrs_SH 
+ Productive_Cocoa_SH + Food_Crop_only_SH + Forested_Fallow_SH 
+ non_forested_fallow_SH)/ SH_households at t=0 
Timber_&_rubber_SH = 9,152 ha 
 
Remaining land: 
 
Forest_reserve = 41,384 ha 
Old_growth_sacred_forest = 3,813 ha 
Urban & bare soil = 6,102 ha 
 
SECTOR: Carbon 
 
In this sector, the amount of carbon is calculated for which a payment can be 
received. The business as usual scenario is used as the carbon baseline. All 
variables in this sector are convertors. 
 
Calculation of carbon (C) contents different land-uses: 
 
C_old_growth_per_ha = 200 ton C/ha 
C_secforest_per_ha = 160 ton C/ha 
C_timber_&_rubber_per_ha = 135 ton C/ha 
C_new_cocoa_per_ha = 50 ton C/ha 
C_cocoa_2to8_per_ha = 70 ton C/ha 
C_prodcocoa_per_ha = 100 ton C/ha 
C_forest_fallow_per_ha = 130 ton C/ha 
C_nonforest_fallow_per_ha = 15 ton C/ha 
C_food_crop_per_ha = 30 ton C/ha 
Total_C_old_growth_off_reserve =  C_old_growth_per_ha * 
Old_growth_off_reserve_LL(t) 
Total_C_sec_forest_LL = C_secforest_per_ha * Sec_Forest_LL(t) 
Total_C_timber_&_rubber_LL = C_timber_&_rubber * Timber_&_Rubber_LL 
Total_C_new_cocoa_LL = C_new_cocoa_per_ha * Cocoa_&_food_LL(t) 
Total_C_cocoa_2to8_LL = C_cocoa_2to8_per_ha * Cocoa_2_to_8_yrs_LL(t) 
Total_C_prodcocoa_LL = C_prodcocoa_per_ha * Productive_Cocoa_LL(t) 
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Total_C_forest_fallow_LL = C_forest_fallow_per_ha * Forested_Fallow_LL(t) 
Total_C_foodcrop_LL = C_food_crop_per_ha * Food_Crop_LL(t) 
Total_C_nonfor_fallow_LL = C_non_for_fallow_per_ha * 
Non_forested_fallow_LL(t) 
Total_C_sec_forest_SH = C_secforest_per_ha * Sec_Forest_SH(t) 
Total_C_timber_&_rubber_SH = C_timber_&_rubber * Timber_&_Rubber_SH 
Total_C_new_cocoa_SH = C_new_cocoa_per_ha * Cocoa_&_food_SH(t) 
Total_C_cocoa_2to8_SH = C_cocoa_2to8_per_ha * Cocoa_2_to_8_yrs_SH(t) 
Total_C_prodcocoa_SH = C_prodcocoa_per_ha * Productive_Cocoa_SH(t) 
Total_C_forest_fallow_SH = C_forest_fallow_per_ha * 
Forested_Fallow_SH(t) 
Total_C_foodcrop_SH = C_food_crop_per_ha * Food_Crop_only_SH(t) 
Total_C_nonfor_fallow_SH = C_non_for_fallow_per_ha  * 
Non_forested_fallow_SH(t) 
 
Calculation of C contents for payment scenario 2: 
 
Scenario 2 only concerns carbon payments to LL since old-growth forest is 
located on their land. For scenario 2, the amount of carbon for payment is 
obtained by calculating the carbon stock for the land-uses that have replaced 
old-growth forest after 20 years under business as usual and subtracting this 
value from the calculated carbon stock in the old-growth forest after 20 years 
(scenario 2). In these calculations we ‘distillate’ only the carbon changes on 
the land which is currently covered with old-growth forest from the total 
landscape carbon changes. Thus the carbon amount for the land uses 
replacing old-growth forest under business as usual is assessed by 
calculating the total landscape carbon changes on LL land after 20 years, 
minus the changes in carbon outside the current old-growth area after 20 
years as explained in more detail here below. 
 
C_cocoa_sec_fallowLL= Total_C_new_cocoa_LL + Total_C_Cocoa_3to8_LL + 
Total_C_Prodcocoa_LL + Total_C_for_fallow_LL + 
Total_C_sec_forest_LL 
Total_C_ outside_current_area_old_growthLL = Graphical function of time 
(year, value Total_C_ outside_current_area_old_growthLL) 
(0.00, 1.1e+007), (1.00, 1.1e+007), (2.00, 1e+007), (3.00, 1e+007), 
(4.00, 9.9e+006), (5.00, 9.6e+006), (6.00, 9.4e+006), (7.00, 
9.5e+006), (8.00, 9.6e+006), (9.00, 9.7e+006), (10.0, 9.8e+006), 
(11.0, 9.8e+006), (12.0, 9.9e+006), (13.0, 1e+007), (14.0, 1e+007), 
(15.0, 1e+007), (16.0, 1e+007), (17.0, 1e+007), (18.0, 1e+007), 
(19.0, 1e+007), (20.0, 1e+007) 
The values in this graphical function are the carbon changes on the LL 
land excluding the carbon changes in the land currently covered with 
old-growth forest. The values are obtained from the values of 
C_cocoa_sec_fallowLL running the model for 20 years under a 
business as usual scenario and multiplying the following flows by zero: 
Crops_on_cocoa_land_LL, Cocoa_on_fallow_LL, 
Old_growth_into_cocoa. 
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By giving these flows a value zero we calculate the carbon changes in 
the area outside the old-growth forest going through the different 
cocoa stages. We assume that the old-growth forest is only converted 
into cocoa, not into food crops. 
C_cocoa_sec_fallow_oldgrowthLL= Total_C_new_cocoa_LL + 
Total_C_Cocoa_3to8_LL + Total_C_Prodcocoa_LL + 
Total_C_for_fallow_LL + Total_C_sec_forest_LL + Total_C_old_growth 
Total_C_scen_1_&_2 = C_cocoa_sec_fallow_oldgrowthLL - Total_C_ 
outside_current_area_old_growthLL 
We get the C-values for the area currently covered with old-growth for 
scenario 1 and 2 while multiplying the following flows by zero: 
Crops_on_cocoa_land_LL, Cocoa_on_fallow_LL 
Total_C_for_paymentLL_scen2 = 1,125,045 tonC 
This value is obtained from the converter value Total_C_scen_1_&_2 
at t=20 when REDD Scenarios=2 minus the converter value 
Total_C_scen_1_&_2 at t=20 when REDD Scenarios=1. The flows 
Crops_on_cocoa_land_LL and Cocoa_on_fallow_LL are multiplied by 
zero since we want to calculate only carbon changes in the land 
currently covered with old-growth and we assume the land currently 
covered with old-growth forest will be converted to cocoa land, not 
into cropland. 
 
Calculation of C contents for payment scenario 3: 
 
For scenario 3, the amount of carbon for payment is obtained by calculating 
the carbon stock for the land-uses that replace old-growth and secondary 
forest after 20 years (business as usual) and subtracting this value from the 
calculated carbon stock in the area now covered with old-growth and 
secondary forest after 20 years (scenario 3). Under scenario 3 this area 
remains covered with secondary and old-growth forest and some secondary 
will grow into old-growth forest increasing carbon contents. In these 
calculations we ‘distillate’ only the carbon changes on the land which is 
currently covered with old-growth and secondary forest from the total 
landscape carbon changes. Thus the carbon amount for the land-uses 
replacing secondary and old-growth forest under business as usual is 
assessed by calculating the total landscape carbon changes on LL and SH 
land after 20 years, minus the changes in carbon outside the area currently 
covered with secondary and old-growth forest after 20 years as explained in 
more detail here below. 
 
C_cocoa_&_fallowLL = Total_C_new_cocoa_LL + Total_C_Cocoa_3to8_LL + 
Total_C_Prodcocoa_LL + Total_C_for_fallow_LL 
Total_C_cocoa_outside_current_area_old_growth_&_sec_LL = Graphical 
function of time (year, value 
Total_C_cocoa_outside_current_area_old_growth_&_sec_LL) 
(0.00, 7.1e+006), (1.00, 7.4e+006), (2.00, 7.6e+006), (3.00, 
7.8e+006), (4.00, 7.8e+006), (5.00, 7.8e+006), (6.00, 7.7e+006), 
(7.00, 7.7e+006), (8.00, 7.7e+006), (9.00, 7.7e+006), (10.0, 
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7.7e+006), (11.0, 7.7e+006), (12.0, 7.7e+006), (13.0, 7.7e+006), 
(14.0, 7.7e+006), (15.0, 7.7e+006), (16.0, 7.7e+006), (17.0, 
7.7e+006), (18.0, 7.7e+006), (19.0, 7.7e+006), (20.0, 7.7e+006) 
The values in this graphical function are obtained from the values of 
C_cocoa_&_fallowLL running the model under a business as usual 
scenario and multiplying the following flows by zero: 
Crops_on_cocoa_land_LL, Cocoa_on_fallow_LL, 
Old_growth_into_cocoa, Cocoa_planting_on_sec_LL and by connecting 
the flow Fallow_to_sec_LL to the stock Cocoa_&_food_LL(t) instead of 
Sec_forest_LL(t). 
By giving these flows a value zero we calculate the carbon changes in 
the current cocoa area going through the different ages. We assume 
that the secondary and old-growth forest is only converted into cocoa, 
not into food crops. 
Total_C_land_currently_old_growth_&_sec_LL = Total_C_new_cocoa_LL + 
Total_C_prodcocoa_LL + Total_C_sec_forest_LL + 
Tot_C_old_growth_off_reserve + Total_C_cocoa_3to8_LL + 
Total_C_forest_fallow_LL 
Total_C_scen_1_&_3_LL = Total_C_land_currently_old_growth_&_sec_LL - 
Total_C_cocoa_outside_current_area_old_growth_&_sec_LL 
We get the C-values for the area currently covered with old-growth for 
scenario 1 and 3 while multiplying the following flows by zero: 
Crops_on_cocoa_land_LL, Cocoa_on_fallow_LL 
Total_C_for_paymentLL_scen3 = 3,221,492 tonC 
This value is obtained from the converter Total_C_scen_1_&_3_LL’s 
value at t=20 when REDD Scenarios=3 minus the converter 
Total_C_scen_1_&_3_LL’s value at t=20 when REDD Scenarios=1. The 
flows Crops_on_cocoa_land_LL and Cocoa_on_fallow_LL are multiplied 
by zero. 
C_cocoa_&_fallowSH = Total_C_new_cocoa_SH + Total_C_Cocoa_3to8_SH 
+ Total_C_Prodcocoa_SH + Total_C_for_fallow_SH 
Total_C_cocoa_outside_current_area_ sec_SH = Graphical function of time 
(year, value Total_C_cocoa_outside_current_area_ sec_SH) 
(0.00, 1.1e+007), (1.00, 1.1e+007), (2.00, 1.1e+007), (3.00, 
1.2e+007), (4.00, 1.2e+007), (5.00, 1.2e+007), (6.00, 1.2e+007), 
(7.00, 1.2e+007), (8.00, 1.2e+007), (9.00, 1.2e+007), (10.0, 
1.2e+007), (11.0, 1.1e+007), (12.0, 1.1e+007), (13.0, 1.1e+007), 
(14.0, 1.1e+007), (15.0, 1.1e+007), (16.0, 1.1e+007), (17.0, 
1.1e+007), (18.0, 1.1e+007), (19.0, 1.1e+007), (20.0, 1.1e+007) 
The values in this graphical function are obtained from the values of 
C_cocoa_&_fallowSH running the model under a business as usual 
scenario and multiplying the following flows by zero: 
Crops_on_cocoa_land_SH, Cocoa_on_fallow_SH, 
Cocoa_planting_on_sec_SH and by connecting the flow 
Fallow_to_sec_SH to the stock Cocoa_&_food_SH(t) instead of 
Sec_forest_SH(t). 
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Total_C_land_currently_sec_SH = Total_C_new_cocoa_SH + 
Total_C_cocoa_3to8_SH + Total_C_prodcocoa_SH + 
Total_C_sec_forest_SH + Total_C_forest_fallow_SH 
Total_C_scen_1_&_3_SH = Total_C_land_currently_sec_SH - 
Total_C_cocoa_outside_current_area_sec_SH 
Total_C_for_paymentSH_scen3 = 403,237 tonC 
This value is obtained from the converter Total_C_scen_1_&_3_SH’s 
value at t=20 when REDD Scenarios= 3 minus the converter 
Total_C_scen_1_&_3_SH’s value at t=20 when REDD Scenarios =1. 
The flows Crops_on_cocoa_land_SH and Cocoa_on_fallow_SH are 
multiplied by zero. 
 
SECTOR: Cocoa production 
 
Production and income from cocoa plantations is simulated in this sector. 
Income from cocoa makes up for over 90% of the rural population’s cash 
income (estimation district officials 2007) which is why we use cocoa income 
as a proxy for total cash income excluding REDD payments. All variables in 
this sector are convertors. 
 
Cocoa_production_per_ha = 11.8 bags (767 kg) 
Price_per_bag predicted_by_World_Bank = Graphical function of time (year, 
value Price_predicted_by_World_Bank) 
(0.00, 94.6), (1.00, 87.4), (2.00, 72.5), (3.00, 69.1), (4.00, 67.1), 
(5.00, 65.7), (6.00, 64.6), (7.00, 63.7), (8.00, 63.0), (9.00, 62.3), 
(10.0, 61.8), (11.0, 61.2), (12.0, 60.8), (13.0, 60.3), (14.0, 59.9), 
(15.0, 59.6), (16.0, 59.2), (17.0, 58.9), (18.0, 58.6), (19.0, 58.4), 
(20.0, 58.1) 
Profit_ratio = 0.8 
Total_production_LL = Cocoa_production_per_ha * Productive_Cocoa_LL(t) 
Total_cash_value_cocoa_LL = Total_production_LL * Price_per_bag 
Total_cocoa_income_LL = Total_cash_value_cocoa_LL * Profit_ratio 
Cocoa_income_per_LL_hh = Total_cocoa_profit_LL/LL_Houdeholds 
Total_production_SH = Cocoa_production_per_ha * Productive_Cocoa_SH(t) 
Total_cash_value_cocoa_SH = Total_production_SH * Price_per_bag 
Total_cocoa_income_SH = Total_cash_value_cocoa_SH * profit_ratio 
Cocoa_income_per_SH_hh = Total_cocoa_profit_SH/SH_Households 
 
SECTOR: REDD payments 
 
In this sector the payment to the farmers (LL and SH) is calculated. LL have 
old-growth and secondary forest on their land and thus receive carbon 
payments under both scenario 2 and 3. SH only have some secondary forest 
on their land so they only get a carbon payment under scenario 3. 
 
Conversion_factor_CO2_to_C = 1/3.67 
Price_tonCO2 = 10US$ 
Share_to_farmers = 0.25 
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Contract_payment_share_per_year(t) = Graphical function of time (year, 
value Contract_payment_share_per_year) 
(0.00, 0.00), (1.00, 0.2), (2.00, 0.02), (3.00, 0.02), (4.00, 0.02), 
(5.00, 0.02), (6.00, 0.1), (7.00, 0.02), (8.00, 0.02), (9.00, 0.02), 
(10.0, 0.02), (11.0, 0.1), (12.0, 0.02), (13.0, 0.02), (14.0, 0.02), 
(15.0, 0.02), (16.0, 0.1), (17.0, 0.02), (18.0, 0.02), (19.0, 0.02), 
(20.0, 0.2), (21.0, 0.00) 
C_due_for_payment_scen_2_LL = if REDD_Scenarios=2 then 
Total_C_for_payment_scen2 else 0 
C_due_for_payment_scen_3_LL = if REDD_Scenarios=3 then 
Total_C_for_paymentLL_scen3 else 0 
Total_gross_scen2_payment_LL = 
Price_tonC*C_due_for_payment_scen_2_LL 
Total_gross_scen3_payment_LL = 
Price_tonC*C_due_for_payment_scen_3_LL 
Total_net_scen_2_REDD_pay_LL = 
Total_gross_scen2_payment_LL*Share_to_farmers 
Total_net_scen_3_REDD_pay_LL = 
Total_gross_scen3_payment_LL*Share_to_farmers 
Total_annual_REDD_scen_2_LL = 
Total_net_scen_2_REDD_pay_LL*Contract_payment_share_per_year 
Total_annual_REDD_scen_3_LL = 
Total_net_scen_3_REDD_pay_LL*Contract_payment_share_per_year 
Total_annual_REDD_LL = 
Total_annual_REDD_scen_3_LL+Total_annual_REDD_scen_2_LL 
REDD_per_LL_hh = Total_annual_REDD_LL/LL_Houdeholds 
C_due_for_payment_SH = if REDD_Scenarios=3 then 
Total_C_for_paymentSH_scen3 else 0 
Total_gross_REDD_payement_SH = Price_tonC * C_due_for_payment_SH 
Total_net_REDD_pay_SH = Total_gross_REDD_payement_SH * 
Share_to_farmers 
Total_annual_REDD_SH = Total_net_REDD_pay_SH * 
Contract_payment_share_per_year 
REDD_per_SH_hh = Total_annual_REDD_SH/SH_Houdeholds 
 
SECTOR: Income & net present value 
 
In this sector we simulate total and per capita cash income for the rural 
population in the district over the next 20 years and the Net Present Value 
(NPV) of this per capita cash income. The NPV is the present value (PV) of a 
time series of cash flows. To obtain present values we discounted the cash 
income using a 20% discount rate.  
 
The equations used for PV and NPV are: 
PV(t) = Cash per capita (t)/(1+r)t 
NPV = t=1 ∑ 20 PV(t) 
where r is the discount rate and t=time  
All functions in this sector are convertors. 
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Total_rural_income = Total_cocoa_income_LL + Total_cocoa_income_SH + 
Total_annual_REDD_LL + Total_annual_REDD_SH 
Income_per_capita(t) = Total_rural_income/Total_rural_population 
PV_rural_income_pp_per_year_6%(t) = Income_per_capita(t)/1.06t 
PV_rural_income_pp_per_year_20%(t) = Income_per_capita(t)/1.2t 
NPV_6% = t=1 ∑ 20 PV_rural_income_pp_per_year_6%(t) this is calculated 
after the simulation 
NPV_20% = t=1 ∑ 20 PV_rural_income_pp_per_year_20%(t) this is calculated 
after the simulation 
 
The model can be downloaded at 
http://www.cifor.cgiar.org/conservation/_ref/research/research.2.
5.htm 
To be able to open the model you need to have STELLA installed, with the 
following link a safe-disabled trial version can be downloaded 
http://www.iseesystems.com/community/downloads/STELLA/STEL
LADemo.aspx   
 
Contract breaking and price at which deforestation is stopped 
 
Farmer decision is approximated by NPV per capita of future income. We 
could not simulate this decision making directly in our model since the 
simulation at time t doesn’t know yet what income will be in time t=1. 
Instead we calculated afterwards based on the simulation results at what 
time in the simulation farmers would likely break the contract. Each year, 
NPV was re-calculated for the following 20 years, so the simulation was run 
for 40 years in order to calculate the NPV in year 20. Under the REDD 
scenario we simulated avoided deforestation for the contract period but not 
after, so after 20 years farmers will convert the forest to cocoa. 
After one year of participation in a REDD scheme, a farmer will no longer be 
able to compare his NPV with NPV under the business as usual scenario. This 
because if after one year he breaks the REDD contract and starts planting 
cocoa again, his cocoa is planted one year later than under business as usual 
and will thus become productive one year later. In order to obtain the year in 
which the contract will be broken we entered the feature of contract breaking 
in the model to re-calculate the NPV under the new scenario including 
contract breaking and comparing this with the NPV of remaining in a REDD 
scheme. The price at which deforestation is stopped is the price at which the 
NPV of the REDD scenario is higher then the NPV under the REDD scenario 
with contract breaking throughout the 20 year contract period. 
 
Contract breaking is entered in the model as follows: 
 
Time_contract_breaking_old_growth = this year is entered by the modeler 
(for Scenario 2 and 3) 
Time_contract_breaking_sec_forest = this year is entered by the modeler 
(for Scenario 3) 
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Contract_breaking_old_growth = if 
TIME<Time_contract_breaking_old_growth then 0 else 
Demand_for_new_cocoa_land_LL*0.9 
Contract_breaking_sec_forest = if TIME<Time_contract_breaking_sec_forest 
then Fallow_to_sec_LL else Cocoa_planting_sec_LL 
Old_growth_into_cocoa = if REDD_Scenarios=1 then 
Demand_for_new_cocoa_land_LL*0.9 else 
Contract_breaking_old_growth 
Cocoa_planting_on_sec_LL = if REDD_Scenarios=2 then 
Contract_breaking_sec_forest else Cocoa_planting_sec_LL 
Cocoa_planting_on_sec_SH = if REDD_Scenarios=2 then 
Contract_breaking_sec_forest_SH else Cocoa_planting_sec_SH 
Total_annual_REDD_scen_2_LL = if 
TIME<Time_contract_breaking_old_growth then 
Total_net_scen_2_REDD_pay_LL*Contract_payment_share_per_year 
else 0 
Total_annual_REDD_scen_3_LL = if 
TIME<Time_contract_breaking_sec_forest then 
Total_net_scen_3_REDD_pay_LL*Contract_payment_share_per_year 
else 0 
Total_annual_REDD_SH = if TIME<Time_contract_breaking_sec_forest then 
Total_net_REDD_pay_SH*Contract_payment_share_per_year else 0  
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Chapter 8 
Logging or conservation concession: Exploring conservation and 
development outcomes in Dzanga-Sangha, Central African Republic 
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ABSTRACT 
The Dzanga-Sangha landscape consists of a national park surrounded by 
production forest. It is subject to an integrated conservation and 
development project (ICDP). In collaboration with the ICDP personnel, a 
participatory model was constructed to explore wildlife conservation and 
industrial logging scenarios for the landscape. Three management options for 
the landscape’s production forest were modelled: (I) ‘predatory logging’, 
exploitation by a logging company characterised by a lack of long-term plans 
for staying in the landscape, (II) sustainable exploitation by a certified 
logging company, or (III) conservation concession with no commercial timber 
harvesting. The simulation outcomes indicate the extreme difficulties to 
achieve progress on either conservation or development scenarios. Both 
logging scenarios give best outcomes for development of the local 
population. However, the depletion of bushmeat under the predatory logging 
scenario negatively impacts the BaAka-pygmy minority who strongly depend 
on hunting for their income. The model suggests that conservation and 
development outcomes are largely determined by the level of economic 
activity, both inside and outside the landscape. Large investments in the 
formal sector in the landscape without any measures for protecting wildlife 
(scenario I) leads to some species going nearly extinct, while investments in 
the formal sector including conservation measures (scenario II) gives best 
outcomes for maintaining wildlife populations. The conservation concession 
at simulated investment levels does not reduce poverty. Neither does it seem 
capable of maintaining wildlife populations since the landscape is already 
filled with settlers lacking economic opportunities as alternative to poaching. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The Congo basin forests constitute the second largest area of moist tropical 
forest in the world, after the Amazon, covering a total area of about two 
million km2 (CBFP 2006). About 12 percent of this area is under protection 
(Laporte et al. 2007) while 76 percent consists of production forest (CBFP 
2006). These production forests are often located in proximity to national 
parks, forming a buffer between the protected area and more intensively 
used agricultural areas. The Dzanga-Sangha landscape located in the south-
western part of the Central African Republic (CAR) is typical of this situation. 
Clark et al. (2009) investigated the effect of logging on mammal populations 
in the proximity of this area and concluded that production forests, if 
managed appropriately can extend the effective habitat of many of Central 
Africa’s most threatened species. 
 
Despite its high biological diversity, the Congo basin ranks economically 
amongst the poorest regions of the world (Blom 2001). CAR has a gross 
national income of merely € 290 per capita and ranks amongst the lowest 
income countries (World Bank 2009). The forestry sector is of major 
importance to the CAR’s economy; timber contributed 41 percent of the 
national export revenues in 2007 and the sector is, after the government, the 
most important provider of employment nationwide (Wasseige et al. 2009). 
In remote rural areas, logging companies are by far the most important 
providers of salaried jobs (Wasseige et al. 2009) and often take over the role 
of the state in providing services (e.g. electricity and hospitals) in the villages 
where they operate. For this reason, local people often see their arrival as an 
opportunity to advance local development. Logging concessions in the Congo 
Basin thus have a dual function buffering and extending protected areas 
while boosting the local economy. But the centres of development that are 
stimulated by forestry operations have also been linked to an upsurge in use 
of wildlife for bushmeat (Bennett 2004). Not all of the vast production forest 
in the Congo Basin is currently being logged; in 2007 only 36 percent was 
legally allocated as logging concessions. Africa’s timber production is 
projected to increase substantially (FAO 2003) thus an increase in the 
number of licenses and area exploited is expected. The arrival of logging 
companies in these remote forest areas will affect the local economy and 
wildlife populations. 
 
Ever since the creation of the national park in 1990, an integrated 
conservation and development project (ICDP) has been operating in the 
Dzanga-Sangha landscape. Discussions are on-going between the CAR 
government and proponents of the ICDP concerning the options for the 
management of the production forest. The most likely scenario is that a 
license will be issued to a logging company, for the extraction of timber 
under a rotation cycle. However, one conservation organization leading the 
ICDP has advocated making the area a ‘conservation concession’. The 
concept is defined as follows by Rice (2003, p1): ‘Under a conservation 
concession agreement, national authorities or local resource users agree to 
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protect natural ecosystems in exchange for a steady stream of structured 
compensation from conservationists or other investors’. With conservation 
and development experts from the ICDP we constructed a systems dynamics 
model for the Dzanga-Sangha landscape to explore different management 
options for the production forest and their consequences for wildlife and for 
the local economy. 
 
METHODS 
 
Conservation and development in the Dzanga-Sangha landscape 
 
Situated in the extreme south-west of the CAR, the Dzanga-Sangha 
landscape covers a total area of 4,643 km2. Of this area, 27 percent is made 
up by the national park (Sangha and Ndoki sector), 4 percent is pre-park (2 
km-wide buffer zone around the parks), 55 percent is production forest (to 
be allocated to a logging concession), 13 percent is a communal hunting 
zone and 1 percent is reserved for agriculture (Fig 1). 70 percent of the 
production forest is at the same time reserved for safari hunting though at 
the moment all safari hunting companies have closed down. 
 
The forest of Dzanga-Sangha constitutes an integral part of those sites 
termed critical for conservation of dense forests in the Afro-tropical region 
(Monza 1996). It hosts approximately 105 terrestrial mammal species, out of 
which 16 are primates, 14 are ungulates and 14 are carnivores (Blom 2001). 
The region has a remarkable high density of forest elephants (Loxodonta 
cyclotis) with 0.2-0.3 individuals per km2 and of western-lowland gorillas 
(Gorilla gorilla gorilla) with 1.05 individuals per km2 (Blake 2005). The region 
is important for Bongo antelopes (Tragelaphus euryceros) with an estimated 
density of 0.3 individuals per km2 (Klauss-Hugi 1998). Hunting pressure is 
high in the landscape resulting in rapidly declining populations of several 
wildlife species (Blake 2005). The worsening wildlife situation in Bayanga is 
illustrated by the closure of the last active safari hunting company in 2007. It 
is unlikely that safari hunting will resume in the near future. The employment 
provided by the safari company at the time it was operational was rather 
limited (<10 permanent jobs) and safari tax revenues represented a tiny 
fraction of the forestry taxes (e.g. 0.25-1.5 percent of forestry taxes for the 
period 2000-2003). For this reason, safari hunting has not been included in 
the model. 
 
The Dzanga-Sangha landscape had a population of about 6850 people (2 
people / km2) in 2005, living in 12 villages (Kamiss 2006, 2007 GTZ census 
unpublished). Before the arrival of a logging company in 1972, Bayanga was 
a small fishing village (Kamiss 2006). The population at that time consisted 
of BaAka (pygmies, mainly hunter-gatherers) and Sangha Sangha (Bantus, 
mainly fishermen). These original people now make up about one third of the 
total population, the rest being Bantu migrants (Kamiss 2006). Principal 
income sources of the local population are agriculture, hunting, gathering 
and local sale of non-timber forest products (NTFPs, like Gnetum spp),  
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Figure 1. 
The Dzanga-
Sangha 
landscape 
(modified 
from GTZ-
GFA 2009) 
 
 
fishing and employment in ecotourism and the ICDP project. Ecotourism is 
well developed in the landscape: in 2007, about 580 tourists visited the area 
generating 72 million FCFA (€ 110,000) of local revenue (Feiganangai 2003). 
Of this amount, about 12 percent is directly captured by local people through 
salaries (pers. com. Roth 2008). Though this amount may seem substantial, 
annual salary revenue generated by the logging company when it was 
operational was much higher, at 270 million FCFA (€ 411,600) (Czesnik 
2007). 
 
Bayanga -where the sawmill is located- is the largest village, home to 57 
percent of the total population in the landscape. Though the sawmill has not 
been operating since 2004, previous logging activities have attracted many 
migrants into the landscape; roughly two thirds of the population is not 
original to the region (Kamiss 2006). Between 1972 and 2004, four different 
logging companies have exploited the logging concession in the Dzanga-
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Sangha landscape. Most of the logging companies operated only for short 
periods, given that this is a remote area and the financial returns on logging 
are severely limited by the costs of extraction and marketing. The departure 
of these logging companies was often abrupt, leaving its local employees 
unemployed with several months of unpaid salaries. The intervals during 
which the concession remained closed usually ranged between one to four 
years. The majority of the workforce remained in the village or in mining 
camps just north of the landscape, hoping to be paid for their past work and 
hoping to secure employment in a new logging company (Noss 1995). 
However, with each re-opening only a fraction of the old workforce was 
usually re-employed and many new people arrived from outside the 
landscape (pers. com. Kamiss 2007). The 2004 sawmill closure resulted in an 
increase in households practicing agriculture from 39 to 76 percent (Kamiss 
2006). Laid-off employers usually turn to hunting (Doungoubé 1990). 
Logging itself also augments hunting pressure through increased access to 
markets and hunting by family members of sawmill employees (Bennett 
2004). However, with its history of logging around Bayanga the hunting 
pressure is already high in absence of logging activities. 
 
Participatory modelling 
 
Between 2004 and 2009, under the guidance of model experts, an 
exploratory landscape model is built by non-model expert conservation and 
development actors working in the Dzanga-Sangha landscape. The objectives 
of participatory modelling comprise to stimulate the exchange of knowledge 
and visions between the actors, unravel complex interactions, identify drivers 
of change, understand trade-offs between conservation and development 
outcomes, and explore plausible future scenarios (Van den Belt 2004, 
chapter 9). The model has been developed in the user-friendly modelling 
language STELLA 8.0 (HPS 1996). STELLA is a system dynamics modelling 
language whose basic components are stocks (such as forest area, elephant 
population and annual budgets), flows (e.g. change from forest to agriculture 
or birth and death of elephants) and convertors that moderate these flows 
(including laws, interventions and price variations). The scenarios to be 
simulated with the model were defined during workshops with the 
conservation and development actors working in the Dzanga-Sangha 
landscape.  
 
The model structure 
 
The model reflects nature – society interactions. Visioning exercises like 
historical trend analysis (Sayer et al. 2007) were undertaken to identify 
trends of socio-economic and biological variables, as well as other crucial 
attributes of the landscape. These exercises helped to select the main stocks 
and flows for the model. We did not attempt for the model to be all-inclusive, 
rather the stakeholders were urged to select only those variables and 
interactions they considered most important for the outcomes of concern to 
the ICDP. This resulted in a model existing of 12 interconnected sectors (sub-
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models), containing a total of 260 variables. Figure 2 gives a schematic 
representation of some –incomplete- relations between variables in the 
model determining per capita income. It demonstrates how many relations 
are ambiguous, e.g. investment in logging provides an alternative to 
poaching through employment but at the same time it attracts potential 
poachers through increased immigration. Many such relations are regulated 
through interventions either by the ICDP or by a certified logging company. 
 
 
Figure 2. Schematic representation of relations between some variables in 
the model 
 
The model sectors are ‘human population’, ‘BaAka and Bantu households’, 
‘forest elephant and duiker populations’, ‘hunting’, ‘local economy’, 
‘employment’, ‘logging concession’, ‘eco-tourism’, ‘land-use’, and 
‘interventions’. In ‘human population’ we model natural growth and 
immigration, the latter being partly driven by employment, partly by the bad 
socio-economic situation in the rest of the country. The sectors ‘BaAka and 
Bantu households’ simulate income generating activities. In the model, 
households get income from agriculture, fishing, hunting, NTFPs, 
employment and commerce. With exception of NTFP and fishing, the income 
contributions per household are all dynamic. Households are simulated to 
turn to poaching and agriculture in absence of formal employment (Fig 2). An 
increase in salaried jobs, on the other hand, results in agricultural products 
being sold at higher prices and commerce being stimulated. Income from 
hunting is driven by duiker and elephant hunting (modelled in the ‘hunting’ 
sector). Income from employment is mainly driven by logging and 
ecotourism investment. The ‘hunting’ sector furthermore simulates elephant 
poaching to be partly determined by the number large calibre guns, in its 
turn a function of roads, traffic and cash in the landscape (all increasing with 
logging activities), and controlled under the ‘interventions’ sector by the 
ICDP and the certified logging company. Duiker hunting is simulated to be 
mainly determined by the number of hunters and controlled by snare 
removal and surveillance (simulated in the sector ‘interventions’). Both the 
number of duikers and elephants hunted decrease when its populations drop 
below a critical number. The variables and their relations in each model 
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sector are given in Table 1 which also gives the data sources. Furthermore, 
the model can be downloaded at: 
http://www.cifor.cgiar.org/conservation/_ref/research/research.2.5.htm 
 
Table 1. The model’s assumptions and data inputs 
Data Source 
Model sector: Human population 
Total population= 7350 people in 2009 (2007 data 
projected to 2009 with an annual growth rate of 1.5%) 
of which 30% is BaAka, 70% is Bantu 
2005 and 2007 GTZ 
census (unpublished) 
Natural growth rate = 1.5% Mediated from UN 
(2009) 
Immigration rate= 1-3%. We assume a 1% fixed 
immigration due to the bad socio-economic situation in 
CAR. An additional 0-2% immigration depends on total 
investments in salaried jobs, 0 being current 
investment, 2% being 5 times the current investment 
Local expert 
approximation 
 
 
 
One-off immigration due to opening logging 
concession= 2000 Bantus. One-off outmigration due to 
closure logging concession (scenario I only)= 500 
Bantus 
Local expert 
approximation based 
on historical trend 
pers. com. Kamiss 
2007 
Model sector: Land-uses 
National park = 1,444 km2; Communal hunting zone = 
587 km2; Logging concession = 2,571 km2; Agriculture 
zone = 40 km2 (but agriculture is not modelled to be 
restricted to this zone) 
GIS measurements 
Dzanga-Sangha 
Project 2008 
Model sectors: BaAka and Bantu households 
Average BaAka household size= 6.8 
Average annual BaAka household cash income= 
300,000FCFA (€460) of which now 49% comes from 
hunting, 31% from NTFPs, 11% from fishing, 5% from 
agriculture and 4% from employment in ecotourism 
Results from 20 BaAka 
household 
questionnaires 2006 
Average Bantu household size= 7.5 
Average annual Bantu household income= 900,000 
FCFA(€1370) of which now 46% comes from 
agriculture, 23% from employment by the ICDP project 
and ecotourism, 16% from fishing, 11% from hunting 
and 4% from commerce 
Results from 30 Bantu 
household 
questionnaires 2006 
 
Cash per household from NTFPs and fishing remains 
constant 
Local expert 
approximation 
The price of agricultural products (and thus income 
from agriculture) increases with the employment rate 
(maximum increase 50%) 
Households practicing agriculture is positively related to 
the number of unemployed men 
Kamiss 2006 
Income hunting BaAka= duiker income * (100/ 
Percentage duikers total bushmeat income BaAka)  
Income hunting Bantu= duiker income * (100/ 
Percentage duikers total small bushmeat income Bantu) 
+ elephant income  
Duiker income= (duikers hunted – wastage – auto-
Local expert 
approximation  
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consumption) * average duiker price. For duikers 
hunted see hunting sector 
Elephant income= elephants hunted * price elephant 
(=390,000 FCFA). For elephants hunted see hunting 
sector  
Wastage= 10% (wastage snare hunting= 27% (Noss 
1998) but now more home-made gun hunting) 
Percentage duikers total bushmeat income BaAka= 80-
85% 
Percentage duikers total small bushmeat income 
Bantu= 90% 
Average price duiker= 2600 FCFA (weighted average of 
prices three duiker species; C. monticola= 1300 FCFA, 
C. callipygus= 4400 FCFA C. dorsalis= 5300 FCFA) 
2006 household 
questionnaires 
Income from commerce= %age of total investment in 
salaries (now 60% of total commerce) + other cash to 
commerce (constant) 
2006 questionnaire 
results mediated with 
expert approximation 
Other cash to commerce = 14,600 FCFA/household 
10% of the investment in salaries goes directly to 
commerce 
Garreau 1994 
Model sector: Logging concession 
Average annual log production rate= 0.11m3/ha Czesnik 2007  
Number of logging concession employers= 430 at 
opening concession 
Average annual salary logging company without 
certification= 614,000 FCFA (€936) 
Pago pers. com. 2007 
(the ex-director of 
personal last active 
logging company)  
Average salary certified logging company= 1,085,000 
FCFA (€1654)  
40% increase in production prospected in next 20 years 
for both certified and non-certified logging companies 
CIB management plan 
2006 
 
Future projection of number of employers and taxes to 
be paid increases with log production  
Local expert 
approximation 
Total forestry taxes exist of logging tax (taxe 
d’abattage) which is 7% of the logged value and a 
reforestation tax (taxe de reboisement) which is 11% 
of the exported log value (article 36, finance law 2001). 
Logging tax= 137 million FCFA, Reforestation tax= 70 
million FCFA (Average for the period 2000-2003) 
Czesnik 2007  
 
Model sector: Ecotourism 
At current ecotourism provides 13 fulltime jobs and 
some temporary activities (equivalent to another 2 
fulltime jobs) 
Average annual ecotourism fulltime salary = 576,000 
FCFA(€878) 
Dzanga-Sangha 
project 2008 
The number of ecotourists remains unchanged under 
scenario I and II and increases five times in the first 10 
years of the simulation under scenario III to remain 
fixed from year 10 to 20 
Ecotourism starts to decrease when the number of 
elephants drops below 450 (45% of current elephant 
population) 
Local expert 
approximation 
Model sector: Local economy  
Sums up the total investment in the formal sector Calculated with model 
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Model sector: Employment  
Calculates the employment rate by dividing the number 
of formal jobs by the total labour force (# of 
unemployed adult men) 
Calculated with model 
Adult men= 12% of the total population Noss 1998 
Model sector: Forest elephant populations 
Populations in and outside the park are simulated 
separately using a logistic equation, starting with 1003 
elephants (704 inside the park-299 outside the park). 
Off-take by hunting is simulated in the ‘hunting’ sector 
Blake 2005 densities, 
projected to 2009 by 
local expert 
approximation 
Birth rate= 3% Turkalo 2005 
Natural death rate= 1% 
Carrying capacity (in and outside park)= 2.5 
elephant/km2  
Local expert 
approximation 
Sustainable off-take rate= 0.0045 elephant/km2/year 
or 20 elephants for the entire area per year 
Calculated with model 
Model sector: Duiker populations 
Duiker refers to the species Cephalophus monticola, C. 
callipygus and C. dorsalis 
 
 
Populations in and outside the park are simulated 
separately using a logistic equation, starting with 
196,420 duikers (86,050 inside the park-110,370 
outside the park). Off-take by hunting: ‘hunting’ sector 
Reproduction rate (birth rate – natural death rate) = 
0.43% 
Carrying capacity = 110 duikers/km2 (using maximum 
densities Noss as reference point) 
Data from Noss 1998 
mediated with local 
expert judgement: 
mid-point data for 
Noss’ density range is 
used, and maximum 
for Noss’ reproduction 
rate 
Sustainable off-take rate= 3.9 duikers/km2/year Calculated with model 
Model sector: Hunting 
Number of BaAka hunters= 97% of the adult male - 
adult males with a job 
2006 household 
questionnaires 
Number of Bantu hunters= 30% of the adult male 
unemployed population and 20% of the adult male 
population under scenario II (hunting will be restricted 
under this scenario and is therefore expected to be a 
less attractive option) 
Noss 1998 mediated 
with local expert 
judgement 
Local expert 
approximation 
Elephants hunted increases with number of immigrant 
hunters and number of large calibre guns and 
decreases with anti-poaching surveillances and when 
elephant density drops below 0.2/km2 
Number of elephants hunted at the start of the 
simulation is 67/year 
Estimation Bokoto 
2007 
Local expert 
approximation 
Duikers hunted increases with the number of hunters 
and decreases with snare removal and when the duiker 
density drops below 40/km2  
Duiker hunting is calibrated with an approximate 
number of 115 duikers/hunter/year 
Noss 1998 
~67% of elephants hunted are captured inside the 
national park 
Extrapolation of 
elephant poaching 
observations 
~20% of duikers hunted are captured inside the 
national park 
Local expert 
approximation 
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The number of large calibre guns increases with the 
increase of traffic, roads and salaries in the landscape 
and are controlled by the certified company (see 
interventions sector). At the start of the simulation 
there are 15 large calibre guns in the landscape. 
Approximation by park 
director 
(conservateur) 2007 
Model sector: Interventions 
Anti-poaching investment is 178 FCFA/ha inside the 
park and 90 FCFA/ha outside the park 
Currently 55 people are employed by the ICDP, 
projected to go up to 69, 71 and 84 in 20 years for 
scenario 1, 2 and 3 respectively (ecoguard jobs 
increase with investment in ecotourism) 
Local expert 
approximation 
Anti-poaching surveillances and snare removal increase 
with ICDP budget (fixed in the simulation) plus the 
contribution of the certified logging company 
Observation from 
neighbouring certified 
companies 
 The certified logging company controls the traffic of 
large calibre guns and bushmeat 
 
The data entered in the model 
 
Data was obtained from existing project monitoring and missing data (e.g. 
recent data on duiker population) was extracted from scientific publications 
and ongoing studies underway in the reserve (see Table 1). Additional 
information to fill some data gaps was gathered through 50 interviews held in 
April-June 2006 with the head of household (chef de ménage); 20 concern 
BaAka, 30 Bantu households. The interviewed households were randomly 
selected in three different villages (Bayanga, Bomandjokou and Mossapoula) 
characterized as: a village with a sawmill (though closed at the time of the 
interview, but with a higher concentration of migrant households), a village 
with employment from ecotourism and a village without access to formal 
employment. The questions focused on income generating activities, and 
number and species of animals hunted. Income per activity was 
approximated making the respondent estimate the total production of the 
household, the share sold and the price per product. When respondents had 
difficulties using numbers in their replies, marbles were used to quantify 
importance of activities. Given the small sample size and the possible large 
error with estimated values, the interview results are of indicative value only 
and we deemed it necessary to discuss and validate the results with local 
experts (Table 1). Remaining data gaps were filled by informed estimates 
obtained through discussions with local experts working in the area. Thus, 
the simulation results of this study are based on the best available 
information to us. We recommend further profound and solid research to fill 
knowledge gaps. 
 
Indicators of conservation and development outcomes in the landscape 
 
The state of key attributes indicating the status of conservation and 
development in the landscape were selected and plotted on graphs to 
visualize the consequences of the different scenarios for conservation and 
 137 
development (simulation outcomes). Elephant and duiker populations were 
selected as proxies indicating the general state of conservation. Elephants 
have low reproduction rates and their hunting is prohibited; they are mainly 
poached with large calibre guns. Duikers have high reproduction rates and 
their hunting is legal under certain conditions; they are mainly captured with 
cable snares or hunted with small home-made guns. They form the most 
important source of bushmeat; the 2006 household surveys revealed of the 
small animals hunted 9 out of 10 were duikers. Noss (1998) collected data 
on bushmeat hunting in Bayanga in 1994 and concluded at that time hunting 
levels were likely to be unsustainable for duikers. When simulating the 
situation from 1994 to today, based on Noss’ approximated hunting pressure, 
mid-range duiker densities, and maximum reproduction rates, there would be 
no duikers left outside the protected area. However, 16 years after Noss’ 
study, bushmeat markets are still abundantly supplied with duikers, and 
2006-2008 mapping of hunting zones by the ICDP (Dzanga-Sangha project 
unpublished) showed hunting areas still to be in the proximity of the villages 
providing little evidence of their depletion. Furthermore, the 2006 household 
questionnaires (Table 1) indicated the number of duikers hunted per hunter 
to be almost the same as the number found by Noss. This is why we have 
chosen rather high values in the possible range Noss’ study gives for duiker 
density and reproduction rate (Table 1).  
 
Household cash income was used as a proxy indicating the state of local 
development. Though this only gives a rough approximation in a situation 
where subsistence income is of great importance, the actors building the 
model still thought this was the best indicator to approximate the 
development situation of local people. Since about half of the cash captured 
by BaAka comes from bushmeat (2006 household surveys, Table 1), 
monetary income does reflect their access to this important forest product. 
 
The outcomes of the simulation often led to discussions amongst 
stakeholders and revisions of the model until consensus was reached on 
plausible future scenarios. Considering the process adopted for the 
elaboration and revision of the latter, the results presented in this article do 
not represent precise predictions but are indicative and should serve as a 
basis for reflection and discussion, concerning the future of the Dzanga-
Sangha and similar landscapes. 
 
Scenario descriptions 
 
Scenario I: ‘Predatory Logging’ (business as usual)  
This scenario simulates logging companies characterised by a lack of long-
term plans for staying in the landscape and minimal investments in the local 
salaries, infrastructure and facilities. The continuous arrival and departure of 
logging companies simulate an extension of what the landscape has 
experienced since 1972. We simulated the opening of the sawmill attracting 
many job seekers and their families (2000 people) while with a closure we 
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expect only some of them to leave (500 people). The simulation assumes 
opening of the sawmill in year 2 and 13, and closure in year 10 and 18. 
 
Scenario II: Logging by Certified Company  
This scenario simulates the re-opening of the sawmill by a company 
obtaining Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) certification. We assume their 
sustainable exploitation practice to result in a long-term forestry enterprise, 
thus no closure is simulated. This feature was confirmed by Desmet 
(personal communication 2009) of the neighbouring logging company CIB 
who claimed that without their FSC certificate the company would have most 
likely collapsed due to the financial crisis. The FSC certificate furthermore 
requires the company to provide basic services in the villages located in the 
concession, to pay higher salaries and put resources into controlling poaching 
(FSC 2007). 
 
Scenario III: Conservation Concession (no logging) 
This scenario simulates the production forest in the Dzanga-Sangha 
landscape as a conservation concession. Following the earlier given definition 
of Rice (2003) of a conservation concession, we assume the compensation 
the conservation investor pays to the state would be equivalent to the taxes 
and royalties paid by a traditional concessionaire, amounting on average 207 
million FCFA/year (€ 316,000) for the period 2000-2003 (Czesnik 2007). We 
believe this would be the minimum investment of a conservation concession 
that would be approved by the government, since ideally a conservation 
concession should also compensate for the foregone salaries of the logging 
company personal. We assume ecotourism to develop under this scenario 
with the number of eco-tourists increasing to five times the current number 
after 10 years. 
 
RESULTS 
 
Local economy and population dynamics 
 
The cash investment in the formal sector is substantial under both logging 
scenarios (Fig 3). With each closure of the logging company under scenario I, 
the investment drops below the conservation concession scenario (III) the 
difference being made by the larger investment in ecotourism employment 
under scenario III.  
 
The human population increases substantially under all scenarios (Fig 4a). 
Due to the politically unstable and economically weak situation in the CAR, 
immigration into the landscape is expected to be high even in the absence of 
opportunities for paid labour. Under the conservation concession scenario, 
the population increases with an annual growth rate of 2.5 percent. Scenario 
II has the highest population growth attracted by the large cash investment 
in the formal sector (Fig 3). Though the cash investment under scenario I is 
much lower than under scenario II, population size is comparable due to the 
recurring cycle of opening and closing; with each opening (year 2 and 13) 
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attracting more people than those leaving after each closure (year 10 and 
18). 
 
 
Figure 3. Investment 
in the formal sector 
(salaries from 
ecotourism, the ICDP 
and the logging 
concession) under the 
three scenarios 
explored (I: predatory 
logging, II: certified 
logging, III: 
conservation 
concession) 
 
 
The number of hunters (Fig 4b) is calculated as a percentage of the 
unemployed male population in the landscape (Table 1). The number of 
hunters falls back when people are employed by the company after re-
opening (year 2 and 13). The number of hunters increases substantially more 
though each time the predatory logging company shuts down (year 10 and 
18) due to the simulation of laid-off workers turning to poaching.  
 
 
Figure 4. Total human population (a) and number of hunters (b) in the Dzanga-
Sangha landscape under the three scenarios explored (I: predatory logging, II: 
certified logging, III: conservation concession) 
 
BaAka are poorer than Bantu in monetary terms, capturing about one third of 
the cash a Bantu captures per capita (Table 1 and Fig 5). BaAka cash income 
shows a downward trend which is mainly due to the declining duiker 
population. Their access to bushmeat diminishes which currently contributes 
 140 
50 percent of their cash income (2006 household surveys, Table 1). Though 
the BaAka only capture 5-10 percent of the jobs in the logging concessions 
this affects their per capita cash income quite dramatically since they are less 
in number and because their average per capita cash income is quite low (Fig 
5a). Giving average cash income, Figure 5a hides a larger income 
differentiation for BaAka under scenario I with only some capturing the 
benefits (salaried jobs) but all suffering the costs (reduced access to 
bushmeat). Bantu cash income also shows a downward trend but this is due 
to the high increase in population mainly due to immigration and thus the 
investments in the formal sector are divided over a larger number of people 
lowering the per capita cash capture. Even though the cash investment in the 
formal sector is continuously increasing under scenario II (Fig 3), the migrant 
inflow is larger than the creation of new jobs at the logging concession 
resulting in the cash per capita decreasing slightly. 
 
 
Figure 5. Average annual per capita cash income for (a) BaAka pygmies and (b) 
Bantus under the three scenarios explored (I: predatory logging, II: certified 
logging, III: conservation concession) 
 
Wildlife populations 
 
Under the predatory logging and conservation concession scenarios, the 
simulated elephant population declines by 85 and 50 percent respectively 
after 20 years (Fig 6a). Such dramatic losses have been seen in the past in 
the landscape when the elephant population decreased by 70 percent from 
2855 individuals in the 1980’s (Carroll 1986) to 869 individuals in 2004 
(Blake 2005). In year 7 of the simulation, under scenario I the elephant 
density inside the park drops below 0.2/km2 resulting in a decreasing hunting 
success from this moment onwards (Fig 6a). In year 10 under scenario I, the 
elephant population declines faster due to the increase in poachers (Fig 4b) 
being a result of the closure of the logging company. The same feature is 
seen with the closure in year 18 under scenario I, though the elephant 
population is already so weak hunting elephants has become quite difficult. 
Though scenario II results to be the best option to conserve the elephant 
population, this still entails a 35% decline in elephants. 
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The duiker population (Fig 6b) is strongly related to the number of hunters 
(Fig 4b) under the three scenarios. For the first ten years of the simulation, 
the conservation concession gives worst results for the duiker population 
because of the lack of alternative income generating activities for the local 
population of which as a result a large share dedicates to bushmeat hunting. 
The closures of the logging concession in year 10 and 18 (scenario I) result 
in a sudden increase in duiker hunting and thus a sudden decrease in duiker 
population (Fig 6b) as people compensate forgone income from their lost 
jobs with bushmeat hunting. Already at the start of the simulation, the duiker 
population is slightly below 40 animals/km2 so the hunting success 
diminishes linearly with the decrease in duiker density. Again scenario II 
results in best outcomes for duikers which still results in duiker densities 
dropping more than half the current values. 
 
 
Figure 6. Total number of forest elephants (a) and duikers (b) in the Dzangha-
Sangha reserve under the three scenarios explored (I: predatory logging, II: 
certified logging, III: conservation concession) 
 
The predatory logging scenario bares a more dramatic effect on elephants 
than duikers in comparison to the other scenarios. We modelled this scenario 
to be accompanied by an increased import of large calibre guns used for 
elephant poaching through the opening of roads and the increased traffic and 
because the employers will have more money to purchase guns (in line with 
findings of Bennett 2004). With a certified logging company though, we 
expect the company to establish control points on the roads limiting the 
transport of guns and bushmeat, and to close logging roads that are no 
longer used. This is being done by neighbouring certified companies in 
Cameroon and Congo.  
 
Sensitivity analyses 
 
A sensitivity analysis showed that wildlife population outcomes are sensitive 
to levels of human migration, and duiker population outcomes are sensitive 
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to duiker density and reproduction rate. If instead of the assumed 1 – 3 
percent immigration rate, we assume an out-migration rate of 2 percent e.g. 
as a result of economic opportunities in the town of Berberati or Bangui, the 
elephant population would be 12–70 percent higher at the end of the 
simulation. Assuming this out-migration under the scenario of a certified 
logging company, the elephant population would be comparable to the 
current population size after 20 years. Using minimal duiker densities with 
maximum reproduction rates as given by Noss (1998) results in similar 
downward population trends when comparing the three scenarios, only they 
would go extinct under scenario I and III after 19 and 20 years respectively, 
while under scenario II a small population of around 10,000 duikers would 
remain after 20 years. Assuming minimum densities and reproduction rates 
from Noss (1998) results in minimal differences between the scenarios and 
duikers going extinct under all scenarios.  
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Local and national economy 
 
Overall, peoples’ incomes declines in the absence of a major 
entrepreneur/employer like a logging company, mainly because the 
landscape lacks the economic activities needed to support the increasing 
human population. Bushmeat hunting doesn’t seem able to provide a 
sustainable cash flow for the increasing local population. Current modelled 
hunting levels are unsustainable (Fig 5b) and hunting pressure from outside 
the area might increase in the future as improved roads provide better 
access to the landscape. Agricultural production is not likely to provide an 
income alternative either for a large proportion of the people. The Dzanga-
Sangha landscape has mainly ferralitic soils which are rapidly impoverished 
by slash-and-burn and when not altering cycles of cassava cultivation with 
other crops (Kokamy-Yambere 2007) as is the current practice. This, 
together with the administrative restrictions placed on agricultural expansion, 
limits the potential of agriculture to become a major income source. We 
didn’t model soil fertility declines and didn’t restrict agricultural expansion to 
remain within the small administrative agriculture zone. A separate modelling 
exercise showed when applying an agricultural rotation, agricultural 
expansion, as needed to keep agricultural production at current levels, would 
already be restricted by the limits of the agriculture zone within the next five 
years. If the boundaries of the agriculture zone are not revised and the 
current practice of continued mono-cropping continues, household income 
might decline more dramatically than suggested by the simulation results. 
 
The sensitivity of the data to human migration levels in and out of the 
landscape illustrates the importance for rural areas of growth in the national 
economy (Frost et al. 2007), as this reduces pressure on natural resources. 
At the same time, national development also brings new conservation 
challenges for rural areas because of increased access through infrastructure 
development (Laurence 2006). If on the other hand the socio-political turmoil 
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in the country continues, and little economic opportunities surge, the 
Dzanga-Sangha landscape is a likely refuge for people who will make a living 
with some bushmeat hunting, agriculture and other activities. If in such a 
situation the flow of people coming to Dzanga-Sangha is even larger than the 
1-3% immigration modelled, this would give very pessimistic outcomes for 
the landscapes’ wildlife populations.  
 
Conservation concession 
 
The current conservation concession scenario assumes a compensation of 
forgone forestry taxes of € 316,000/year or € 1.23 per ha/year (Table 1). 
The Cameroonian government was unable to find investors ever since 2001 
willing to pay € 1.4 per ha for 830,000 ha of almost entirely intact forest 
bordering a national park as a conservation concession (The Economist 2008 
and personal observation Sandker 2009). Likewise, the Peruvian government 
tried to auction off 800,000ha forest as a conservation concession but could 
not find investors willing to pay between € 0.7-2.8 per ha (Hardner & Rice 
2002). The Dzanga-Sangha concession concerns largely logged-over forest 
so it might be overly optimistic to assume investors will be found for the 
simulated € 1.2 per ha/year.  
 
According to Karsenty (2007), opportunity costs of forgone wages for the 
Cameroonian 830,000ha would be as much as € 6.4 million per year (€ 7.8 
per ha) additional to the taxes and royalties paid. Even if investors would be 
willing to pay the € 316,000 in the CAR, with the current situation of bad 
governance, direct payments to the government will do little for the local 
population.  
 
One could argue ecotourism could provide economic opportunities to the local 
population (though ecotourism could probably be as well developed under 
the certified logging scenario). Under our most optimistic scenario (assuming 
a 400 percent increase in tourists), ecotourism could contribute € 55,850 to 
the local economy whereas the logging concession contributes between € 
364,100 and € 885,200. A willingness-to-pay study in the Dzanga-Sangha 
landscape (Tieguhong 2009) revealed tourists are willing to pay about 1.8 
times more than they currently spend, but even doubling the revenue from 
ecotourism it would still contribute less to the local economy than logging 
would. Furthermore, a large share of the population living far from the 
project may have no access to income from ecotourism. Often income from 
ecotourism cannot compete with income from more destructive activities 
(Oates 1999). Perhaps carbon payments could increase the investment in 
forest conservation, though research by World Growth (2009) found the 
value of carbon credits at best brings in only a quarter of what can be 
secured from more effective economic use of forest land by developing 
countries. 
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Hunting 
 
The logging activities might lead to a larger increase in hunting pressure than 
we modelled because of intensified commercial hunting through increased 
traffic and increased cash income in the villages and bushmeat demand from 
the concession workers. This is likely to alter the difference between scenario 
I and II, but we do not expect this to change the overall trends under the 
three scenarios.  
 
Elephants 
 
One ecologist working in the landscape believed that the decrease in 
elephant population could be even more dramatic than the simulation results 
suggest. We assumed elephant hunting would become less successful once 
the elephant density drops below 0.2 elephants per km2, but since elephants 
concentrate on forest clearings (salines) hunting success might start 
decreasing at a lower elephant density. Furthermore, the number of 
elephants might decrease more drastically than simulated in the three 
scenarios if the elephants migrate to neighbouring Congo or Cameroon. Blake 
(2005) mentions that elephants move out of dangerous areas.  
 
Duikers 
 
Van Vliet and Nasi (2008) report how different methods to approximate 
duiker densities result in highly variable results. Noss (1998) compared his 
own findings based on line transect surveys and net hunt encounters with 
those of other studies using different methods to approximate duiker 
densities (i.e. radio-telemetry, pellet and track counts). He indicates that 
densities of C. monticola could vary in a range of 11 – 79 animals/km2 in the 
community hunting zone of the Dzanga-Sangha landscape according to 
different methods used to approximate duiker density. The density range he 
gives for C. callipygus and C. dorsalis shows an even larger variation, with 
highest approximated densities being 25 to 30 times the most conservative 
estimates. As explained under the method section, based on the hunting off-
take rates in combination with duikers apparently still being abundant, we 
have used a high reproduction rate and relatively high densities for duikers in 
the model (Table 1). When interpreting the results one should consider the 
great uncertainty concerning duiker density. This study seeks in the first 
place to assess a realistic trend in duiker population. For a precise prediction 
of duiker densities we would recommend a more in-depth study on duikers.  
 
Given the large variation in possible duiker densities, Noss (1998) was not 
certain whether hunt off-takes in 1994 were unsustainable for C. monticola 
and C. dorsalis. He did find hunting of C. callipygus to be at unsustainable 
levels even assuming the most optimistic density and reproduction figures. 
When comparing Noss’ (1998) data gathered in 1994 on snare-captured 
duiker species with the most hunted species according to the 50 household 
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interviews in 2006, we observe that the capture of C. monticola has doubled 
in proportion to C. callipygus. Furthermore, the share of C. dorsalis 
(consisting of 10 percent in kg of the duiker captured in 1994) has gone 
down almost three times (3.6 percent in kg of total hunted kg in 2006). A 
study carried out by Van Vliet et al. (2007) comparing duiker inventories in 
Gabon in the 1980’s and 2006 demonstrated that C. dorsalis has become 
locally extinct as a result of hunting pressure. Thus the relative decrease of 
C. dorsalis compared to the other duiker species in 2006 might reflect local 
depletion of this species due to over-hunting. We hypothesize that as the 
result of the depletion of one species of duiker, other species of duiker 
(notably C. monticola with its high reproduction rate) might increase as they 
have a higher carrying capacity and are exposed to less inter-species 
competition. These are however speculative findings since the data of Noss 
and the 2006 survey data were assessed in different ways, the standard 
hunting method for small animals has altered between 1994 and 2006 with 
small home-made guns gaining in popularity, and the household hunting 
estimates from the 2006 questionnaires are thought to be too rough to allow 
drawing any solid conclusions from it. We recommend further research to be 
done to test the hypothesis we pose. In any case, if a resilient animal like the 
duiker shows a dramatic decline, it is quite likely that other less resilient 
small animals will locally disappear with high hunting pressure. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The simulation results oblige one to temper expectations on best outcomes 
for wildlife conservation and local development in the Dzanga-Sangha 
landscape. The most optimistic scenario outcomes suggest even minimal 
wildlife losses to be quite dramatic for the 20 years to come, while the 
income situation for local people only improves little. On a positive note, 
there does appear to be room for synergies, with scenario II giving the best, 
or least bad, outcomes for both conservation and development. 
 
Contrary to the suggestion of Niesten & Rice (2004), the simulation results 
suggest that at current investment levels conservation concessions do not 
have the potential to provide economic development. In the situation of the 
Dzanga-Sangha landscape the conservation concession is not capable of 
maintaining wildlife populations since the landscape is already filled with 
settlers lacking alternative income generating activities. Economic 
development outside the landscape, and economic investments in the 
landscape (notably logging or mining) have major consequences for wildlife 
densities as they determine the extent of  human migration in and out of the 
landscape and determine the economic alternatives for the people living in 
the landscape. External economic investments have a higher impact on the 
size of wildlife populations than current conservation interventions. A key 
criticism of past integrated conservation and development initiatives has 
been their failure to recognise the importance of external forces whose 
impact dwarfs that of the on-site interventions of conservation agencies 
(McShane & Wells 2004). It seems that in situations like the Dzanga-Sangha 
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landscape, an important role of the ICDP is that of negotiating and informing 
the actors of the consequences of their choices of the credentials of logging 
companies. This choice will be the main determinant of conservation and 
development outcomes for the landscape.  
 
The results of this study suggest that rather than seeking to expand the 
protected area networks in the Congo Basin, both wildlife conservation and 
local development outcomes are better served by an appropriate balance 
between sustainable use and protection of the forest. This study therefore 
illustrates the importance of initiatives like Forest Law Enforcement, 
Governance and Trade (FLEGT), promoting timber certification and the 
allocation of Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation 
(REDD) funding to sustainable management as well as protection. 
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The role of participatory modeling in landscape approaches to 
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The Role of Participatory Modeling in Landscape Approaches to
Reconcile Conservation and Development
Marieke Sandker 1, Bruce M. Campbell 2,3, Manuel Ruiz-Pérez 1, Jeffrey A. Sayer 4,5, Richard Cowling 6, 
Habtemariam Kassa 7, and Andrew T. Knight 6,8
ABSTRACT. Conservation organizations are increasingly turning to landscape approaches to achieve a
balance between conservation and development goals. We use six case studies in Africa and Asia to explore
the role of participatory modeling with stakeholders as one of the steps towards implementing a landscape
approach. The modeling was enthusiastically embraced by some stakeholders and led to impact in some
cases. Different stakeholders valued the modeling exercise differently. Noteworthy was the difference
between those stakeholders connected to the policy process and scientists; the presence of the former in
the modeling activities is key to achieving policy impacts, and the latter were most critical of participatory
modeling. Valued aspects of the modeling included stimulating cross-sector strategic thinking, and helping
participants to confront the real drivers of change and to recognize trade-offs. The modeling was generally
considered to be successful in building shared understanding of issues. This understanding was gained
mainly in the discussions held in the process of building the model rather than in the model outputs. The
model itself reflects but a few of the main elements of the usually rich discussions that preceded its
finalization. Problems emerged when models became too complex. Key lessons for participatory modeling
are the need for good facilitation in order to maintain a balance between “models as stories” and technical
modeling, and the importance of inviting the appropriate stakeholders to achieve impact.
Key Words: conservation and development; landscape approach; multiple stakeholders; natural resource
policy; participatory modeling; systems modeling
INTRODUCTION
Integrated conservation and development projects
emerged in the 1970s and represent major
investments by conservation organizations.
However, their effectiveness is seriously questioned
(McShane and Wells 2003, Garnett et al. 2007). A
new wave of investment is now emerging in
“landscape approaches” as a way to integrate
conservation and development (Sayer and
Campbell 2004, Sayer and Maginnis 2005).
Landscapes are considered as mosaics of land cover
types that provide environmental services and
development opportunities for the multiple needs of
diverse stakeholders. A landscape approach seeks
to understand landscape dynamics and the desired
changes from different viewpoints, the aim being to
identify interventions and policies that will achieve
the stated goals of stakeholders. Constituting a
forum for stakeholder negotiations is a fundamental
first step in taking a landscape approach (Sayer and
Maginnis 2005).
“Facilitated”, “mediated”, “group”, or “participatory”
modeling are terms used for building models with
non-modelers under the guidance of a skilled
modeler. Participatory modeling has been used in a
wide range of situations, including business
(Vennix 1996, Vennix et al. 1996), fisheries (Otto
and Struben 2004), and environmental decision-
making (e.g., Van den Belt et al. 1998, Vanclay et
1Autonomous University of Madrid, Spain, 2Center for International Forestry Research, Bogor, Indonesia, 3Challenge Program for Climate Change,
Agriculture and Food Security, University of Copenhagen, Denmark, 4International Union for Conservation of Nature, Gland, Switzerland, 5Faculty of Earth
and Environmental Sciences, James Cook University, Cairns, Queensland, Australia, 6Botany Department, Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University, Port
Elizabeth, South Africa, 7Center for International Forestry Research, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 8current affiliation: Department of Conservation Ecology and
Entomology, Stellenbosch University, Matieland, South Africa
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al. 2006). A wide range of model types have been
used in participatory modeling, including Bayesian
or belief networks (Lynam et al. 2002), agent based
modeling (Bousquet and Le Page 2004, Castella et
al. 2005) and system dynamics modeling (Van den
Belt 2004, Sandker et al. 2007).
Although models are widely used to predict and
plan, participatory models serve to explore options
and enrich debate. Rouwette et al. (2002) and
Lynam et al. (2007)reviewed different cases where
participatory modeling was used, and concluded
that it improves communication between
stakeholders and this increases understanding of
complex systems. Akkermans and Vennix (1997)
found that five out of six case studies used
participatory modeling successfully to create
insights and build consensus. This is confirmed by
Bousquet et al. (2007) and Castella et al. (2007),
who claim that building models with multi-
stakeholder groups who have different perceptions
and objectives helps build a shared understanding
of problems. García-Barrios et al. (2008) report that
modeling is particularly effective in stimulating
cross-sector strategic thinking, and in helping
participants confront the real drivers of change and
recognize non-linearities and trade-offs. The
modeling process helps participants step back and
look beyond their own world view to the holistic
landscape picture. All of these characteristics help
in the implementation of a landscape approach.
In this paper, we examine several case studies where
participatory system dynamics modeling was
applied to environmental management challenges,
and explore how it contributed to promoting a
landscape approach. The case studies are drawn
from landscapes where conservation and
development goals were mutually sought. More
specifically, we examine whether participatory
modeling helped in conceptualizing the landscape
and its dynamics, in exploring possible
interventions, and in facilitating discussions among
multiple stakeholders. We also present lessons for
using participatory modeling.
METHODS
Background to the case studies
The case study sites all have extraordinary
biodiversity values. The Tri National de la Sangha,
which stretches between Cameroon, the Central
African Republic, and the Republic of Congo
(hereafter TNS), and Malinau (Indonesia) have vast
areas of largely undisturbed rainforest. The TNS
houses significant populations of forest elephant
(Loxodonta cyclotis), lowland gorilla (Gorilla
gorilla gorilla), and chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes
troglodytes). Malinau’s tropical rainforests are
among the world’s internationally recognized
biodiversity “hotspots” (Mittermeier et al. 2004).
Wasa Amenfi West (Ghana), where rainforest is
surrounded by agroforests, is also a biodiversity
hotspot. The Chilimo Forest (Ethiopia) is a National
Forest Priority Area and represents one of the few
remnants of dry Afro-montane forests that used to
cover the central plateau of Ethiopia. Namaqualand
(South Africa) forms part of the Succulent Karoo
biodiversity hotspot, which is one of only two arid
regions in the world to qualify as such. The
Subtropical Thicket Biome (South Africa) forms
part of the Maputaland-Pondoland-Albany biodiversity
hotspot (Steenkamp et al. 2004) and displays high
levels of plant endemism, along with populations of
African elephant (Loxodonta africana) and
endangered rhinoceros (Diceros bicornis michaeli
and Diceros bicornis bicornis).
Some of these landscapes have been subject to
recent rapid transformation. In Malinau, many
small-scale logging permits were issued as a result
of decentralization. In Chilimo, deforestation
increased significantly when state control weakened
after 1991. These landscapes were selected for this
paper because of their high biodiversity values and
high levels of poverty, and because all had projects
with conservation and development goals. Despite
this commonality, the landscapes are highly diverse
in their social-ecological contexts and stakeholder
makeup. In some of the models, participants
included governance as part of the system, notably
in the TNS model where governance drastically
affected outcomes landscape wide. In other
landscapes, the governance component in the model
was restricted to implications of specific policies.
The characteristics of the landscapes, and the
modeling approaches applied in each are described
in Table 1.
Model building approach and objective
In all landscapes, alternative scenarios were
simulated to explore the trade-offs between
conservation and development (see Table 1). Our
approach to participatory modeling builds upon the
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Table 1. Landscape characteristics and details of the modeling approach for each of the six case studies.
Landscape characteristics Modeling approach
Total
area
(km2)
Forest
cover
(%)
Pop-
ulation
pres-
sure
(pers-
on/
km2)
Cash
income
per
capita
(US$/
annum)
Land use
pressures
Objective Steps in process to
produce models
Stakeholder
engagement
No. of
variables
in the
model
Malinau, Indonesia
42,000 >90 2 180 Logging and
development of
biofuel plantations
Explore impact on livelihoods and
biodiversity of proposed conversion of
forest to oil palm plantations (Sandker et
al. 2007)
Workshop (2001),
many small
workshops, training
course on modeling,
continuing until 2007
District officials,
researchers,
representatives of
community
organizations
297
Wasa Amenfi, Ghana
3,465 ~25 55 600 Deforestation for
cocoa plantations
Explore whether carbon payments can
halt the conversion of primary and
secondary forest into cocoa plantations
(Sandker et al. 2010)
Workshop (2008) District officials,
local and
international
conservation agency
staff (International
Union for
Conservation of
Nature - IUCN),
logging company
representative,
landholder and
researchers
178
Tri National de la Sangha, Central Africa
35,000 >90 4 250 Wildlife poaching; to
a lesser extent
logging
Intended to focus on livelihood outcomes
from conservation initiatives but came to
focus on governance and corruption
impacts (Sandker et al. 2009)
Five annual
workshops, policy
briefings, continuing
until 2009
Conservation agency
staff (IUCN, World
Wildlife Fund,
Wildlife
Conservation
Society), regional
conservation bodies,
researchers (20–25
persons per
workshop)
584
Chilimo, Ethiopia
220 <30 60 40 High timber
extraction, grazing,
farming
Explore joint forest management versus
state control (Kassa et al. 2009)
Training course
(2005), policy
workshops
20 staff from a
forestry college,
graduate students,
staff of non-
governmental
organizations
(NGOs), local
officials, policy
advisors
486
Subtropical Thicket Biome, South Africa
3,686 Not
natu-
rally
fully
cove-
red
with
forest
73 2085 Urban development,
irrigated farming,
over-grazing, alien
plant invasion
Explore different mechanisms to
schedule conservation actions
Work with PhD
student to define
model (2003)
None for the
modeling part of the
project
538
(con'd)
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Namaqualand, South Africa
50,000 Not
natu-
rally
fully
cove-
red
with
forest
4 285 Unsustainable
farming, mining,
illegal trade in
succulents (Hofmann
and Rohde 2007)
Explore different mixes of commercial,
communal, and conservation land uses,
and estimate opportunity costs of
conservation on communal lands (James
et al. 2005)
Workshop (2004) Officers from
agencies involved in
conservation and
agriculture, NGOs,
researchers
526
concept of the “throw-away” model: computer-
implemented models that are built in a short time to
explore a particular problem and are then
“discarded” (Sayer and Campbell 2004). This
approach is similar to that proposed for scoping
models (Van den Belt et al. 1998, Van den Belt 2004,
Sandker et al. 2008). The objective of these models
is to explore links between the major components
of landscape systems and simulate possible trends
in environmental and livelihood outcomes over
time. The term “throw-away model” stresses the
utility of the model in facilitating brainstorming and
discussions rather than its use as a formal predictive
tool. The process of building the model in a
participatory manner is therefore more important
than the model produced. King and Kraemer (1993)
doubt the usefulness of models with high predictive
value in policy making processes. Decisions made
that involve multi-stakeholder processes usually go
deeper into the social realm where predictions are
far from accurate.
In our approach, we collaboratively identify and
build scenarios, where the modeled scenarios “tell
the story” of envisaged future changes across a
landscape. The intention of scenario building is to
consider a variety of possible futures rather than to
focus on the accurate prediction of a single best
outcome (Bennett et al. 2003, Peterson et al. 2003).
Ultimately, the objective of the model building
exercise is to improve the performance of local
stakeholders in identifying interventions that are
likely to have the greatest impact on them. In some
cases, the objective is also to inform more distant
stakeholders at the national, regional, and
international levels.
Stakeholders
These case studies typically aim to help
stakeholders find solutions to their conservation and
development challenges. Local stakeholders are
primarily local landowners, and managers in
government and in local and international non-
governmental organizations (NGOs). As part of the
process in the TNS, several sessions were held with
stakeholders at a policy level (donors, parliamentarians,
regional agencies). Policy level dialogue was also
part of the Chilimo and Malinau processes.
Model building steps
The approaches adopted in the six case studies were
similar. In all cases, we used the systems dynamic
modeling software STELLA. This is a stock-and-
flow modeling language with a user-friendly icon-
based interface. Most commonly, a workshop was
held with a diverse range of stakeholders (Table 1),
at which a number of activities were facilitated to
promote discussion of desirable conservation and
development outcomes at the landscape scale (Fig.
1). We often started with historical time trends as a
precursor to visioning so as to create awareness of
current trends in the landscape and to provoke
discussion about the events that triggered changes
in the landscape in the past and which might do so
in the future. The visioning exercises took several
forms: brainstorming on possible future scenarios,
identifying “undesired” and “desired” scenarios
from different stakeholders’ perspectives, identifying
the major drivers of change, and discussing possible
interventions.
The next step was to identify indicators of
conservation and development, which generally
became variables in the landscape model, later to
be plotted on graphs to display the simulated
outcomes under different scenarios. Examples
included “household income”, “village development
budget”, “elephant population”, and “forest cover”.
This was typically accomplished by using flip charts
and flash cards.
The next step was to define the different sectors
(sub-models) of the landscape, for example “rural
population dynamics”, “land-use changes”, and
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Fig. 1. Schematic representation of steps taken in the participatory modeling process (modified from
Sandker et al. 2009). 
“wildlife populations”. Different groups of
participants then worked independently to build
these sectors under the guidance of specialist
modelers. Landscape stakeholders selected the
sectors and their elements, including all that they
believed were affecting conservation and
development outcomes in the landscape. Variables
in the sectors were defined and parameterized using
data from reports, literature, or expert estimates. The
dynamics of the system were added by indicating
how variables influence each other, based on the
earlier discussions about the main drivers of change.
A reality check was typically conducted where the
model was run and simulated outcomes for specific
variables were checked against known trends or
participant expectations, which often led to further
changes to the model.
Sectors were then linked to run the complete model.
The modeling process often resulted in changes in
focus as understanding of the system emerged. This
often led to new sectors being added to the model
while others became obsolete. The modeling group
then explored the potential impacts of different
interventions. This allowed participants to ask
“what if” questions and served as a reality check for
what may be achieved with different interventions.
Time investment
In some case studies, long-term engagement was
possible. This was the case for the TNS (four annual
meetings) and Malinau (seven years of engagement
with district stakeholders) where the model was
revised and updated at each successive meeting. At
the other extreme, in the Subtropical Thicket Biome
case study, the model was prepared by researchers
with the intention of using it in multi-stakeholder
forums, but the plan was terminated and the model
was not further developed. In Wasa Amenfi,
Chilimo, and Namaqualand, models were built at a
single workshop. Wasa Amenfi was the shortest
workshop, and the model was built in only five days
but engagement through email discussions
continued for several months. At Chilimo, a 10-day
training program was held for lecturers and
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researchers, which included engagement with other
local stakeholders. In Namaqualand, a 7-day
workshop was held, and the model was refined over
the next 12 months.
Evaluation of the participatory modeling case
studies
The value of the participatory modeling cases was
assessed through a questionnaire survey of the
participants. Twenty-three participants from the six
case studies participated in the questionnaire. The
participants were grouped into four types of
stakeholders: scientists, local/national NGO staff,
international NGO staff, and persons closely
connected to the policy process. The questions were
based on reported qualities from participatory
modeling experiences (Akkermans and Vennix
1997, Costanza and Ruth 1998, Rouwette et al.
2002, Van den Belt 2004, Beall 2007). The
questions were grouped into four categories that
described participatory modeling: (1) “process”: the
participatory process of building the model and the
thinking and discussion it provoked; (2) “structure”:
the actual model and the more technical aspects of
the model building; (3) “outputs”: the simulated
indicator outputs featured in graphs or tables; and
(4) “impact”: the impact of the modeling exercise
and how the modeling results were used after the
model session. The questionnaire had six questions
on process, six on structure, six on outputs, and five
on impacts (Appendix 1). The questions were
structured as Likert statements (Babbie 1989) that
were scored from one to five, with one representing
a very low perceived value while five represented
a high perceived value. The average scores for each
case are presented in Appendix 1. The matrix of
landscapes and their average scores for the four
model building characteristics, and the matrix of
stakeholders and their average scores were analyzed
using Principal Component Analysis (PCA).
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Modeling characteristics
Average scores from the participants for the
different characteristics of participatory modeling
are shown in Figure 2. The highest scores were given
to process, whereas impact scored the lowest. The
latter characteristic also has the highest standard
deviation, indicating a great variety of views about
the potential impact of the modeling exercises.
These results are in line with the expectations of the
throw-away model approach, where the functioning
and outputs of the model are less relevant than the
process of discussion, interpretation, and consensus
building.
Modeling results in the different landscapes
The PCA results of the average landscape scores for
the four different modeling characteristics (process,
structure, outputs, and impact) are shown in Figure
3. The PCA divides the landscapes into three groups:
(1) Subtropical Thicket Biome and Namaqualand,
(2) Malinau, Chilimo and Wasa Amenfi, and (3)
TNS. The X-axis is largely a gradient from low (left)
to high (right) scores. The Subtropical Thicket
Biome and Namaqualand modeling exercises
scored poorly, though in Namaqualand, the
modeling process added some value. Malinau, Wasa
Amenfi, and Chilimo are landscapes where the
modeling was rated highly for all modeling
characteristics. The TNS scored high on process,
structure, and outputs, but scored poorly on impact.
It is noteworthy that the highest scoring case studies
concerned models with the fewest number of
variables (Fig. 3, Table 1). The Y-axis differentiates
between high and low impact. This seems to indicate
that process, structure, and outputs are closely
related but that other factors influence whether
impact is achieved.
The initial model developed by experts for the
Subtropical Thicket Biome was highly complex.
This raised several problems. The time taken to
build the model (about two person-months) was too
much in relation to the need to act quickly in the
project context. Also, the data needs were too great
and the model would have been difficult to explain
to the landowners who were the principle
stakeholders. In the end, the model was abandoned.
The model in this case had become too expert-
driven. In Namaqualand, the model was also
excessively complex – a simple model would have
sufficed. The participatory modeling proved a
distraction from the real objective of simply
supplying local stakeholders with better information
that could have been obtained through other
methods.
In the TNS, the modeling gained high scores on
process, structure, and outputs, but there was no
impact. The explanation of the performance of the
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Fig. 2. Average scores for the four characteristics of the model building exercise derived from the
questionnaire survey. 
TNS model lies partly beyond the questionnaire
results. The model outputs suggested governance
was the main problem in the landscape, and little
impact was possible without reducing corruption
within local government. This considerable
challenge lay beyond the mandate of the
stakeholders present at the modeling workshop
(mainly conservation NGOs) or would put their
relationships with government at risk.
In the Malinau, Wasa Amenfi, and Chilimo
landscapes, participatory modeling resulted in or
came close to having positive impacts. A primary
reason why these cases had positive impacts was
due to the presence of participants who had strong
links to policy makers. This was most obvious in
Chilimo where discussions and policy meetings
after the modeling exercise resulted in a change in
national legislation. For Chilimo, one of the
participants was already engaged in policy dialogue
with national level actors as the government was
revisiting its forest proclamation. The results of the
modeling exercise were systematically used to
inform the policy formulation process, which led to
the inclusion of a law that was relevant to joint
management of protected forests (Kassa et al. 2009).
In Malinau, the model results were presented and
discussed with the district head; the discussions
around the model were partially responsible for
turning his attention to carbon payment schemes.
The experience in Wasa Amenfi served as a lesson
on the feasibility of reducing emissions from
deforestation and forest degradation (REDD) in
comparable landscapes on a global level (Sandker
et al. 2010), and the results could contribute to
national level negotiations on REDD.
Modeling results for different stakeholders
The PCA results of the average scores for the
different types of participants for the four different
modeling characteristics are provided in Figure 4.
Each stakeholder type was placed in a distinct group.
Again, the X-axis is explained mainly by the overall
scores provided by the stakeholders. Scientists are
clearly differentiated from the rest; they gave the
lowest overall scores (3.3). At the other extreme,
stakeholders with connections to the policy process
gave the highest overall scores (3.8), and were
especially positive in relation to impact. National
NGO staff were especially positive about model
structure. International NGO staff, located in the
middle, gave high scores to most of the
characteristics.
THE LIMITATIONS OF PARTICIPATORY
MODELING
Complexity of models
STELLA is a simple, icon-based modeling
language, and therefore is relatively accessible to
non-professionals. Most participants confirmed this
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Fig. 3. PCA of average scores for each of the four characteristics of participatory modeling for each
landscape. 
by ranking the user-friendliness of STELLA with a
medium to high score (Appendix 1: 2.1). One
participant commented “participative workshops
are the best strength of STELLA since it is
conceptually easy to learn compared to other
modeling languages”. However, the lowest of all
values was given to “the ease to run or alter the
model” (Appendix 1: 2.2). Even though it is a
relatively simple modeling language, non-modelers
experience technical constraints in mastering
STELLA. If all the elements of a landscape are
included, the model can become highly complex
and is no longer easily understood by all
stakeholders. Complexity is inherent in the use of
system dynamics modeling and forms the biggest
limitation to the modeling being a participatory
process. We therefore believe the success of
participatory modeling depends on the presence of
a skilled facilitator. Without good facilitation, the
model likely passes into the realm of a high-tech
simulation tool and loses its value as a means to
stimulate participation and exchange among
participants.
Modeling that is “narrow” in scope
The model structure and outputs gained lower
scores than the model building process (Fig. 2). One
participant in the Ghana modeling session
commented “a multi-dimensional discussion turned
into a model with a one-track mind”. While the
discussion provoked by the model building process
was broad, only a small number of options were
selected for simulation.
Difficulty to achieve impact
Changing the way in which people think is a slow
and difficult process. In a study by Pala and Vennix
(2005) that evaluated whether students’ understanding
of basic system concepts improved after they took
a system dynamics course, the authors suggested
that “...it is possible that our students only enrich
(i.e., add information to existing conceptual
structures) their ideas rather than revising
(i.e., changing their beliefs or presuppositions)
them.” This seems to hold for most of our
participants. They gave medium to high scores for
“enhancing out-of-discipline thinking” and “focusing
on most relevant problems” (Appendix 1: 1.5 and
1.6), but gave lower scores for their ability to apply
model outcomes to their daily activities (Appendix
1: 4.2 and 4.3).
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Fig. 4. PCA of average scores for each stakeholder group for the four characteristics of participatory
modeling. 
THE STRENGTHS OF PARTICIPATORY
MODELING
Better understanding 
Early stages of model development often revealed
a lack of shared understanding of problems among
stakeholders. With the exception of the
Namaqualand and Subtropical Thicket Biome case
studies, high scores were given to the modeling
exercise’s value in increasing understanding of the
landscape (Appendix 1: 1.1) and problems at hand
(Appendix 1: 1.2). One participant commented that
the modeling exercise was “ an interesting approach
that helps to connect the dots”. Several participants
also praised the model’s capacity to help identify
what data should be collected to increase the
understanding of the landscape: “It made clear
where data is still lacking, which I find a crucial
element of planning new activities.”
Increasing dialogue
One of the key needs of a landscape approach is to
facilitate multi-stakeholder discussion and negotiation.
The participants gave the modeling process
moderate to high scores in building consensus on
how to proceed (Appendix 1: 1.3) and creating
awareness of different viewpoints (Appendix 1:
1.4). One participant mentioned she thought the
enriching discussion was not a product of the model
but rather of the facilitator’s guidance, indicating
good facilitation is key if the modeling process is to
produce insightful exchange.
Some participants noted that awareness of different
viewpoints was restricted because not all
stakeholders were included in the modeling
exercise. We found it difficult to adequately involve
a sufficiently wide cross-section of local
landowners and managers because time demands
on stakeholders involved in the modeling process
often proved excessive. Participation generally
extended only as far as officers of NGOs and
government agencies.
Enhancing out-of-discipline thinking
Most participants concluded that they were
stimulated to think outside their own discipline
(Appendix 1: 1.5). In a number of the case studies,
the participants were largely conservationists with
a biophysical background. They had a clear view
and knowledge of conservation dynamics and how
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they affected these, but their view of development
appeared superficial and incomplete (where the
gaps were filled by development NGO participants).
Despite the development rhetoric of many of the
conservation organizations, the models often
showed that conservation programs had little
positive impact on local livelihoods. The models
challenged them to better address the issues
influencing the livelihoods of local people.
Confronting the drivers of change 
Most participants believed that participatory
modeling was helpful in ensuring focus on the most
relevant problems (Appendix 1: 1.6). When
building quantitative models, assumptions must be
made explicit because they have to be spelled out
in scenarios, supported with data, and embodied in
the equations used to build the model. The model
outputs sometimes resulted in confronting
findings – e.g., in the TNS, NGOs realized that the
impacts of their current activities on local
livelihoods would be negligible unless corruption
was confronted (Sandker et al. 2009). This formed
the basis for lively debate and a realization that shifts
in strategies for investing conservation funds were
needed. In Chilimo, where joint forest management
is considered to be successful, participants
identified future constraints to the system and issues
that need to be addressed to sustain the
interventions. Malinau comprises a region of
extreme change – here, the focus of discussions was
on the new challenges and opportunities that are
likely to unfold from major external investments.
Formulation of strategy and policy
Initially, it was believed by those leading the
participatory modeling process that the models
would be most useful for the participants within
their landscapes. The models did contribute to
understanding, did help in the exchange viewpoints,
and did stimulate out-of-discipline thinking
(Appendix 1: 1.1, 1.4, 1.5). However, mean impact
scores were low. The best cases of success were
outside the landscape. Outputs from the models,
usually extremely simplified, can be used to
communicate with external stakeholders, including
people not involved in the modeling process. This
is illustrated by the previously mentioned use of
model outputs for the TNS, Chilimo, and Malinau
to present certain points of view to policy makers.
LESSONS LEARNED FOR
IMPLEMENTING EFFECTIVE
PARTICIPATORY MODELING
Select the appropriate tools
It is essential to have sound reasons for embarking
upon participatory modeling. In the Subtropical
Thicket Biome case study, participatory modeling
was probably not the appropriate approach. It may
have been more effective to develop a GIS-based
decision support system combined with expert
judgment to choose the best mix of conservation
options. In the Namaqualand case, participatory
modeling was also probably inappropriate – simple
spreadsheets could have been used to compare
scenarios, and could have been used as the basis for
discussion in stakeholder and policy forums.
Vennix (1996: 106) states “...system dynamics is
appropriate in situations where (a) the problem is
dynamically complex because of underlying
feedback processes, and (b) one looks for robust
long term solutions.” In the Subtropical Thicket
Biome and Namaqualand cases, stakeholders were
beyond the phase where the problem had to be well
defined and the underlying causes explored. Rather,
they were in the planning phase of detailed
information gathering to make a better comparison
between different options. For an overview of what
approach to use in what situation, we refer to
Chapter 4 in Vennix (1996).
Invite the right stakeholders
For the modeling to help in the exchange of different
viewpoints, a sufficiently broad range of
stakeholders should be involved in the model
building process. Participants with good connections
to policy makers should be invited to ensure the
modeling results in impact.
Modeling is just one of various instruments in
the toolkit
Participants noted a limitation of participatory
modeling. They mentioned that it was “narrow”
since it selected only one or a few options for deeper
exploration. Hisschemöller et al. (2001) state “Since
models are only capable of analyzing well-
structured problems, models are necessary but not
sufficient tools to identify and define the problem
to be evaluated...”. Modeling should be seen as one
of a broader set of tools that help to implement a
landscape approach.
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Another limitation arises from processes that are
extremely difficult to simulate. Many proponents of
modeling advocate the use of soft system variables
(“e.g., degree of social cohesion”) (Sterman 1991,
Vanclay et al. 2006), but we have found that
stakeholders are highly skeptical of including such
variables (Sandker et al. 2008).
Value of the process
Some of the most interesting insights and the more
valuable discussions of possible scenarios came
before the detailed modeling. Thus, the visioning
phase is crucial. One participant commented “The
modeling is good for helping the process of
identifying possible strategies and policies.
However, the future remains subject to uncertainty
and therefore scenarios should be seen as an
additional source of information but not as a
prediction of reality.” This view is in accordance
with the concept of a throw-away model.
Facilitation
Good facilitation helps ensure stakeholders engage
meaningfully with each other and the model does
not become overly complex. In addition, the
facilitator has an important role in encouraging
participants to challenge conventional wisdom.
Facilitation does not stop at the end of a modeling
workshop. The most significant impacts have come
where the facilitator has remained involved over
several years and so has been able to update and
adapt the model to address emerging problems.
Participatory modeling can form a key input during
processes of change, for identifying opportunities
and constraints (Cowling et al. 2008).
Dealing with time constraints
It was often challenging to realize all mentioned
objectives of participatory modeling given
stakeholders’ time constraints. If the modeling goes
too slowly, you risk not getting to the bottom of the
problem and limiting the outcomes to knowledge
exchange. If the modeling goes too quickly, you risk
losing comprehension by some stakeholders who
consequently might feel little ownership of the
model, which often results in little uptake of its
outcomes. Ideally, as explained by Beall (2007), the
modeling is realized on different places along the
“hands on” continuum, from an active use of the
modeling software by the participants to more
technical model “fixing” by the facilitator, who in
the absence of the participants, translates
stakeholder views into the model. It is therefore
important to have a series of meetings, with the
facilitator advancing the model in between them. In
case of the TNS, for example, the governance issue
came up only in the third meeting.
Keeping the model as simple as possible
Building participatory models reveals a problem
common to modeling generally – that of balancing
simplicity against accuracy. Scientists feel a need
to develop a highly complex model to capture the
immense complexity of social-ecological systems
because they are often uncomfortable with
uncertainty (Knight et al. 2006). There is a
perception that the greater the detail, the greater the
value in exploring scenarios. In our case, the highest
overall scores were given to models with the lowest
number of variables, so complexity does not
necessarily lead to a more useful model. One
participant gave low scores to the degree of reality
in the model and its outputs, commenting “due to
the complexity and the frequent lack of data of
sufficient quality, the model is merely good to give
very rough indications; the big trends are probably
right though”. This is exactly the aim of the throw-
away model – to gain understanding of general
system functioning. It is not suitable for precise
predictions. It is also unrealistic to expect
stakeholders to commit long periods of time to
modeling. Some of the more successful
participatory modeling exercises, the exercise in
Ghana for example, were completed within 3-5
days. A balance needs to be found between those
improvements to the model that are essential for the
exploration of scenarios and those that yield only
marginal improvements in outputs.
CONCLUSION
Process came out as the most valued aspect of
participatory modeling, which suggests that the
approach of the throw-away model was valued by
the participants. These findings concur with Vennix
(1996: 98) who reports “...most insights are gained
during rather than after the model building process.”
Specifically, the modeling process was valued in its
ability to stimulate information exchange and
strategy discussions.
In most case studies, a wide range of disciplines
were involved from the outset, and disciplinary
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issues were not the biggest challenge. Challenges
related more to reconciling the diverse views of the
stakeholders involved (scientists, staff of local and
international NGOs, stakeholders with connections
to the policy process) than to the disciplinary mix.
The evaluation results demonstrate that engaging
stakeholders is not a simple process because
different stakeholders sometimes have wide-
ranging perspectives on what is valuable in the
participatory process. Scientists typically were
more critical of the modeling, while stakeholders
with policy connections valued the model’s role in
informing decision makers. King and Kraemer
(1993) discuss the division between scientists and
policy makers and the low uptake by policy makers
of ‘scientific’ modeling results (referring to
predictive models of physical processes of the
environment). Participatory modeling is apparently
better able to reach policy audiences, though it may
lack some credibility with scientists.
It takes careful judgment to determine when
participatory modeling can be usefully applied.
Strong facilitation of the modeling process is
essential to keep the focus on “models as stories”
rather than models becoming the end in themselves.
Participatory modeling is not a panacea for solving
the difficult problems of reconciling conservation
and development at landscape scales. However,
with skilled facilitation, models can be powerful
tools to help stakeholders better understand the
dynamics of landscapes and improve their decision
making and investments in natural resource
management. Therefore, they certainly help in
taking a landscape approach.
Responses to this article can be read online at:
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol15/iss2/art13/
responses/
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APPENDIX 1. The questions for each of the four characteristics describing participatory modeling with
mean scores by case study. 
Value of participatory modeling in
terms of:
Malinau Wasa
Amenfi
TNS† Chilimo Subtropi-
cal
Thicket
Biome
Namaqua-
land
Mean
scores
1.
Model
building
process
1. understanding/
conceptualization of system
4 4 4 5 3 4 4.3
2. getting a common
understanding of problems at hand
4 4 4 4 1 4 3.7
3. building consensus on way
forward
4 4 4 5 1 4 3.6
4. creating awareness of different
viewpoints
4 4 4 5 2 3 3.9
5. enhancing out-of-discipline
thinking
4 4 4 5 4 5 4.2
6. focusing on most relevant
problems
4 3 3 4 2 4 3.5
Mean score "process" 4.1 3.8 4.1 4.4 2.1 3.6 3.9
2.
Model
structure
1. the user-friendliness of the
Stella software
4 4 3 4 4 4 3.7
2. the ease to run or alter the
model
3 4 3 3 2 2 3.0
3. the sense of ownership of model 4 4 4 4 4 3 3.6
4. the degree to which the model
approaches reality
3 3 4 4 2 4 3.3
5. the completeness of the model 4 3 4 3 2 4 3.6
(con'd)
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6. capturing complexity 4 3 4 4 3 3 3.6
Mean score "structure" 3.4 3.6 3.7 3.5 2.6 3.2 3.5
3.
Model
outputs
1. the degree to which model
outputs are believable
3 3 4 4 3 4 3.3
2. identifying best options
for impact (optimization)
5 3 4 4 1 4 3.5
3. formulation of strategy 4 4 3 4 2 3 3.3
4. supporting decision making 4 3 3 4 1 3 3.0
5. supporting policy formulation 4 4 4 5 2 3 4.0
6. communicating strategy 4 4 3 4 1 3 3.4
Mean score "outputs" 3.9 3.6 3.7 4.1 1.5 3.0 3.5
4.
Impact
after
model-
ing
1. improving performance of
interventions
4 3 3 3 2 2 2.9
2. actual changing the focus of
interventions
4 4 3 4 1 2 3.1
3. actual changing the strategy 4 3 2 4 1 3 2.9
4. actual use in policy formulation 4 4 1 4 2 2 2.6
5. actual use to communicate
strategy
4 3 3 4 1 2 3.2
Mean score "impact" 4.1 3.3 2.9 3.8 1.3 2.1 3.1
† Tri National de la Sangha (TNS), which stretches between Cameroon, the Central African Republic,
and the Republic of Congo
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ABSTRACT 
This study explores how conservation and development are inter-linked and 
quantifies their reciprocal trade-offs. It identifies interventions which hold a 
promise to improve both conservation and development outcomes. The study 
finds that development trajectories can either be at the cost of conservation 
or can benefit conservation, but in all cases sustained poverty negatively 
affects conservation in the long term. All Reducing Emissions from 
Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD) implementation scenarios come 
at a cost of development and the financial benefits of payments for 
environmental services (PES) are not sufficient to make up for lost 
opportunities to earn cash. However, environmental service benefits and 
subsistence income enhance the attractiveness of conservation scenarios to 
local people and PES may provide the extra cash incentive to tip the balance 
for such a scenario. The paper also stresses the importance of external 
factors (like industrial investments and the development of the national 
economy) in largely determining landscape scale outcomes, and suggests a 
negotiating and visioning role for conservation agencies.   
 
Keywords: deforestation; ICDP; participatory modelling; PES; poverty; 
protected areas; REDD.  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Conservation and development are strongly related in tropical forest 
landscapes. For some decades now, integrated conservation and 
development projects (ICDPs) have been attempting to improve conservation 
and development outcomes simultaneously but worldwide they have been 
criticised for lack of progress (Christensen 2004; Kremen et al. 1994; Wells 
et al. 1999). To identify interventions contributing to this dual objective, one 
needs to have a good understanding of how conservation and development 
are related. If trade-offs occur between conservation and development 
outcomes we need to quantify them to see whether they can be overcome. 
Perhaps the best known representation of the large-scale and long-term 
relation between conservation and development is given by the 
environmental Kuznets curve. This relation assumes an inverse U-curve, 
where moving out of absolute poverty first comes with environmental 
degradation and only after a substantial increase in wealth is this 
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degradation halted, and in some cases, turned into environmental restoration 
(e.g. reforestation). This environmental degradation response to increased 
wealth would imply ICDPs in developing country situations are largely 
attempting to do the impossible. However, the large scale in the Kuznets 
curve refers to a national level response, while ICDPs work at landscape 
levels. While it is uncertain whether this relationship holds for many 
developing nations, it is even more of an unknown whether it would hold at a 
landscape scale.  
 
This study visualizes trajectories of conservation and development outcomes 
under different scenarios for five forest landscapes. For each of the 
landscapes a business as usual scenario is defined as the most likely scenario 
to happen in absence of new conservation or integrated conservation and 
development approaches. For each landscape, we also included an 
alternative scenario based on the introduction of a new strategy or approach 
to conservation (and development). For the Indonesian and West-African 
landscape, Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation 
(REDD) implementation strategies are explored, while for the Central African 
landscapes we explore better governance of timber and wildlife royalties, and 
forest certification. Simulation results for conservation and development 
indicators after 20 years from now are compared for each of the scenarios. 
We attempt to assess whether moving out of poverty goes at the cost of the 
environment to assess the chances of success for ICDPs. We quantify trade-
offs occurring between conservation and development outcomes in forest 
landscapes and we also explore whether payments for environmental 
services (PES) can overcome these trade-offs. Finally, we try to identify 
interventions which hold the potential to improve both conservation and 
development outcomes.  
 
METHODS 
 
The study locations 
 
We compared the current conservation and development indicator scores in 
five tropical forest landscapes and more importantly, we compared the likely 
future trajectories for conservation and development outcomes under a 
range of selected scenarios. The five landscapes (Table 1) are located in 
South-East Asia, and Central and West Africa: Malinau district, East-
Kalimantan, Central Indonesia; Kaimana district, Papua, East Indonesia; the 
SE Technical Operational Unit, SE Cameroon; the Dzanga-Sangha landscape, 
SW Central African Republic (CAR), and Wasa Amenfi district, SW Ghana.  
 
The common criteria for the selected landscapes are that they all have 
forests with great biodiversity, of which part is protected in national parks or 
forest reserves. In all of them projects or the government are attempting to 
improve conservation and development and all have some form of conflict 
between conservation and development interests. 
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Table 1. Characteristics of the five landscapes studied 
 Kalimantan Papua Cameroon CAR Ghana 
Total population 65,200 42,600 140,646 7,346 161,825 
Total area (km2) 42,621 17,298 36,066 4,672 3,465 
People/km2 1.5 2.5 3.9 1.6 46.7 
Forest cover 99 95 97 99 25 
Primary forest cover 
(including logged-over 
primary forest) 
96 95 90 99 16 
Per capita cash income 
(US$) 
250 205 270 215 625 
Purchasing Power Parity* 
(international $) per capita 
690 565 500 395 1145 
Data source Chapter 5 Chapter 4 Chapter 6 Chapter 8 Chapter 7     
*To convert cash income to PPP we used the 2007 conversion factor (WB 2009) for South-Asia 
(Kalimantan and Papua) and Sub-Saharan Africa (Cameroon, CAR and Ghana). 
 
 
Indicators of Conservation and Development 
 
To quantify trade-offs between conservation and development we selected 
indicators of both. Forest cover (indicating quantity of forest) and primary 
forest cover (indicating quality of forest) percentages are used to 
approximate conservation outcomes. Average per capita cash income is used 
to indicate economic development outcomes, which is converted to 
purchasing power parity (PPP) in order to compare among the different 
geographical locations. Some conservationists see wildlife hunting for food as 
a more immediate threat to biodiversity conservation rather than 
deforestation (Wilkie et al. 2005). We suggest this is largely so in Central 
Africa but doesn’t hold for countries like Indonesia where forests are replaced 
at large scales by other land-uses. For the Central African landscapes we 
included relative changes in forest elephant (Loxodonta cyclotis) and duiker 
(Cephalophus spp) populations to approximate conservation outcomes. No 
data on wildlife populations were available to us for any of the other 
landscapes. 
 
Scenario exploration 
 
The scenarios are defined during participatory modelling sessions with local 
actors working in the landscapes and at the national or regional level. The 
modelling platform used was the system dynamics software STELLA, and 
with the participants a model was built of the landscape including all features 
related to conservation and development outcomes and their interactions. 
For more information on the model building process, the model structure and 
data input we would like to refer to the chapters mentioned in Table 1. For 
each location, three scenarios were explored: 1. business as usual (BAU), 2. 
an alternative scenario, 3. an alternative scenario including payments for 
environmental services to be received by the local population (Table 2). The 
business as usual scenarios selected are not necessarily a projection of 
historical trends but correspond with the most likely scenario to happen 
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according to participants considering changes seen and anticipated for the 
region. The alternative scenarios are scenarios with new approaches to 
conservation and/or development. In the Indonesian and Ghanaian 
landscapes, we explored the implementation of Reducing Emissions from 
Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD) strategies (Table 2). In the 
Central African landscapes, deforestation is not a real issue now and isn’t 
projected to be a major issue under the BAU scenarios, which is why we 
selected better governance (Chapter 6) and forest certification (Chapter 8) as 
alternative scenarios. When including PES under the alternative scenarios we 
assume local people to receive 20% of REDD payments, while under the 
alternative scenario without PES we assume the entire REDD payment to be 
consumed at central and district government level. We included a wildlife 
payment for the Central African landscapes following a REDD-design: wildlife 
population baselines are constructed for elephant and duiker populations 
based on a scenario without interventions (obtained with the model). If fewer 
animals are poached than under the baseline the difference in population size 
is paid for using the Cameroonian safari hunting fees per animal (Table 2). 
Some assumptions in the original models have been altered to have more 
coherence when comparing the different geographical locations. E.g. we 
altered the duiker density in CAR to get the density assessed with a similar 
method as in Cameroon and regarding REDD the carbon price paid on the 
international market is set equal for all locations (Table 2).  
 
Table 2. Scenario description with main assumptions for the different 
landscapes 
Landscape Scenario Assumptions 
BAU 500,000ha of forest are converted to plantation over 20 years  
Annual timber and plantation salaries are 10 and 12 mln Rp 
respectively 
Oil palm requires 0.2 worker/ha, for more assumptions see Chapter 
5
Kalimantan 
 
Alternative 
scenario 
REDD: A REDD strategy will be implemented resulting in plantation 
development to be restricted to 100,000ha over 20 years; local 
people don’t receive a share of the REDD payment 
Alternative 
scenario 
with PES 
BAU scenario is used to calculate total amount of carbon prevented 
from being emitted; CO2 price= 10US$; the scenario assumes a 20-
year REDD contract with an equal annual pay; local people receive 
20% of the REDD payment 
BAU 600,000ha of forest are converted to plantation over 20 years 
Annual timber and plantation salaries are 10 and 12 mln Rp 
respectively 
Oil palm requires 0.2 worker/ha, for more assumptions see Chapter 
4
Papua 
 
Alternative 
scenario 
A REDD strategy will be implemented resulting in plantation 
development to be restricted to 108,000ha over 20 years; local 
people don’t receive a share of the REDD payment  
Alternative 
scenario 
with PES 
BAU scenario is used to calculate total amount of carbon prevented 
from being emitted; CO2 price= 10US$; REDD contract lasts 20 
years, and an equal amount is paid each year. 
Cameroon BAU Prolongation of current trend: bad governance and high levels of 
poaching, ICDP invests in anti-poaching only, see Chapter 6 
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Alternative 
scenario 
Better governance: ICDP invests in improvement of redistributing 
and managing timber and wildlife royalties, see Chapter 6 
Alternative 
scenario 
with PES 
BAU scenario without ICDP is used to calculate total number of 
elephants and duikers prevented from being lost after 20 years; 
prices per animal are derived from safari hunting fees set by the 
Cameroonian government, being US$185/elephant and 
US$37/duiker; Duiker price is approximated since it concerns 
various species; PES contract lasts 20 years, and an equal amount 
is paid each year, all goes to local people in the form of an anti-
poaching salary. 
BAU Prolongation of current trend: Re-opening of sawmill in the 
landscape run by a company showing low social responsibility and 
no long-term management plan, see Chapter 8. We use minimum 
duiker density estimations by Noss (1998), and maximum 
reproduction rate approximation. 
CAR 
Alternative 
scenario 
FSC: re-opening of the (currently closed) sawmill by a company 
obtaining Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) certification, showing 
high social responsibility, see Chapter 8 
Alternative 
scenario 
with PES 
Worst case BAU scenario (complete extinction elephant and duiker) 
is used to calculate total number of elephants and duikers 
prevented from being lost after 20 years; prices per animal are 
derived from safari hunting fees set by the Cameroonian 
government, being US$185/elephant and US$37/duiker; Duiker 
price is approximated since it concerns various species; PES 
contract lasts 20 years, and an equal amount is paid each year, all 
goes to local people in the form of an anti-poaching salary. 
BAU Prolongation of current trend: Cocoa expansion at the cost of 
forest, see Chapter 7
Ghana 
 
Alternative 
scenario 
A REDD strategy will be implemented resulting in no more forest to 
be converted to cocoa.  
BAU scenario is used to calculate total amount of carbon prevented 
from being emitted; CO2 price= 10US$; REDD contract lasts 20 
years, and an equal amount is paid each year, all goes to local 
people. 
Alternative 
scenario 
with PES 
All All We used the same PPP factor for the 20 year income projection 
though it is likely this will change, notably with fast development in 
South-Asia PPP might decrease. 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
When comparing the data point sizes in Figure 1, one notices that moving 
out of poverty coincides with moving into a cash economy. The Ghanaian 
landscape is already a cash economy now with around 90% of income being 
cash. 
 
For the Ghanaian landscape, future PPP is unlikely to decrease as shown in 
Figure 1. Rather these outcomes indicate the landscape’s future economy will 
depend less on natural resources while off-farm employment and 
urbanization will increase. In the landscape in Kalimantan people are already 
almost out of poverty. Their income situation improved greatly over the past 
decade when decentralization resulted in an enormous cash inflow into the 
sparsely populated district from mining and logging royalties resulting in a 
‘boom’ effect on the previously small capital town (Moeliono et al. 2008). 
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Figure 1. Changes in (primary) forest cover and purchasing power parity 
(PPP) under different scenarios (described in Table 2) 
 
Most marked changes are expected in Papua moving out of poverty to 
become the wealthiest landscape in 20 years under business as usual with a 
99% cash economy. However, these average numbers hide vast income 
disparities which are likely to occur under this industrial plantation scenario, 
and loss of many environmental benefits. The larger suitability for plantations 
in Kaimana-Papua compared to Malinau-Kalimantan explains why economic 
development is projected to be vaster under business as usual. 
 
Figure 1 demonstrates that trade-offs occur between conservation and 
development; improved conservation outcomes under the alternative 
scenarios come at a cost for local incomes which are not as high as under 
business as usual (with the exception of the Central African landscapes). In 
none of the simulations, PES were able to overcome these trade-offs in cash 
terms. However, the development outcomes in Figure 1 hide the large range 
of negative consequences of large scale plantation investments, like great 
income disparity, pollution and perhaps even conflict (Chapter 4 and 5). 
Preoccupation for these negative impacts, plus the fear of a ‘boom and bust’ 
scenario, where the natural capital is consumed providing a one-time, 
unsustained money inflow, might result in local people being more attracted 
to the alternative scenario. It is in such a situation, where subsistence 
income and (long-term) benefits from environmental services for local people 
makes the scenario more attractive, that PES could tip the balance and 
incentivize to opt for a scenario they already like.  
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Considering (primary) forest cover as indicator for conservation gives similar 
outcomes under the business as usual and alternative scenarios for 
Cameroon and CAR, where conservation outcomes are better approximated 
with wildlife indicators (Figure 2).  
 
 
Figure 2. Changes in wildlife populations and purchasing power parity (PPP) 
under different scenario 
 
Figure 1 and 2 show that an improved income situation either coincides with 
best conservation outcomes (see Cameroon and CAR), or coincides with 
worst conservation outcomes (see Papua and Kalimantan). However, Figure 
2 suggests that a deteriorating income situation or a maintained situation of 
extreme poverty comes with negative long-term impacts on conservation 
outcomes. Business as usual in Indonesia means great economic 
development going at the cost of natural resources. Business as usual in 
Central Africa means some wildlife species will go nearly extinct, while people 
remain (extremely) poor. Though the Central African scenarios may seem the 
most pessimistic, at the same time they hold the largest potential for 
synergies between conservation and development through efforts like 
improved governance or timber certification. However, especially the 
governance issue is difficult to resolve and even these scenarios giving best 
outcomes result in great wildlife losses. A potentially more notable difference 
in development and conservation outcomes would be obtained if the national 
 176 
economy was boosted. Chapter 8 discusses such a development and finds 
that if this would result in a 2% outmigration rate, with people moving to 
cities for salaried jobs, under the FSC scenario the elephant population could 
be maintained at its current size.  
 
The wildlife PES scheme for the Central African landscapes results in a per 
capita payment which changes little for people’s income situation, yet poor 
people might be incentivized with a small amount of extra cash, especially 
since these scenarios already come with (cash) benefits for local people. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Causes of deforestation 
 
With the exception of Ghana, small scale agriculture is not the main driver of 
deforestation and forest degradation in the studied landscapes. Rather this is 
driven by commercial plantation and logging companies. These findings 
concur with those of Ickowitz (2006).  
 
Income and deforestation 
 
Investments in the landscape coinciding with forest deterioration and/or loss 
influence local people’s income either positively through inflow of cash in 
royalties and salaried jobs, negatively through increased pollution and 
depletion of wildlife and forest products, or, as in most cases, in ambiguous 
ways. These findings from our landscape studies give similar results as 
studies on this relation at the national scale. Several studies (Kaimowitz & 
Angelsen 1998; Thomas et al 2000; Koop & Tole 1999) have tested the 
hypothesis of a Kuznets curve relation between poverty alleviation and 
deforestation. Though this correlation is found to be positive in some cases 
(Kaimowitz & Angelsen 1998, Thomas et al. 2000), in all cases it is 
statistically insignificant providing weak empirical evidence for their causal 
relationship at the national level. There seems to be no one-size-fits-all 
explanation for conservation and development interactions and responses 
can be ambiguous. Wunder (2001) explains this ambiguity stating poverty is 
extremely complex and multidimensional and in many cases its links with 
deforestation are indirect. 
 
Bushmeat consumption and income 
 
The relation between bushmeat consumption and wealth doesn’t seem to be 
explained by the Kuznets-curve either. Studies among poor populations 
found in some cases that an increase in wealth was negatively related with 
bushmeat consumption (Albrechtsen et al. 2006), in others it was positively 
related (Wilkie et al. 2005), and Apaza et al. (2002) found earnings bore no 
association with wildlife consumption. Godoy et al. (2006) explain these 
different responses by categorizing bushmeat in the different locations of 
these studies as an inferior, normal or luxury good. In the Central African 
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landscapes bushmeat is preferred over other meat sources (Wilkie & 
Carpenter 1999) so one would expect an increase in income to result in 
increased bushmeat consumption, resulting in worst conservation of wildlife 
populations. However, we found the contrary in our explored scenarios; in 
the Cameroonian and CAR landscape, the scenarios resulting in highest 
income give at the same time best conservation outcomes for wildlife 
populations. This is explained by the assumption in the alternative scenarios 
that local people will protect their natural resources if these provide them 
with extra income. Local people receive benefits related to their surrounding 
natural resources through improved governance of wildlife and timber 
royalties (Cameroon) or through the implementation of FSC certification 
standards (CAR). A status quo of the current situation, i.e. people remaining 
poor, is unlikely to maintain viable wildlife populations since actual hunting 
levels are thought to be unsustainable (Noss 1998). 
 
National economic development and conservation 
 
In Cameroon, unless an enormous long-term flow of funds for conservation 
could be assured, conservation outcomes would not be sustainable if the 
governance situation in the region were not improved (Chapter 6). 
Macroeconomic development of the national economy strongly influences 
conservation and rural development. In some cases, external factors even 
determine conservation outcomes, rendering local management institutions 
obsolete (Fisher et al. 2010). Increased opportunities outside the forest and 
urbanization trends can reduce the pressure on forest resources. For 
example, all scenarios for the CAR landscape result in substantial wildlife 
losses (Chapter 8), which is explained by the lack of alternative income 
opportunities for the local population other than bushmeat hunting. The 
stagnant CAR economy, together with a turbulent socio-political situation in 
the rest of the country, leads to a lack of income opportunities outside the 
forest. The result is low migration out of forest landscapes – currently only 
38% of the CAR population is urban while in neighbouring country Cameroon 
it is 55% (UN 2006). In addition, the forest acts as a social safety net, thus 
bringing people into forested landscapes. According to Brandon (2001) 
‘getting the politics right’ is the swiftest and most direct way to influence the 
links between poverty, land use and biodiversity loss. Culas (2007) and 
Heath and Binswanger (1996) confirm the important role of the overall policy 
framework. They mention environmental policies and institutions empowering 
local people exercise a much more critical impact on the sustainability of 
natural resource use than measures such as limiting economic development 
(because it is presumed to be destructive) or reducing population pressure in 
forested landscapes.  
 
Payments for Environmental Services 
 
Tropical forest is often regarded as being invaluable for humanity or, when 
assessed in monetary terms, is highly valued, e.g. Costanza et al. (1997). 
Despite this high valuation, our findings concur with those of Karsenty 
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(2007) in that often conservation payments don’t come close to real 
opportunity costs. PES are unlikely to reverse economical drivers of 
deforestation or degradation since these are very hard to out-compete with 
PES payments, as is shown by the scenario outcomes for the Ghanaian 
landscape. Furthermore, in a situation with high opportunity costs, as 
Karsenty (2007) argues, ‘low-cost conservation’ is a potential threat to the 
development wishes of poor people. In its turn, according to our findings, a 
population remaining in a situation of poverty provides an unsustainable 
pressure on natural resources, so on the long term such ‘low-cost 
conservation’ could be counter-effective. Frost et al. (2007) claim wide 
ranging investments and large infusions of capital are needed to significantly 
reduce poverty, and that ‘without significant external changes, not much can 
be done to improve on what local people are already doing for themselves’. 
Some PES ‘hand-outs’ for conservation will thus not alleviate poverty, and a 
status quo in development will not reduce pressure on natural resources. 
 
Our results suggest PES will only be effective if they reinforce intrinsic 
motivations. This way they can enhance the attractiveness of an already 
much appreciated scenario by local people, where local people themselves 
value the ecological services and prefer to preserve these. For example, in 
Malinau district, Kalimantan, local people would settle with much less than 
the opportunity costs for preserving their community forest (Wunder et al. 
2008).  
 
Decision making processes 
 
Unfortunately, decisions are often not made on the basis of best outcomes 
for local people, even when decision-making power has been decentralised. A 
very obvious example occurs in the Cameroonian landscape where local 
leaders show little concern towards improving the situation for the poorest 
people in their administrative unit. The previous mayor in the landscape 
siphoned off most of the timber royalties destined to finance development 
projects. Likewise, the decision whether to attract oil palm investments or 
apply a REDD strategy in the Indonesian landscapes will probably be 
determined by the best deal for the district government (and its officials) 
rather than concerns about outcomes for local people. In such a situation 
there is a risk that the earlier mentioned ‘low-cost conservation’ provides 
local leaders with cash making them opt for a conservation scenario which 
could deprive local people from ameliorating their income situation. On the 
other side, it could also make local leaders opt for a conservation scenario 
which ‘protects’ local people from negative affects associated with the BAU 
scenario like large scale pollution and forest loss from oil palm plantations. 
Conservationists should therefore assess different scenarios with their trade-
offs to assure they don’t provoke an unethical situation where the poor are 
disadvantaged. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
In an attempt to understand the relation between conservation and 
development, we found that an increase in the well-being of local people in 
the landscape can either go at the cost of natural resources or be coherent 
with conservation. However, in all cases, a population remaining in poverty, 
impacts conservation outcomes negatively in the long term. This suggests 
lifting people out of poverty ultimately changes unsustainable pressure on 
natural resources in the long term though it depends on the development 
pathway chosen whether this pressure is reduced or increased. The choice of 
pathway can be influenced by PES schemes. Yet, the potential of PES is 
limited and it is unlikely to lift people out of poverty. It can only incentivize 
less environmentally destructive options if these come along with substantial 
non monetary benefits for local people. 
 
The business as usual scenarios for the five landscapes all give worst 
outcomes for conservation and in some cases for development as well. This 
urges for a change in current conservation approaches and for each 
landscape, possible conservation and development pathways should be 
explored. In landscapes like the Ghanaian, where no conservation alternative 
is likely to compete with economic drivers, we should accept that a REDD 
scenario doesn’t stand a chance and invest for example in enrichment of the 
plantation with timber species. In landscapes like the Indonesian one, where 
forests are being lost at a fast rate and large scale, yet locally there exists 
interest for alternative options, REDD negotiations should be given an 
impulse to reach a fast implementation of such strategies. As the CAR 
landscape shows us, when defining a conservation and development 
strategy, we have to take into consideration the major impacts of external 
factors like investments in the local economy and development of the 
national economy. This means in some cases, conservation and development 
organizations working on the local scale can have more impact by taking up a 
negotiating role, influencing policy formulation and local government 
decisions. Therefore, in landscapes like the Central African examples, 
conservationists might find themselves charged with tasks like advocating 
better governance and supporting the government in the negotiation process 
so they will attract logging companies with a desire to get certified. These 
tasks might seem far removed from wildlife conservation but in reality they 
hold a major impact on conservation. 
 
Culas (2007) suggests to effectively reduce pressure on natural forest, 
environmental policies and institutions should be improved rather than 
limiting economic or population growth. Our findings concur with this, since 
limiting economic growth comes with unsustainable pressures on natural 
resources. We suggest the exploration of conservation and development 
scenarios to test whether an investment in a conservation strategy means 
throwing away money in a lost cause, or whether such an investment can 
guide the conservation-development pathway in a desired direction. 
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